thur Wellesley armed the Portuguese troops, offered money to assist in equipping them for the field, which was declined by their general officers, whom he ruet on the 7th, and arranged a plan of operations and march, which was delayed, it their desire, and for their conventence, till the 10th. He also left full information of his situation, intentions, and other circumstances, for lieut. general sir Harry Burrard, on his arrival at Mondego (and for whom he had previously left advices at the Berlings, off Peniche, in case of his making that point), and recommended a plan of operations for sir John Moore's corps on its arrival, to act towards Santarem and the Tagus. On the 8th, he renewed his communications to sir Harry Burrard, leaving them at Mondego. -It appears, from the many substantial reasons enumerated in sir Arthur Wellesley's narrative, and with the aid of 6000 Portuguese, from whose co-operation, he had reason to expect great advantage, but in which he was subsequently disappointed, that he determined to proceed (without waiting for his expected reinforcements, of which he had been apprised) with his own army, of 13,000 men (British) against an enemy who, he knew, could not well produce a greater number in the field. He advanced by the coast road towards Lisbon, for the substantial reason, among others, of preserving his communication with the shipping, from which alone he could derive his bread. Wine could be found in all the villages occupied by the army, and slaughter cattle were furnished by contractors.-It appears, that the army marched on the 9th and 10th of August, from Mondego, having Burses, although indifferent, for 18 pieces of cannon, for ammunition great and small, a considerable store of bread, and a moderate hospital establishment. The cavalry, about 400, including 200 Portuguese. On the 10th and 11th, they arrived at Leyria.-On the 13th, marched to Calveria.-On the 14th, to Alcabana, where they received bread and oats, landed at Nazareth.- On the 15th, to Caldas, and halted the 16th, receiving further supplies from Nazareth.It appears, that hitherto the Portuguese had moved on his left, extending towards the Tagus, but they now raised such difficulties about subsistence, and proceeding on the manner sir Arthur Wellesley thought most advisable, that he dispensed with their cooperation, on condition they would send him 1600 men, to be at his disposal, and to whom he was to furnish bread. He also recommended to their general, as a measure of safety, to remain about Caldas, which

they did till after the battle of Vimeira.— On the 17th, there was a very considerable action near Ob dos, with a corps of 6000 inen, under general Laborde, who had taken post in the defiles, and was forced to retire with considerable loss. This and a small previous action cost us about 480 men. The army was that night at Valla Verde.. and on the morning of the 18th, heard of the arrival of general Anstruther's brigade on the coast. On the 18th, the army marched to Lowinha, and on the 19th to Vimera, where it halted on the 20th.-This day brigadier-general Anstruther's brigade (2400 men) joined, and lieutenant general sir H.. Burrard arrived off Maciera in the afternoon.

On the 21st, early in the morning, brigadier-general Ackland's brigade (1750 mer) landed and joined the army.-It appears. that when sir A. Wellesley was at Leyria, the enemy had the two considerable advanced corps of Laborde and Loison in their front,. which (as he moved on with a Portuguese. corps on his left, as far as Alcabaca) fell back towards Lisbon, and joined Junot,, who had assembled by the 20th, from 12 to 14,000 men, at Torres Vedras, about eight miles from Vimeira; calculating probably, that the weather might disappoint the landing of Anstruther's and Ackland's brigades, whom he must have espied in the offing on the 19th and 20th. He determined to attack sir Arthur Wellesley's army in its situation at Vimeira, on the 21st, before the junction of so considerable a force. In this enterprize general Junot completely failed. His attack was repelled in the most gallant manner, and with great loss he was obliged to retreat upon Torres Vedras, and Cabeca deMonte Chique, where he endeavoured to re-assemble his troops. The detail of this honourable action, in which we lost 700 men, is given in the Extraordinary Gazette, of Sept. 16, published upon this occasion. It appears that lieutenant-general sir H. Burrard, having on the 21st of July received notice of your inajesty's appointment of him as second in command of the forces placed under the command of lieutenant-general, sir. Hew Dalrymple, and having also receiv ed all necessary instructions, went imme diately to Portsmouth, embarked on the 27th, and sailed on the 31st, in the Andacious, together with the fleet of transports, containing a corps of 10,000 infantry, commanded by lieut.-gen. sir J. Moore.-After a continuance of contrary wind and bad weather, the fleet was near Cape. Finisterre on the 16th of August; and it having been recommended to him, that before he proceeded to the southward of Oporto, he

