inanis populi multitudo, qui, velut æstuans dictabat impetus, fieri prorsus densis vocibus clamitabant. Nempe vesana est vulgi latrantis opinio, quum imperite judicium profert de rebus incognitis. Quid enim huic cum virtute, cum prudentiâ? Quid temperatum aut forte est? Vendant opifices, emantque merces sordidas. Fabri incudes feriant, et ceteri illiberalium cultores artium sua lucra provideant; non se gravibus optimisque viris, quoties de virtute agitur, stolidi inserant; quod non intelligunt, discutere nolint; nec velut putant, id bonum esse fateantur.'—(MURATORI, Diss. 52; tom. III. p. 128.) This passage contains a distinct statement of the doctrine that the government ought to be vested in the intelligent and virtuous few, and that the ignorant and turbulent many ought to be excluded. There is likewise mixed with it the ancient Greek prejudice against τέχναι βάναυσοι.

The same views occur in the treatise of Bodinus On Government: 'Et quidem mirum debet videri, si plebs imperita, id est, multorum capitum immanis quædam hydra, rectam ullam sententiam ferat. Certè quidem ab imperitâ multitudine consilium rerum gerendarum petere, aliud nihil est, quam a furioso sanitatem. . . . Quid autem absurdius, quam pro legibus habere levis et imperitæ multitudinis temeritatem, quæ ad mandandos honores cæco sæpius et inconsiderato impetu quam certo et explorato judicio fertur? Quid magis furiosum, quam extremis reipublicæ periculis ab insanâ plebe consilium petere ? nihil enim injussi magistratus obire possunt ; nec si possint, velint; et ut velint tamen [non] audent, perterriti furore plebis, quæ adversos casus ac sua peccata regerit in ipsos magistratus.'—BODINUS de Rep. VI. 4, pp. 1087, 1088. This treatise was published in 1576. See Bayle, Dict. in v. Note D.

NOTE B. (page 177.)

In choosing persons for all employments, they have more regard to good morals than to great abilities; for, since government is necessary to mankind, they believe that the common size of understanding is fitted to some station or other, and that Providence never intended to make the management of public affairs a mystery, to be comprehended only by a few persons of sublime genius, of which there seldom are three born in an age. But they suppose truth, justice, temperance, and the like, to be in every man's power, the practice of which virtues, assisted by experience and a good intention, would qualify any man for the service of his country, except where a course of study is required. But they thought the want of moral virtues was so far from being supplied by superior endowments of the mind, that employments could never be put into such dangerous hands as those of persons so qualified; and, at least, that the mistakes committed by ignorance, in a virtuous disposition, would never be of such fatal consequence to the public weal as the practices of a man whose inclinations led him to be corrupt, and who had great abilities to manage, to multiply, and defend his corruptions.'-Gulliver's Travels, Lilliput, p. 81.

The above remarks of Swift represent what may be considered, at present, as the popular and prevailing view of the subject. It seems to be generally thought, that good intentions in a ruler are the first consideration, and that, provided he desires to benefit the community, his capacity for judging of the best means for accomplishing his end is of secondary importance, Nevertheless, experience has

shown that the delusions of short-sighted benevolence have been productive of very mischievous consequences to nations.

Elsewhere, Swift expresses similar opinions as to the sufficiency of unaided common sense for conducting the affairs of civil government.

'He confined the knowledge of governing within very narrow bounds-to common sense and reason, to justice and lenity, to the speedy determination of civil and criminal causes, with some other obvious topics, which are not worth considering. And he gave it for his opinion, that whoever could make two ears of corn, or two blades of grass, to grow upon a spot of ground, where only one grew before, would deserve better of mankind, and do more essential service to his country, than the whole race of politicians put together.'-Ib., Brobdignag, p. 228.

According to this last doctrine, an improving farmer would confer a greater benefit on his country than the most enlightened and patriotic statesman. This is not Cicero's opinion: 'Neque enim est ulla res in quâ propius ad Deorum numen virtus accedat humana, quam civitates aut condere novas aut conservare jam conditas.'-De Rep. I. 7.

The following passage likewise refers to the prevalence of the opinion, that common sense is sufficient for the affairs of government :

'Un homme d'esprit n'est point jaloux d'un ouvrier qui a travaillé une bonne épée, ou d'un statuaire qui vient d'achever une belle figure. Il sait qu'il y a dans ces arts des règles et une méthode qu'on ne devine point; qu'il y a des outils à manier dont il ne connoît ni l'usage, ni le nom, ni la figure; et il lui suffit de penser qu'il n'a point fait l'apprentissage d'un certain métier, pour se consoler de n'y être point maître. Il peut au contraire être susceptible d'envie et même de jalousie contre un ministre et contre ceux qui gouvernent, comme si la raison et le bon sens, qui lui sont communs avec eux, étoient les seuls instruments qui servent à régir un état et à présider aux affaires publiques, et qu'ils dussent suppléer aux règles, aux préceptes, à l'expérience.'—LA BRUYÈRE, Caractères, c. 11.

NOTE C. (page 177.)

