be good, "oportet discentem credere,” yet it must be coupled with this, "oportet edoctum judicare"-for disciples do owe unto masters only a temporary belief, and a suspension of their own judgment, until they be fully instructed-and not an absolute resignation, or perpetual captivity.'1 Whatever deference is justly due to great names and competent judges, they are not to be regarded as infallible-as the oracles of a scientific religionor as courts of philosophy without appeal. Those who come after the great discoverers of truth, and teachers of mankind, may, though endowed with inferior intellectual gifts, retread the same ground-they may verify what is correct, and reject what is erroneous or doubtful. They may remove subordinate defects, and complete parts which have been left imperfect, in systems which they could not have conceived. Although they could not have designed the plan, or laid out the foundations, they may assist in bringing the edifice to perfection.

The great and successful insurrection against the authority of a defective scientific system, was in the two centuries which succeeded the invention of printing-when the scholastic philosophy, founded chiefly upon the logical and metaphysical writings of Aristotle, and developed under the influence of the Church, was dethroned. This revolution, although it had been prepared by a long series of minor insurgents, as well as by the positive researches of Galileo and Descartes, was mainly consummated by Bacon; and he may be considered as the type of this great intellectual movement. According to the poetical tribute of Cowley, Bacon was the main author of this triumph of Reason over Authority.

Authority-which did a body boast,

Though 'twas but air condensed, and stalk'd about,

Like some old giant's more gigantic ghost,

To terrify the learned rout

1 Adv. of Learning, b. I. (vol. I. p. 45.) Compare Cicero, De Nat. Deor. I. 5: 'Quin etiam obest plerumque iis qui discere volunt auctoritas eorum qui se docere profitentur. Desinunt enim suum judicium adhibere: id habent ratum quod ab eo quem probant, judicatum vident.' See also Sir T. Browne's Vulgar Errors, b. I. c. 6 & 7.

'Oportet in eâ re maxime, in quâ vitæ ratio versatur, sibi quemque confidere, suoque judicio ac propriis sensibus niti ad investigandam et perpendendam veritatem, quam credentem alienis erroribus decipi, tanquam ipsum rationis expertem.'-LACTANT. Div. Inst. II. p. 146; ed. Spark.

2 See Whewell's Philosophy of Inductive Sciences, b. XII. c. 7. Compare a passage from the preface to the first vol. of the Transactions of the Academy of Sciences at

With the plain magic of true Reason's light,

He chased out of our sight;

Nor suffered living men to be misled

By the vain shadows of the dead:

To graves, from whence it rose, the conquered phantom fled.'

§ 3. When, however, we speak of the triumph of Reason over Authority, accomplished by the establishment of the Baconian inductive method in the place of the scholastic philosophy, and adopt the received language on this subject, we must be careful not to confound, under the name of submission to authority, two distinct intellectual defects.

A blind spirit of routine in philosophy, and a passive assent to existing dogmas, without verification, or a really independent scrutiny, is not identical with belief on the principle of authority. By Authority, we have in this Essay understood, in conformity with general usage, the influence which determines the belief without a comprehension of the proof.2 But the scientific student, who servilely follows a beaten track, does not necessarily accept opinions upon the mere credit of his master, and without understanding the evidence on which they rest. He may, on the contrary, have gone through all the reasonings propounded by his guide-may have perused and reperused all his writings-have commented select portions of them-interpreted the obscure, and illustrated the concise passages-and reproduced his doctrines in compends and epitomes. He may be a slavish follower, but a slave both voluntarily and upon conviction.

Paris, quoted by Dr. Whewell, ib., vol. II. p. 428; also Hallam, Lit. of Europe, vol. II. c. 3.

1

Cowley's Epistle to the Royal Society. Compare Dryden's verses, in his Epistle to Dr. Charleton

2 Thus, Cicero speaks of his belief being influenced, not merely by the arguments, but by the authority of great philosophers: Nec solum ratio ac disputatio impulit, ut ita crederem; sed nobilitas etiam summorum philosophorum et auctoritas.'-De Senect.

c. 21.

