Without entering into the merits of the dispute between Messrs Mathews and Lestock, what might have been the most proper time for giving the signal for bearing down to close engagement, we have no doubt that the following observations will now be found just:

139. That, if Mr Mathews and his seconds had been properly supported, the greatest part of the Spanish rear might have been cut off:* Therefore, that the attack made by him upon the rear of the enemy, as it was so far separated from the centre and van, was both bold and well designed at the time.

140. That, as Mr Rowley's position with the van did overawe the van of the enemy, it was a proper one.

141. That it is evident that the French, on this occasion, as well as on all the others that have followed since that time, had the safety and preservation of their ships only as the principal thing in

view.

142. Again, from this battle, we may be able to form some judgment of the effect of cannon-shot, with respect to distance.

Note by Lord Rodney. This is too true. Few ships followed the example of their truly brave Admiral and his seconds.

The Royal Philip, the Spanish Admiral,* in his combat with the British Admiral and his seconds, had all his rigging destroyed, not a top-mast left standing on end, his main-yard upon the deck, and two or three port-holes beat into one. He had 238 men killed, and 262 wounded.

The Constant, the Spanish Admiral's second ahead, during the short time she staid, had 25 men killed, and 43 wounded.

On the other hand, the Marlborough, opposed to the Spanish Admiral and his seconds, had her main and mizen-masts beat overboard, and, though otherwise a wreck, had her ensign nailed to the stump of the mizen-mast which remained. She had 43 men killed, and 128 wounded; amongst the first was Captain Cornwall, her brave commander, and Captain Godfrey of the marines.

143. Great and dreadful as these effects were, yet the distance between the combatants must have been very considerable, that could have admitted of a fire-ship being put in motion, set on fire, time

for her men to take to their boats, to quit her, and to get off, and, lastly, to blow up without injury to so many ships surrounding her. After so many circumstances being allowed to take place, can the distance be thought to be less than 400 or 500 yards at least ?*

144. Again, the Poder of 64 guns, another Spanish ship, after having been exposed a long time to a cannonade from five ships in the British line, without having suffered material damage (vid. No, 14.); yet the first broadside from the Berwick (which had broke the foresaid line, and had approached within half musket-shot†) killed twenty-seven of her men, dismounted seven of her lower-deck guns; and, when she struck to the Berwick, had not a mast standing.

145. A General at the head of his troops, and leading them on to action, has long been considered as a sufficient signal; and Mr Mathews' ship, when going down to battle, as Admiral, in the

Note by Lord Rodney.—I believe none of the ships were in what I call close action, and in which Britain will always succeed.

+ The distance between these two ships at this time may be supposed to be about 400 or 500 yards, not less than that between the two opponent flag-ships. The boats from several ships of the British fleet getting on board the Poder when she struck, at one and the same time, is in some de gree a confirmation of this opinion.

centre, should have been the example for his whole fleet, whether the signal was given at ten or twelve o'clock. The brave commanders of the Norfolk and Marlborough, his seconds, were of this mind; as has also been Sir George Rodney upon a later occasion. Therefore, every ship which kept her wind, and did not follow the Admiral, Mr Mathews, down to fight the enemy, ought only to be considered as breakers of the line. And hence that Sentence of the Court-Martial which broke Mr Mathews, ought virtually to be considered as the source of all the many naval miscarriages since.

SECTION IV.

146. ADMIRAL PARKER'S ACCOUNT OF THE ENGAGEMENT WITH THE DUTCH ON THE DOGGER BANK, 5TH AUGUST 1781.*

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Yesterday morning we fell in with the Dutch squadron, with a large convoy, on the Dogger "Bank. I was happy to find I had the wind of

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them, as the great number of their large frigates might otherwise have endangered my convoy, Having separated the men of war from the mer"chant ships, and made a signal to the last to keep their wind, I bore away, with a general

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signal to chase. The enemy formed their line, "consisting of eight two-decked ships, on the "starboard tack. Ours, including the Dolphin of

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forty-four guns, consisted of seven. Not a gun "was fired on either side until within the distance "of half musket-shot. The Fortitude being then "abreast of the Dutch Admiral, the action began, "and continued with an unceasing fire for three "hours and forty minutes. By this time our ships "were unmanageable. I made an effort to form "the line, in order to renew the action; but found "it impracticable. The Bienfaisant had lost her "main top-mast, and the Buffalo her fore-yard; "the rest of the ships were not less shattered in "their masts, rigging, and sails; the enemy appeared to be in as bad a condition. Both squadrons lay-to a considerable time near each other, "when the Dutch, with their convoy, bore away "for the Texel. We were not in a condition to "follow them."

147. This affair, though in itself greatly different from the many we have had with another encmy, yet, with respect to the subject before us, viz. the mode of attack, is perfectly similar. The gal