exists by which they enjoy, in return for a small yearly tribute, the protection of various Berber chieftains, by whom the robbery or murder of a Jewish protégé is considered a personal affair, and one that must be avenged by blood. And so it is that in this, perhaps, the wildest district of Morocco, one meets Jewish women travelling one or two together without fear, when in those portions of Morocco over which the Moorish Sultan holds some authority no woman, Arab or Jew, can venture alone, or even several together, without the protection of men.

There are many minor divisions of the Berber race in Morocco, one and all of which possess characteristics differing in some degree from those of their neighbors; but of these space does not allow of mention here.

Yet when nowadays so many American and English travellers visit Tangier, with

its picturesque old crumbling "kasbah," and its narrow white streets-the one little spot near Europe where one still lives in the Old Testament-it would be neglect were the reader not told that he will find there representatives of the Berber race in the Riffi tribesmen, who have left their mountain homes to seek a livelihood in the town. They are easily recognizable, from their short brown cloaks and the long lock of hair left unshaven on the back of their heads. The principal interest which centres in them is perhaps this: that within the last few years they have been guilty of acts of piracy on the open seas. They are the last of the Barbary Corsairs, and one cannot help feeling a hope that they will continue the anomalous calling yet awhile, and so help to maintain the assertion that the three hours crossing from Europe to Africa is a myth, and that, in reality, one travels back a thousand years.

THE

VIII*

THE BATTLE OF LAKE ERIE AND PERRY'S VICTORY-CHAUNCEY'S THIRD BATTLE

WITH YEO.

HILE the movements related in the last article were in progress, the contest for Lake Erie was brought to a final decision. The successful transfer of the vessels from Black Rock to Erie, shortly after the abandonment of the Niagara frontier by the British, has been mentioned. From that time, June 18th, Perry remained upon Lake Erie, superintending all administrative work; but in particular pressing to completion the equipment of the two brigs, ordered by Chauncey the previous winter. To the one of these, on which Perry intended to embark his own fortunes, was given the name of Lawrence, in honor of the captain of the Chesapeake, whose death, heroic in defeat, occurred at this period. The other was called the Niagara. They were sister vessels, of five hundred tons, constructed for war, and brig-rigged; that is, with two masts, and carrying square sails on both. Their armaments also were alike: eighteen 32-pounder carronades, and two long 12-pounder guns. They were thus about the equivalent in fighting force of the ocean sloops-of-war, Wasp and Hornet, which, however, were ship-riggedthree masts with square sails. The remainder of the squadron were what we now call a scratch lot. Three were schoonerrigged gunboats, built for the navy at Erie; the remainder were the vessels brought from Black Rock. Of these one was the brig Caledonia, formerly British, captured by Elliott the previous autumn; the others were purchased lake craft. When finally *A map of the Lake region illustrative of this article is

to be found in the March number of SCRIBNER'S MAGAZINE on page 346.

taking the lake, in the beginning of August, the squadron consisted of the two brigs, the Black Rock division-Caledonia, Somers, Tigress, Ohio, and Trippe-and three schooners-Ariel, Scorpion, and Porcupine, apparently those built at Erie; ten sail, all of which, except the Ohio, were in the final decisive battle.

On July 23d the vessels were rigged, armed, and ready for service, but there were not men enough to man them. How little exacting Perry was in this matter, and how eager to enter upon active operations, is shown by a letter from his superior, Chauncey, to the Secretary of the Navy, dated July 8th. "I am at a loss," he says, "to account for the change in Captain Perry's sentiments with respect to the number of men required for the little fleet at Presqu' Isle; for when I parted with him, on the last of May, we coincided in opinion perfectly as to the number required for each vessel, which was 180 for each of the new brigs, 60 for the Caledonia, and 40 for each of the other vessels; making in all, 740 officers and men. But if Captain Perry can beat the enemy with half that number, no one will feel more happy than myself." Chauncey having supreme control over both lakes, all reënforcements from the seaboard were sent to him; and as he had his own particular enemy on Ontario to confront, it was evident and natural that the junior, Perry, would be least well served. Hence, after successive disappointments, being, besides, of much more venturous temper than his superior, it is not surprising that he soon was willing to undertake his task with fewer men than his unbiassed judgment would call necessary.