Now the revolution in philosophy, which is represented by the name of Bacon, must be considered mainly as a change of scientific method, and the consequent substitution of a set of sound. doctrines, of which the proof was understood, for a set of unsound doctrines, of which the proof was equally understood. The Arabian and scholastic philosophy, which had prevailed during the long stationary period after the extinction of Greek civilisation, was doubtless founded upon the writings of Aristotle; but the scientific writers of that period did not bow to the authority of Aristotle, without examining, understanding, and reproducing his reasons. They were, as Dr. Whewell has remarked,' distinguished by their commentatorial spirit-they translated the Aristotelian treatises, and illustrated them with elaborate expositions-they reduced the logical, physical, and metaphysical theories of their teacher into a connected system: but their assent was given to the argument, not to the conclusion without the proof. They repeated the Aristotelian philosophy as a system of deductive science, not as a series of axioms. In truth, the schoolmen adopted the physical tenets of Aristotle, as a modern astronomer adopts the Principia of Newton; they studied the system, understood the proofs, and assented to the conclusions.2 Men such as Thomas Aquinas cannot be charged with a tame and sluggish acquiescence in conclusions, without troubling themselves to examine their connection with the premises. The error of the schoolmen, in fact, consisted in the adoption of a defective scientific method-in the uninquiring acceptance of first principles, false, indistinct, and unverified—and in reasoning deductively from propositions, whose truth had not been established by proper preliminary processes. They received the Aristotelic treatises as the sum of a perfect philosophical system, not as the provisional researches of a progressive science. This error is not identical with a servile deference to authority. The schoolman who drew all his lessons from Aristotle the Maestro di color che sanno,' as he was called by Dante-might have believed nothing on the mere authority of the philosopher; unless those first principles, which he doubtless considered as intuitive truths, may be considered as derived from

1 See his account of physical science during the stationary period of the middle ages, in his Hist. of the Ind. Sci. b. IV.

2 L

Almost the whole career of the Greek schools of philosophy-of the schoolmen of Europe in the middle ages-of the Arabian and Indian philosophers, shows us that we may have extreme ingenuity and subtlety, invention and connection, demonstration and method; and yet that out of these germs no physical science may be developed.'WHEWELL, Hist. of Ind. Sci. vol. I. p. 8.

this source. He mastered the philosophical system in vogue, and understood its logical connection; but it was built upon an unsound basis-and into the sufficiency of this basis, owing to the faultiness of his methods of investigation, he omitted to inquire. A modern student, who has access to the results of a better method, may exhibit equal want of originality of thought, and may merely repeat the deductions of his predecessors without verification or improvement; but if the conclusions are correct, he would not be censured for an undue submission to authority. On the one hand, then, a man who never adopts a speculative opinion without understanding its grounds may, from sectarian prejudice or some other cause, be infected with the intellectual slavishness of the scholastic or Arabian period, and may receive syllogisms as if they were the responses of an oracle. But, on the other hand, a man who is strongly imbued with the progressive principle of science-who verifies all results by a rigid scrutiny within a certain circle of subjects, may, with respect to other subjects, cherish the principle of authority, convinced that he has not time for all things.

