pression in Spain would not have been very different from what it has been; and that, as to Portugal, we should not, in that case, have been upon quite another footing than what we now are. It is clear, that, since the signing of the Convention, the Portuguese have disliked our army; that they have harboured suspicions injurious to it; they have wished it away; in short, that they have been very little better than open enemies. How different would all this have been; how different would the impression have been in all Europe, and particularly in Ireland, if we had brought Junot and his army prisoners to England; which no one denies that we could have done, all the dispute being about the pitiful circumstance of time; three weeks sooner, or three weeks later. That army, which we have carried to France, and there put down, ready equipped for battle; that army, which is now actually in Spain, and which may, possibly assist in capturing the very men, before whom they fled at Vimeira; that army, it is now evident to every one, might have been safely lodged in the prisons of England, while the Russian fleet was brought prizes and their crews prisoners to Spithead, instead of the latter being carried, at our expence, to fight against our ally in the Baltic; all this, it is now evident, might have been done, without, in the smallest degree, retarding any assistance that we had to give to the Spaniards. And yet, we are told, by this Court of Inquiry, that nothing beyond their unmeaning, and, in part, contradictory Report, is necessary to give us satisfaction; while, on the other hand, with lungs of Stentor and with front of brass, the hireling writers of the day are calling upon us for new and greater sacrifices in support of this just and necessary war." Cavalry and artillery! Good God! As if we did not pay for enough! An army that cost for the last year, upwards of twenty millions of pounds sterling, out of which above four millions went for ordnance; such endless trains of horses and waggons and equipage of all sorts; a country full of barracks and magazines and laboratories; every town full of soldiers and horses; the drum and the trumpets stunning us, and the country shaded with clouds of military dust from April to October: and, with all these means, with all this warlike parade and bustle and clutter and expense before our eyes, are we, in good earnest, to be quieted, by being told, that our army of 25,000 men failed to capture 14,000 Frenchmen for the want of horse and artillery, and that, too, ina country where, it is notorious, all the people were our friends, and all the ene mies of the French? If so; if we really are thus to be quieted, it matters very little who are our commanders, who are our rulers, or what either of them do. Tell us not that the horses were at Chichester or at Cork, and that the cannon were at Woolwich. What is that to us? They should have been where they were wanted. It was the business of some of you to see that they were there. You had a thousand ships of war at your command; the transports for the year will cost us two millions of pounds sterling; you might have shipped off one half of the whole nation in the ships at your command; and now you tell us a whining story about a want of horse and artillery. What are your bickerings to us? What is it to us, who amongst you are to blame? It is some of you. You have an army, be it what it may, that costs us 23 millions a year; and, after all, where is this army? If Spain was to be defended, why was not this army in Spain, time enough to meet Buonaparte? What is this army for? For what do we pay all this money; this sum, at the contemplation.of which the brain turns? Where is it wanted but where the enemy is to be met and fought? -These, and the like, are the proper questions for the people of England to put. It is not for us to be amused with tales of wants; a want of this, or a want of that. Where 23 millions a year is paid for the support of an army, that army should want nothing, especially in the day of battle. It is quite beneath us; it is to assist in abusing and cheating ourselves, to enter at all into the squabbles between ministers and generals. It signifies not a straw to us who is to blame. The blame, where there is any, is amongst them; and we have a right to com. plain, and to expect redress.This is my view of the matter. The petition that I would present to the king, should express, or be built upon, sentiments like these. I would complain to him, that, after all our sacrifices for the support of such an immense military establishment, I saw little attempted against the enemy, and less effected; that, whenever the army was concerned, there generally appeared some deficiency in those things for which we pay so dearly; that the time for action seemed, in almost every instance, to have passed by before we began to act; that the armies of. the conqueror of Europe were distinguished by a conduct exactly the contrary; that to oppose him with effect it seemed requisite for us to adopt a new line of conduct; and that, before all other things, it