The clash of interests between the two squadrons, having a common superior but separate responsibilities, is seen by a comparison of dates, which shows operations nearly simultaneous. On July 23d the Erie squadron was reported "all ready to

meet the enemy the moment they are officered and manned"; on July 20th the General Pike was ready, and on the 21st the Ontario squadron sailed from Sackett's Harbor. On the 5th of August Perry had his vessels across the bar at Erie, and on the 6th stood out into the lake. On the 7th Chauncey and Yeo met for their first encounter. On the 8th the two Ontario schooners, Hamilton and Scourge, were lost with nearly all on board; and on the 10th the Julia and Growler were captured. After this, it may be imagined that Chauncey with difficulty parted with any men; and it was in the midst of his second collision with Yeo that the Battle of Lake Erie occurred. In it, of the 180 men deemed necessary by Chauncey, Perry's brig had 142, of whom 30 were sick; while the squadron, with nearly all its vessels present, instead of the estimated 740, had but 490. Of this total, nearly one hundred were received from the army on August 31st, only nine days before the action. For the most part these were strangers to shipboard. Barring them, Perry's fighting force was barely more than half that reckoned necessary by Chauncey.

After the Frenchtown disaster of January 22, 1813, the army of the Northwest under General Harrison had remained strictly on the defensive throughout the spring and summer. The tenure of its position on the Maumee River depended upon Fort Meigs, built during the winter, just above the rapids, some twenty miles from the lake. Thirty miles east of Meigs was Fort Stephenson, on the Sandusky River, protecting the approaches to Sandusky Bay, near which were Harrison's headquarters at the time the squadron was ready to move. Fort Stephenson by its situation contributed also to secure the communications of the Maumee line with central Ohio, and was an obstacle to an enemy's approach by land to Erie, a hundred and fifty miles further to the east. It was not, however, a work permanent in character, like Meigs; and neither post could be considered secure, being inadequately garrisoned. Fortunately, the general tenor of the instructions received by Procter from Prevost conspired with his own natural character to indispose him to energetic operations. His force of regulars was small, and he had not the faculty

which occasional white men have shown, to rouse the Indians, of whom he had an abundance at call, to vigorous and sustained activity. Desultory guerilla warfare by means of them, which was prescribed to him in a letter from Prevost of March 1st, became in his hands inoperative. Nevertheless, the threat of savage warfare, from the number known to be under his command, and the control of the water enabling him to land where he would, hung over the frontier like a pall, until finally dissipated by Perry's victory.

The danger to British control of the water, and thereby to the maintenance of their position in the northwest, in case the American fleet now building should succeed in getting upon the lake, was perfectly apparent, and made Erie a third and principal point of interest. At the time of Perry's first arrival, March 27th, the place was entirely defenceless, and without any organization for defence, although the keels of the two brigs were laid, and the three gunboats well advanced in construction. By a visit to Pittsburg he obtained from an army-ordnance officer four small guns, with some muskets; and upon his application the local commander of Pennsylvania militia stationed at Erie five hundred men, who remained till the vessels crossed the bar. Under this slender protection went on the arduous work of building and equipping a squadron in what was substantially a wilderness, to which most of the mechanics and material had to be brought five hundred miles from the seaboard, under the difficulties of transport in those days. The rapid advance in the preparations aroused the disquietude of the British, but Procter had not the enterprising temper to throw all upon the hazard, for the sake of destroying an armament which, if completed, might destroy him; while on Ontario and the Niagara peninsula the British inferiority of force, with the movement of Chauncey and Dearborn, resulting in the capture of York on April 27th, effectually prevented intervention in the affairs of Lake Erie. At this time Procter made his first effort of the season, directed against Fort Meigs, which he held besieged for over a week-from May 1st to May 9th. Although unable to capture the position, he inflicted a very severe loss upon an American relief force, chiefly through its own

Commodore Perry receiving the surrender of the British at the battle of Lake Erie.