§ 4. Bacon is very explicit and earnest in refuting the fallacy, which confounded a respect for opinions handed down from antiquity, with the respect due to the opinions of the aged.' At a time when a superstitious veneration for traditionary doctrines in philosophy still prevailed, there was a confusion between the age of a man and the age of the world; and it was supposed that, as an old man is more experienced, and therefore more able to judge, than a young man, so a remote generation, as being more ancient, is wiser than the existing one. Bacon exposed this somewhat obvious fallacy by the pithy sentence: Antiquitas sæculi juventus mundi'-justly remarking, that each generation is older than its predecessor, on the same principle that an aged man is older than a youth; and that the latest generation ought to be the wisest, as being furnished with the most ample stock of experiments and observations. The mistake arose from not perceiving

6

1 See Adv. of Learning, vol. II. p. 46; Nov. Org. 1. I. aph. 83. The remark had been previously made by Giordano Bruno. See Whewell's Phil. of Ind. Sci. vol. II. p. 361. Compare Hallam, Lit. of Europe, vol. IV. ch. 9, § 45. Pascal, Pensées, Part I.

art. 1.

Lactantius complains that the heathen religions were maintained simply on account of their antiquity: Hæ sunt religiones, quas sibi a majoribus suis traditas, pertinacissimè tueri ac defendere perseverant: nec considerant quales sint, sed ex hoc proba. tas atque veras esse confidunt, quod eas veteres tradiderunt: tantaque est auctoritas vetustatis, ut inquirere in eam scelus esse dicatur.'-Div. Inst. II. p. 144. Compare above, p. 79.

ས

that, in order to compare the age of the world with that of a man, we ought in each case to reckon downwards; according to which mode of calculation, the nineteenth century is older than the sixteenth, and the sixteenth than the eleventh. Each successive generation enjoys the benefit of the experience and knowledge of its predecessors, together with its own; and if science be in a progressive state, the judgment of the most recent generation ought to be the maturest and best. It is by efforts which, being successive, require time; by the gradual rejection of errors, and discovery of new truths; by the combined attempts at forming and perfecting a technical vocabulary and a philosophical arrangement, that sciences are advanced. Hence Truth may, with Bacon, be called the daughter of Time rather than of Authority. In an enlightened and progressive state of society, sound opinions gradually, in the long run, and in the majority of cases, prevail over error; for, if they were not thus predominant, society would cease to be progressive. Through the knowledge and skill of the steersman, they generally make at last a successful voyage down the great stream of time; while false theories, though they may at first be driven on by a favourable gale, are allowed soon to drift upon the quick-sands and breakers, and to be lost in oblivion.3

1 The nature of this mistake may be illustrated by comparing two chronological eras-in one of which the years are reckoned backwards, in the other, forwards: for example, the years before and after the birth of Christ. We must not suppose that, because the year 150 A.D. is later than the year 100 A.D., therefore the year 150 B.c. is later than the year 100 B.c. In like manner, we must not suppose that, because a man of sixty was born before a man of twenty, therefore the sixteenth century is older than the eighteenth.

2 Auctores vero quod attinet, summæ pusillanimitatis est, auctoribus infinita tribuere, auctori autem auctorum, atque adeo omnis auctoritatis, Tempori, jus suum denegare. Recte enim Veritas, Temporis filia dicitur, non Auctoritatis.—Nov. Org. lib. I. aph. 84.

3 Lord Bacon expresses a different view on this point, which is scarcely consistent with his own dictum, as to Truth being the daughter of Time. Another error . . . . is a conceit that of former opinions or sects, after variety and examination, the best hath still prevailed, and suppressed the rest; as if the multitude, or the wisest for the multitude's sake, were not ready to give passage rather to that which is popular and superficial, than to that which is substantial and profound; for the truth is, that time seemeth to be of the nature of a river or stream, which carrieth down to us that which is light and blown up, and sinketh and drowneth that which is weighty and solid.' -Adv. of Learning, vol. II. p. 47. Compare Nov. Org. 1. I. aph. 77: Sed temporibus insequentibus [after Cicero], ex inundatione barbarorum in imperium Romanum, postquam doctrina humana velut naufragium perpessa esset, tum demum philosophiæ Aristotelis et Platonis, tanquam tabulæ ex materiâ leviore et minus solidâ, per fluctus temporum servatæ sunt.' It seems to me that, if this view were correct, all improvement of mankind, in successive ages, would be impossible.