appeared necessary to cause a further and more efficient inquiry to be made into the causes of the late Conventions in Portugal. -Who is there that does not entertain these sentiments? Not a man in the whole kingdom, who can be said to entertain any sentiments at all upon the subject; and, I verily believe, that there are none, (except a few wretched parasites) who, in private conversation, will affect to entertain different sentiments thereon. But, when it comes to speaking out; when it comes to voting, or even holding up hands; then you perceive, at once, the effect of that chain of dependence, which the Whigs of the Revolution first forged by means of the funding and taxing system, and which has been, in subsequent, and especially in recent times, so strengthened, and so lengthened, as to embrace and hold fast, or to shackle, at least, almost every soul in society. Were it not for this, is it possible, that we should see the torpor that now prevails? Is there any instance, in any part of our history, no matter under whatrace of kings, of the people's appearing so insensible to their situation as they appear at this moment? Were there ever before found Englishmen so base as to defend acts such as are now openly defended? How this will and must end, and that, too, at no very distant day, unless a salutary constitutional reform speedily take place, it is much easier to foresee than it is safe to describe. Whether the people should now petition the king, or the parliament, may be a question with some; though, for my own part, I should certainly be for the former, as well as for the latter. But, that those who petitioned before are bound to do it now, I think, nobody will attempt to deny. All the former motives still exist, with the addition of those which naturally arise out of what has since taken place, in relation to the subject, both at home and abroad. By bringing the matter before parliament, we shall see who, in that body, will stand up in defence of the Conventions; and, what is of far greater importance, we shall ascertain in what degree the House of Commons, the people's House of Parlia ment, participate in the feelings of the people, it being impossible for the most impudent man in existence to deny, that, upon the subject of the Portugal Conventions, the people of England were, and are, unanimous in a feeling of indignation. SPANISH REVOLUTION. -One of the newspapers has observed, that the intelligence from Spain is of a "mixed nature; a good deal chequered." I mast confess, that I can, after a pretty attentive perusal of all the public, and of some private, intelligence, perceive none of this chequer work. It all appears to me very plain; and much too plain to give me any portion of that "sincere satisfaction," which an editor of last evening appears to have felt, or, that he has, at least, done his best to make his readers feel.-In ROMANA's powers and proclamation I see much of dread and of despair, but not a glimpse of confidence or of hope; and, I see still less of either in the "oath" not to surrender Cadiz and the fleet. I remember the oath of Potsdam, and, remembering it, I must beg to be excused, if I entertain a strong suspicion of the efficacy of oaths as opposed to the arms of Buonaparté.The stories, indeed, from Spain are of a "mixed nature;" for those which come from Corunna widely differ from those which come from other ports not in the hands of the enemy. But, why should we deceive ourselves? This is the foolishest of all things; and I am utterly astonished, that such prints as the Times and the Morning Chronicle, for instance, should publish as intelligence, unaccompanied with suitable comment, statements of facts, which their editors must know to be false, the effect of which must be to aggravate the public disappointment.- -The news from Onrunna talks of a desperate defence of Madrid, and gives us the detail, with all the coolness imaginable, just about a week after we have received the account of Madrid's having surrendered at discretion. "Oh!" says the loyal man, what, you "believe the Corsican's bulletins, do you Yes. I do believe them; and you shall have my reason for it, in a few words. I have read these bulletins daring three wars ; not three campaigns; but three distinct wars, each of them ending in the conquest of kingdoms, or principalities; and, though, as to little matters of detail, they have sometimes been incorrect, or false, if you like that word better, they have uniformly proved substantially true, to the woeful experience of those, who, as well as ourselves, have affected to treat them as lies. Loyalty, as was observed a week or two ago; your true modern loyalty, consists, in part, of a. little fingering in the public purse; but another essential ingredient of it is, a total disbelief in any of the victories of Buona parte, till, like a thunder clap, they break, over our heads, after having been kept off as long as possible by means, such as those used by Messrs. Ward and Huskisson previous" to that terrific clap, the battle of Austerlitz. I am satisfied, that we are the