Aristotle, Pol. VI. 4, says that one of the best forms of government is when all the citizens have the right of judging, and calling the magistrates to account, and electing the magistrates; but there is a property qualification for the chief offices. The result of this is, that while the people exercise their due influence, the best men govern, but are subject to responsibility; and irresponsibility, he remarks, is too great a trial for the depravity of human nature: rò yàp éπavaKpéμασθαι, καὶ μὴ πᾶν ἐξεῖναι ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν δόξῃ, συμφέρον ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ ἐξουσία τοῦ πράττειν ὅτι ἂν ἐθέλῃ τὶς οὐ δύναται φυλάττειν τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φαῦλον. ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνειν ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὠφελιμώτατον ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις, ἄρχειν τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἀναμαρτήτους ὄντας, μηδὲν ἐλαττουμένου τοῦ πλήθους.

In another place, the same philosopher points out the fallaciousness of an argument, founded on the supposed analogy between government and arts. It had been alleged, as an argument in favour of an arbitrary king, as opposed to a government according to laws, that a physician ought not to be bound by written rules, but should be left to his own discretion. To which Aristotle answers, that physicians gain their pay for curing a sick man, and have no motive of favour to deprave their judgment; but that persons invested with political power do many

things from grounds of affection or dislike. Even physicians, he says, when sick, call in other physicians, and trainers for the games employ other trainers, as distrusting their own judgment about themselves.-(Pol. III. 11.)

NOTE D. (page 180.)

The principle of numerical equality in government, as the characteristic of democracy, is clearly opposed to the principle of special worth or fitness by Aristotle, in the following passage :—

τὸ δίκαιον τὸ δημοτικὸν τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἐστὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν, ἀλλὰ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν τούτου δ' ὄντος τοῦ δικαίου, τὸ πλῆθος ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κύριον, καὶ ὅτι ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοσι τοῦτ ̓ εἶναι καὶ τέλος, καὶ τοῦτ ̓ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον· φασὶ γὰρ δεῖν ἴσον ἔχειν Pol. VI. 1 ; and lower down he says, that τὸ δίκαιον τὸ δημοκρατικὸν is τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἅπαντας κατ' ἀριθμόν.

ἕκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν.

CHAPTER IX.

ON THE PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE CREATION
OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY.

§ 1. NEW opinions, founded on a legitimate process of observation and inference, are generally worked out in solitude by persons of studious and reflective habits; and they are, when once accredited and established among men of science, expounded, illustrated, and diffused, by popular writers. The two provinces of discovery and diffusion are usually divided; for the power of original thought, and the power of perspicuous elementary exposition, are often not combined in the same mind.

Respecting opinions so formed and so propagated, no general proposition can be laid down. Their character as to soundness will depend on the peculiarities of the several persons with whom they originate; and the reception which they meet with from the public will be determined by its capacity to form a judgment on the matter. For example: the existence of a man with such mighty powers of discovery and demonstration as Newton, and the recognition of his doctrines among his contemporaries, depend upon causes which do not admit of being generalised. The same remark applies to individual writers belonging to professions, or specially conversant with any subject, who treat the question with the authority derived from their own appropriate knowledge and fitness.

In this chapter, it is proposed to consider what are the chief permanent influences, in a modern civilised country, for the authentication of opinions; from what authoritative sources opinions are chiefly diffused; and what securities exist for rendering those guides of general opinion trustworthy. It may be observed, however, that in treating this question, it is difficult always to distinguish the diffusion of opinions by authority, from their diffusion by argument; for that which is argument to one man, is often authority to another. A reasoned proof of a certain position

is put forward in writing, or in oral discourse; one person may be convinced by the reasoning, while another, who has not followed, or perhaps even become aware of the argument, adopts the conclusion, because he has confidence in its promulgator. All opinions are diffused by a mixture of self-conviction and authority: B believes a general truth, because A has proved it; and C believes it likewise, because B is satisfied with the proof. Thus, in a battle, when one part of an army has yielded before an overwhelming attack, the other parts retreat-not because they are attacked, but because the remainder has been repulsed.

Independently of single writers (who cannot be brought under any general description,) the principal agents in the authorisation and diffusion of opinions may be classed under the four following heads:

I. The supreme civil government of a country, and the persons exercising public functions under it.

II. The heads of an established church, and of other churches or religious bodies.

III. Subordinate associations for political, scientific, literary, and other miscellaneous purposes, including universities and places of learning.

IV. The periodical press daily, weekly, monthly, and quarterly.

We will now attempt to ascertain how far each of the influences in question operates, and to what extent its operation is beneficial, or otherwise, for the purpose under consideration.

§ 2. I. Be ore we can examine the influence of a government in authorising and propagating opinions, we have first to consider the preliminary question-how far is it the duty of a government to diffuse and encourage truth, and to repress and discourage error? This question divides itself into two branches,-viz., the encouragement or discouragement of opinions on religion, and the encouragement or discouragement of opinions on secular subjects.

In one sense, the province of a government is unlimited. There is no subject within the circle of human affairs and interests which it does not comprehend. The State is called omnipotent-that is to say, it can exercise for any purpose, and to any extent, the powers which are at its command. But although its province is theoretically unlimited, and its powers theoretically unbounded, there are in practice limits, not only to its powers, but to the purposes to which these powers can be applied with propriety and