tos' for 'post quingentos,' in v. 2, and a story about its having been found in the tomb of Regiomontanus, at Liska, in Hungary. Since the French revolution— which recalled attention to the supposed prophecy—the true origin of the verses, and the nature of the fraud, have been pointed out.-Biog. Univ. in Brusch. It is singular that, by some similar adaptation, a Jacobite should not have applied it to the English revolution of 1688. Compare the remarks of Mr. Grote, Hist. of Gr. vol. vi. p. 214, upon the flexibility of the Greek prophecies, and the manner in which they were moulded to suit any striking occurrence.

We must not, however, suppose that all astrological diviners were conscious impostors, and intentionally fabricated their predictions in such a manner as to admit of no certain interpretation. Many, or perhaps most, of them doubtless believed, to a certain extent, in the reality of the art which they practised. Thus Andrew Goldmayer, who was offered the professorship of mathematics at Strasburg in the year 1635, composed a chronicle of that city upon astrological principles. He complained that ordinary historians paid no attention to the state of the stars, in connection with the events which they narrated; whereas these events could not be understood without their causes, and their causes could only be explained by astrology. He began, therefore, to compose, not only a history of Strasburg, but also a universal history, according to this method, and believed that he would thus throw great light both upon astrology and history. For this purpose, he extracted the chief events out of chronicles; he calculated the position of the stars backwards, and believed himself, by this process, to have discovered the true cause of every important event.—ADELUNG, ut sup. vol. iv. p. 215. The process here described is a scientific process, and was an attempt to found judicial astrology upon inductive reasoning. It therefore proves the good faith of the astrologer. Compare also Kepler's astrological doctrine in Bethune's Life of Kepler, c. vii.; and the opinions of Bodinus de Rep. IV. c. 2.

CHAPTER VI.

ON THE NUMBER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUBJECT, AS COMPARED WITH THE NUMBER OF THE REST OF THE COMMUNITY.

§ 1. IT has been shown, in the preceding pages, that the men of special information and experience, combined with the proper moral and intellectual qualifications, are the competent judges on each branch of knowledge, and therefore the legitimate guides of opinion. Now if we take each subject, whether of speculation or practice, in succession, these persons must always be a small section of the community; in fact, a mere handful, as compared with the entire population. In sciences and arts, the persons versed in those particular departments of knowledge,-in history, historians; in general literature, literary men and poets; in practical questions of law, medicine, architecture, navigation, &c., the men of the respective professions—who form respectively the standard and canon of authority, are but few in number, if set against the body of their fellow-countrymen. Moreover, even with respect to each of these classes, it is principally the ablest, the most learned, the most experienced, the most skilful, whose opinion constitutes authority. So long as we admit the maxim, Unicuique in suâ arte credendum,' the class or body of persons competent to judge in each matter must be numerically insignificant in comparison with the whole people. If we divide the nation into two parts-one consisting of a profession, or body of persons specially conversant with a particular subject, the other consisting of the rest of the population, the numbers of the latter portion will immensely preponderate:

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The few, by nature formed, with learning fraught,

Born to instruct, as others to be taught.

§ 2. In each subject, therefore, the opinion of the great bulk of the people is, taken as a standard of truth and rectitude, un

worthy of consideration, and destitute of weight and authority. It is the opinion of uninformed and inexperienced persons, whose incapacity to judge is not cured by the multiplication of their numbers. The mere aggregation of incompetent judges will not produce a right judgment, more than the aggregation of persons who have no knowledge of a matter of fact will supply credible testimony to its existence.1

This is equally the case, whether the multitude agree in opinion with the few competent judges, or disagree with them.

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If they agree, the opinion of the unscientific or unprofessional many, whether right or wrong, can scarcely fail to be derived, more or less remotely, from that of a few persons either being, or considered to be, competent judges. Now, whether the opinion be sound or unsound, it is in general derived without any adequate process of examination or verification, and is held merely upon trust; so that the concurrence of the multitude adds little or no weight to the judgment of the former. Thus, at present the Newtonian system of the world is accepted by the people at large, in all civilised countries, who therefore believe that the world moves round the sun. But they entertain this opinion merely on the authority of the agreement of scientific astronomers, and with no better knowledge of the grounds of their belief than their ancestors, who recognised the Ptolemaic system, and believed that the sun moves round the earth. On the other hand, the agreement between men of science and the multitude may exist in cases where the opinion is erroneous; and it may arise from the absence of original research and of an enlightened scepticism, from the passive retention of ancient errors and the blind adherence to traditionary prejudices. Of this state of things, the history of the physical sciences in antiquity and the middle ages affords numerous examples, which it would be useless to particularise, and many examples might be cited from the moral sciences at the present time.

If they disagree, the preference is justly due to the opinion of the few competent judges, and the opinion of the uninformed and inexperienced multitude is inferior in authority to that of the

'An quicquam stultius quam quos singulos (sicut operarios, barbarosque,) contemnas, eos esse aliquid putare universos ?'-CICERO, Tusc. Quæst. V. 36.

2. Les hommes, en général, approuvent ou condamnent au hasard, et la vérité même est, par la plupart d'entre eux, reçue comme l'erreur, sans examen et par préjugé.'— HELVETIUS de l'Homme, sect. XI. ch. 8.

select body. In cases where there is an agreement of opinion between the competent few and the incompetent many, the concurrence adds little or no weight to the opinion of the former. In cases where there is a conflict of opinion between the same two classes of persons, the preference must be given to the latter, as a measure of truth, and a canon for the judgments of others.