most credulous nation, particularly the Cockney part of us, of any at this day existing in the sabres of which we were afraid, and to do this, too, under a false pretence! Oh, God! it would have been an act of infamy, the very thought of bearing a share of which would turn one wild. I hope, nay, I trust I may say, that I am sure, that there is not one single native of this kingdom, who does not contemplate such an act with inexpressible horror. Every other evil, when compared with this, is a blessing. Therefore, let what will happen else, world. The Spanish peasants, it is true, believe that the Dolls, stuck up in their village chapels, work miracles in the cure of tooth-ache, rheumatism, incontinence, sterility, and other cases; but, then, those Dolls are made in Holland whereas we swallow the byrefaced lies, which are fabricated here at home, and fabricated too, in so slovenly a manner as not to cover any part of the hook. Fish in the river St. John are so eager for the bait, that, after the first time, they will bite at, and swal-slaughter, capture, total destruction; any low, the naked wire; but, we, still more eager, want no bait at all. We take in, with great self-complacency, lie after lie during the whole of a campaign; and when, at last, by a long series of defeats and disgraces, Buonaparte has conquered another kingdom, we talk about the result with just as little suprize as if it had come gradually upon us through the channel of truth. Now, what sense is there in this? A great deal of modern loyalty there, doubtless, is; but, what sense is there in it?-To give any opinion as to what will be the result of the engagement, or engagements, towards which, apparently, our army, in Spain, was, when the last intelligence came away, fast approaching, would be foolish; because, in fact, we know just nothing at all about either the relative strength, or relative position of the hostile armies. All that I can decidedly express upon the subject is a wish, and that wish is, that whenever and wherever and against whomsoever Englishmen fight they may be victorious; but, I must confess, that this wish is accompanied, in the present instance, with most serious apprehensions. The movements of our troops have hitherto, if our intelligence be correct, been quite unaccountable; and, as to Sir David Baird's Proclamation of the 1st of December, I trust it will prove to be a forgery; for, if true, it will require more than a whole life of glory to wipe it away. There are, perhaps, few persons who have stronger reasons than I have to be anxious about the safe return of the individuals composing that part of our army; but, much rather than hear of their sneaking out of Spain without daring to look the French in the face, I would hear of their being, to the last man, cut to pieces upon the plain. "No tears are so sweet as those which be"dew the unburied head of the soldier;" and no stain so foul as that of military owardice. To draw off, leaving the Spanish peasants, whom we had encouraged to take up arms; to skulk away, at the ap proach of the French, still encouraging those oor creatures to expose themselves to the thing is consoling in exchange for this. The country may lose the flower of its army, and individuals amongst us may lose brothers and sons and fathers and friends; but, neither the dead nor the living will be stained with that dishonour, which, to a mind rightly constructed, would have rendered life insupportable. The very worst of all our acts, during the last war, was the abandonment of the French Emigrants at Guadaloupe. I trust we shall never see the like repeated. I know not their philosophy at the Horse Guards, or at the Military College; but, I know that it ought to teach, that one part of the duty, which a soldier owes his country, is, to die, and that, too, at any time when his death will be more serviceable than his life, which is always the case when the choice lies between death and the chance of dishonour. If a man cannot sit down, by the side of his wife surrounded with his children, and coolly screw his mind up to this pitch, his money, intended for the purchase of commissions, he would do well to apply to the purchase of "consols," or of sugar and plumbs, to be sold by retail. I hope, there will come some circumstance to explain; satisfactorily to explain, the cause of Sir David Baird's Proclamation, if it should prove to be authentic; but, I must confess, that it is with extreme reluctance, that I admit even thế possibility of its being genuine.If our army should gain a battle, though against only a comparative small part of the French force, it may have a wonderful effect upon the Spaniards, and may lead to important results; but, unless the people be com. pletely let loose; unless the war assume a revolutionary turn, still, in my opinion, Buonaparte will prevail. It appears to me to be morally impossible, that he should be beaten by any other means. The only article of really cheering news that I can collect out of all that I have lately read about the operations in Spain, is contained in one of Buonaparte's