27. Then B, by putting before the wind, if he shall arrive at the point A, in the same time that F, the fleet to leeward, has arrived at the point G, his motion will have been at the rate of 5 miles per hour, as must be evident from the scale of miles placed at the top of the figure; and his course, as described by the lines B A and C D, will be slanting or diagonal, forming an angle of 43 degrees with B C, his line a-head, and nearly 4 points large from the wind.

28. Again, if F, (Plate V. Fig. 2.), by carrying more sail, shall move at the rate of six miles per hour, that is, from F to G; then B, having his course made thereby the more slanting, will have just so much the greater difficulty of keeping his ships in line a-breast while coming down to the attack. For the leading ship meeting with no obstruction in her course, will push on, whereas every accident of obstruction accumulating, as it happens to each ship progressively, the rear, being affected in the greatest degree, will, for that reason, be left the farther a-stern. But, from the very form of this slanting course, every ship a-stern will be apt to get into the wake of the ship a-head. Therefore, the whole fleet of B, van and rear, will not arrive in the same time at the line A D, so as to be in a perfect line a-breast, and parallel with the fleet to leeward, but will have assumed the lask

ing form, as represented at the points M, N, and O, in the different parts of the course.

29. And again (in Plate V. Fig. 3.), if the fleet to leeward shall keep his wind, so as to lie up one point, as per line of course F G, making an angle of 11 degrees with his former line of course KFK: Then the rears of the two fleets will thereby be removed at a much greater distance, and the van A, of consequence, must be sooner up with the enemy's van, and evidently so much the farther from support, while F, by bringing up his ships in succession, will have it in his power to disable the van A, (No. 21.) and will afterwards bear away as at H, unhurt, and at pleasure; while B, at this time, by the supposition, being crippled, or having his rear, D, obstructed, and at a distance, will be unable to prevent him, And, in all the three cases, it is evident that the fleet B, so soon as he shall approach within reach of gun-shot, must be exposed to the fire of F's whole line, for he will be a-breast of B continually in every part of his course.

30. But the difficulty of bringing the rear of the windward fleet to action will still be more increased, if the sternmost ships of the fleet to leeward, in place of keeping their wind, shall bear away occasionally, as at M L, (Fig. 3.)

31. All which being admitted, the difficulty of bringing opponent fleets to close engagement may

be accounted for, without being obliged to have recourse to that supposed inferiority, in point of sailing, imputed to our ships, compared to those of the French, our enemy.

32. Hence it appears, that a fleet, B, to windward, by extending his line of battle, with a design to stop and attack a whole line of enemy's ships to leeward, must do it at a great disadvantage, and without hope of success: For the receiving fleet, F, to leeward, unquestionably will have the four following advantages over him, which will be more particularly proved when we come to examine the real practice.

33. First, The superiority of a fire, above twenty to one, over the fleet B, while coming down to attack.

34. Secondly, That, when the ships of B are brought to at their station, if it blows hard, the shot from F, by the lying along of the ships, will be thrown up into the air, and will have an effect at a much greater distance; whereas, on the other hand, the shot from B, from the lying along of the ships also, will be thrown into the water, and the effect lost.

35. Thirdly, That F will have the power of directing, and applying at pleasure, the fire of his whole line against the van of B, who is now unable to prevent it, his ships being disabled, separated, and, therefore, unsupported.