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So numerous are the cases in which the opinion of the multitude conflicts with that of the few competent judges, that a majority of voices has, in questions not involving a legal decision, been considered as a mark of error. Argumentum pessimi turba,' says the Latin proverbial verse, cited by Seneca. It has been said, not only that a majority of voices is no conclusive proof of rectitude, and that moral questions cannot be decided, like questions in a legislative assembly, by a division of the ayes and noesbut that a person ought to be ashamed of finding his opinion or conduct approved by the multitude, and that the concurrence of the many raises a presumption of being in the wrong.2 Pessimum

Est turba semper argumentum pessimi.'

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PUBLIUS SYRUS, V. 190.

That is to say, 'the concurrence of the crowd is a proof of the worst side.'

Compare Seneca, De Vit. Beat., c. 1, 2. 'Sanabimur, si modo separemur a cœtu: nunc vero stat contra rationem, defensor mali sui, populus. Itaque id evenit, quod in comitiis, in quibus eos factos prætores iidem qui fecere mirantur, quum se mobilis favor circumegit. Eadem probamus, eadem reprehendimus: hic exitus est omnis judicii, in quo secundum plures datur. Quum de beata vita agitur, non est quod mihi illud discessionum more respondeas: "Hæc pars major esse videtur." Ideo enim pejor est. Non tam bene cum humanis rebus agitur, ut meliora pluribus placeant: argumentum pessimi turba est.'

There is likewise a verse of the old tragedian, Attius :

'Probis probatum potius quam multis fore.'

P. 201, ed. Bothe.

Cicero gives the following description of the manner in which opinions were formed in his time :—“ The seeds of virtues are (he says) planted by nature in our minds ; but as soon as we are born, we are surrounded with false opinions, so that we almost imbibe error with our nurse's milk. As our education proceeds, we contract further errors from our parents and teachers, and we learn the fables of the poets, which take root in our mind: "Cum vero accedit eodem quasi maximus quidam magister, populus, atque omnis undique ad vitia consentiens multitudo, tum plane inficimur opinionum pravitate, a naturaque desciscimus.'" Tusc. Quæst. III. 1, 2. Compare a similar passage in De Off. I. 32.

2 Plutarch relates a celebrated saying of Phocion, who, on receiving the applause of the people for a speech which he had made in the Athenian assembly, turned round to his friends, and expressed his fear that he had said something which he ought not to have said.--(Phocion, c. 8.)

Speaking of the Optimates, or aristocratic party in the Roman State, about the time of the Gracchi, Cicero says: 'Qui autem adversabantur ei generi [to the popular

omnium est augurium (says Lord Bacon) quod ex consensu capitur in rebus intellectualibus: exceptis divinis et politicis, in quibus suffragiorum jus est. Nihil enim multis placet, nisi imaginationem feriat, aut intellectum vulgarium notionum nodis astringat. Itaque optime traducitur illud Phocionis a moribus ad intellectualia; ut statim se examinare debeant homines, quid erraverint aut peccaverint, si multitudo consentiat et complaudat.'1 This inference, however, holds good only in cases where the majority put themselves under the guidance of bad leaders, and reject the advice. of the persons best qualified to form a sound judgment. It is only when the public array themselves against the opinion of the fittest counsellors, that they are more likely to be wrong than right.

§ 3. We have already had occasion to advert to the old adage• Unicuique in suâ arte credendum '-as expressive of the doctrine that the competent few, and not the incompetent many, constitute the standard of authority. There is another proverb, equally handed down to us from antiquity- Ne sutor ultra crepidam' "——— which forms, as it were, the complement of the other. As the former teaches us to place confidence in the qualified few, in subjects within their own province, so the latter warns us not to rely

party], graves et magni homines habebantur: sed valebant in senatu multum, apud bonos viros plurimum; multitudini jucundi non erant: suffragiis offendebatur sæpe eorum voluntas: plausum vero etiamsi quis eorum aliquando acceperat, ne quid peccasset, pertimescebat. Attamen, si qua res erat major, idem ille populus horum auctoritate maxime commovebatur.'-Pro Sextio, c. 49.

Plutarch, De Lib. Educ. c. 9, advises that youths should not be allowed to listen to popular speeches or discourses at the public festivals : τὸ γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν, τοῖς σοφοῖς ἐστιν ἀπαρέσκειν. He cites also some verses of Euripides, showing the opposition between wisdom in council, and fitness for popular oratory.

The opposition between philosophy, or science, and popular opinion is well-known and established. Thus, Cicero says: 'Est enim philosophia paucis contenta judicibus, multitudinem consulto ipsa fugiens, eique ipsi et suspecta et invisa.'—Tusc. Disp. II. 1. Hence the paradox, that it is better even to err with a great philosopher, than to be right with inferior minds. Errare mehercule malo cum Platone . . quam cum istis vera sentire.'-Ib. I. 17. A similar sentiment occurs in a letter of Hume to Adam Smith: A wise man's kingdom is his own breast; or, if he ever looks farther, it will only be to the judgment of a select few, who are free from prejudices, and capable of examining his work. Nothing, indeed, can be a stronger presumption of falsehood than the approbation of the multitude; and, Phocion, you know, always 'suspected himself of some blunder, when he was attended with the applauses of the populace.'BURTON'S Life and Correspondence of Hume, vol. ii. p. 57.

1 Nov. Org. lib. i. aph. 77. The exception for religious questions refers to the decisions of councils and synods of divines, by a majority of voices.

2 See the story of Apelles, in Plin. H. N. xxxv. 36, § 12. Compare the verse of Euripides, Fragm. Incert. 94. Dindorf. τέκτων γὰρ ἂν ἔπρασσες οὐ ξυλουργικά; and of Aristoph., Vesp. 1431, epdoi tis hy ekaσtos eideín téxvny, referred to by Cicero,

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