bulletins. It is that in which he says, that all the respectable, or genteel, people are for him, and none but. of the rabble agctly like that of our poulators his being exactly like that of our peculators and plunderers, there is some ground to hope, that he has all these on his side, in Spain, and, of course, that the people are against him. The Morning Chronicle has, with much acuteness, noticed this exhilirating circumstance, and has observed, that, if the fact be so, it is a little awkward for the doctrine of those amongst us, who are so eager to contend, that the people, or rabble, as they call them, are every where the allies of Buonaparte. But, my great fear is, that the peculators are against him, and that the "rabble" are for him.Some persons, anticipating a failure in Spain, are making for themselves a consolation in the new possessions and sovereignty, that we shall, in that case, have in the Spanish colonies, including, of course, all the gold and silver mines. I beseech them to dismiss this busy devil from their thoughts; for, in the first place, we should not get those possessions and that sovereignty without long and bloody wars; and, in the next place, they would, if we had them, be an addition to the many burthensome colonies we already have. They would, in short, be another East-Indies, and that is, in one compound word, to express all manner of national corruptions, calamities, and curses. Westminster, 5th January, 1809. OFFICIAL PAPERS. CONVENTION IN PORTUGAL.-Report of the Board of Inquiry to the King, dated Dec. 22, 1808. Also the subsequent Proceedings of the said Board. May it please your majesty.-We the under-written general officers of the army, in obedience to your majesty's warrant, which bears date the 1st day of November, 1808, commanding us strictly to inquire into the conditions of a suspension of arms, concluded on the 22d of August, 1809, between your majesty's army in Portugal, and the French force in that country-and also into a definitive convention, concluded with the French general commanding on the 31st Angust following-also into all the causes and circumstances (whether arising from the previous operation of the British army, or otherwise which led to them)-and into the conduct, behaviour and proceedings of lieutenant general sir Hew Dalrymple, and such other commander or commanders of your majesty's forces in Portugal-and of any other person or persons, as far as the same were connected with the said armistice, suspension of arms, and convention-and 1 to report to your majesty a state thereof, as it shall appear, together with our opinion thereon, and also our opinion, whether any, and what farther proceedings should be had thereupon.-We have, at several meetings, perused and considered your majesty's orders and instructions, as transmitted, to us by the right hon. lord Castlereagh, your ma jesty's principal secretary of state, together with sundry letters, and other papers, therewith transmitted: and have heard and examined lieutenant general sir Hew Dalrymple, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, and other principal officer's employed on the said expedition, with such witnesses as any of them desired: and also such other persons as seemed to us most likely to give any material information: and in order that your majesty may be fully possessed of every circumstance which has appeared in the course of this inquiry,We beg leave to lay before your majesty the whole of our examinations and proceedings to this our report annexed. And upon the most diligent and careful review of the whole matter, we do, in further obedience to your royal command, most humbly report to your majesty, That it appears that early in the month of May, 1908, a very considerable force destined for foreign service, was assem bled near Cork, the command of which, it is imagined, was intended for Sir Arthur Wel lesley That in the month of May, universal and unexpected resistance to French tyranny had taken place in Spain-That ap plication was made for the assistance of Britain, and that government with the universal concurrence of the country, determined on giving Spain and Portugal, thenalso in commotion, the most effectual aid. It appears, that in consequence of such determination major general Spencer, before the surrender of the French fleet at Cadiz, was off that port with about 5,000 men, sent by sir Hew Dalrymple from Gibraltar. His assistance not having been called for there, he proceeded to the mouth of the Tagus, with a view of aiding sir Charles Cotton's fleet in forcing a passage,it having been represented that there were not in the forts and about Lisbon, more than four thousand men. But general Spencer being then off the Tagus (June 24) reports front the best authority he could have, that the enemy had 11,000 men in and about Lisbon, and 9,500 at St. Ubes, the east of Portugal, and elsewhere. In this situation the intended attack could not take place, and general Spencer returned to Cadiz and Gibraltar.It appears that on the 14th June, application was made to the Admiralty to provide a convoy to sail with the troops then under orders from Cork, on the arrival of lieutenant general sir Arthur Wellesley, appointed to the command.-On the 21st June, lord Castlereagh acquaints sir Arthur Wellesley that accounts from Cadiz are bad, and general Spencer was returning to Gibraltar, and that the cabinet postpone their instructions to him till more is known. -On the 28th of June, lord Castlereagh acquaints general Spencer, then supposed at Gibraltar, that Sir Arthur Wellesley, with nine thousand men, is ordered to proceed from Cork, and to act with his (Spencer's) corps, in support of the Spanish nation. He is, therefore, with his corps, to go off to Cadiz to wait for him; in the meantime, availing himself of any circumstance that offers of acting to advantage, even within the Straits. It appears that, on the 12th July, lieut. general sir Arthur Wellesley sailed from Cork with 9,000 men, (under instructions of the 30th June) generally to aid the Spanish nation, and the principal object to attack the French in the Tagus; but authorised, as he understood, to pursue any other object, if more likely to conduce to the benefit of the two nations. And (of t'e 15th July) to endeavour, if possible, not only to expel the enemy from Lisbon, but to cut off their retreat towards Spain. He arrived at Corunna the 20th, communicated with the Gallician Junta, who wished the troops to be employed in expelling the French from Portugal, and recommended him to land in that country (this was on the 26th communicated to general Spencer). Sailed from Corruna the 22d, went Oporto, (leaving the fleet off Cape Finisterre); arrived the 24th, desired by sir Charles Cotton to leave the troops at Oporto or Mondego bay, and come to the Tagus to communicate. Had a conference with the generals and bishop, at Oporto, about the disposal of their force. The bishop promised mules and other means of carriage, and also a sufficiency of slaughter cattle. It appears that sir Arthur Wellesley sailed from Oporto the 25th July, ordered the transports to go to Mondego, proceeded and joined the admiral off the Tagus the 26th. Letters were received from general Spencer at Cadiz, which had returned, and where the Spaniards pressed him, to remain, and he expected orders from sir Arthur Wellesley. Agreed with sir Charles Cotton, that landing in the mouth of the Tagus was impracticable, and unadvisable, as there was great risk from the state of the surf, from the defences and adverse nature of the coast, and from the neighbourhood of the to enemy's whole disposable force, to whose attack we should be exposed in landing, probably in a crippled state, certainly not in a very efficien one.-Peniche fortress was in possession of the enemy. Mondego bay was therefore agreed on as most eligible to land at. Thinking it most important to drive the French from Portugal, he ordered general Spencer to embark (with his 5,000 men), and join off that coast. By his information of the 24th June, the French had more than 20.000 men in Portugal. The admiral's account made them less. Sir Arthur Wellesley thought they had not less than from 16 to 18,000 —It appears, that sit Arthur Wellesley quitted the admiral off the Tagus, on the 27th, and joined the transports off Mondego, on the 30th, He there received information from government (dated 15th July), that a reinforcement of brigadier general Ackland and five thousand men was intended for him, and eventually ten thousand more men, under lieutenant general sir John Moore: That sir. Hew Dalrymple was to command the army: That sir Arthur Wellesley was also to proceed on the instructions he had received, viz. the attack of Lisbon, if his force was sufficient. Dupont having surrendered, general Spencer's arrival was now considered as certain, and also that of general Ackland very soon. The insurrection in Alentejo was a fortunate occurrence at this time, and sir Arthur Wellesley also received information from the secretary of state, dated 15th July, that sir Hew Dalrymple was appointed to the command of the forces in Spain and Portugal, and sir Harry Burrard second in command; and if, in the meantime, he was joined by any officer, senior in rank, hạ (sic Arthur Wellesley) was to serve under him. Of the same date, sir Harry Burrard was also acquainted by the secretary of state that operations are intended to be directed, in the first instance, to the reduction of the Tagus, and secondly, to the security of Cadiz, and destruction of the enemy's force in Andalusia.-It appears, that sir Arthur Wellesley was induced, from various strong reasons, as stated in his narrative, to disembark in Mondego bay. This commenced on the 1st of August; but the surf occasioned great difficulties, so that his corps was not all landed before the 5th. General Spencer arrived on the 5th, and his corps on the 6th. They landed on the 7th and 8th.-It appears, that from the 1st August till the Sth, when the whole was disembarked, that measures were taking for the immediate movement of the army towards Lisbon, and horses and carriages were solicited. Sir Area |