road; being two miles and a half from the landing place. He arrived there before ten, at a time that the advanced corps (Anstruther's and Fane's brigades) were vigorously attacked. The officers conducting sir H. Burrard passed through the village, and brought him to sir Arthur Wellesley, on the heights behind the villages, where the left of the army had been originally posted. Here he was informed, saw, and approved of the steps taken by sir Arthur Wellesley to repulse the enemy, and directed him to proceed in the execution of an operation he had so happily and so well began.-By this time it was evident that the attack upon the village and advanced corps was not meant to be further supported; it was completely repulsed, and the enemy retired in consi derable confusion. They were not followed by the infantry, as the troops had received orders not to quit their position, without particular orders from sir Arthur Wellesley. The detachment of the 20th light dragoons alone pursued, but falling in with a superior cavalry, were soon obliged to return with considerable loss. This order had been very properly given, on a consideration that the principal effort of the enemy would still be made on our left, and upon this point the enemy had just opened his cannonade, and the brigade under major-general Ferguson was already engaged at distant musketry. As support arrived, he advanced, and the enemy gave way, abandoning three pieces of cannon. Major-general Ferguson still advanced, and a mile from where the first battery was taken, another also was taken. The enemy finally made an attempt to regain their last battery, but were repulsed by the 71st and 82d regiments and obliged to retire with great loss.-Soon after twelve the firing had ceased, and the enemy's cavalry were seen from our left, in bodies of about 200, by general Ferguson; and about the same time general Spencer saw a line formed, about three miles in front of our centre. About half past twelve, sir Arthur Wellesley proposed to sir Harry Burrard to advance from his right, with three brigades upon Torres Vedras, and with the other five brigades to follow the enemy, who had been defeated by our left.-It appears that the situation of the army at this moment was on the right, major-general Hill's brigade, which had not been engaged, was on the height behind Vimeira, and at a distance of above three miles from those of generals Ferguson and Nightingale on the left. In front of Vimeira, and in the centre were the brigades of Anstruther and Fane, which had been warmly engaged. Brigadier

generals Bowes's and Ackland's brigades were advanced on the heights, towards the left, in support of generals Ferguson and Nightingale. Brigadier-general Craufurd's brigade was detached rather to the rear of the left, about half a mile from major-gen. Ferguson, to support the Portuguese troops, making front in that direction. It appears, that although the enemy was completely repulsed, the degree of expedition with which a pursuit could be commenced, considering the extended position of the army at that time, and the precaution to be taken against the superior cavalry of the enemy, must have depended on various local circumstances only to be calculated by those upon the spot. This very circumstance of a superior cavalry retarding our advance, would allow the enemy's infantry, without any degree of risk, to continue their retreat in the most rapid manner, till they should arrive at any given and advantageous point of rallying and formation; nor did sir A. Wellesley, on the 17th of August, when the enemy had not half the cavalry as on the 21st, pursue a more inconsiderable and beaten army with any marked advantage; for he says (Gazette Extraordinary)-"The enemy retired with the utmost regularity, " and the greatest celerity; and, notwith"standing the rapid advance of the British

infantry, the want of a sufficient body of cavalry was the cause of his suffering but little loss in the plain and again," He "succeeded in effecting his retreat in "good order, owing principally to my

want of cavalry."-It may also be considered, that as the attack on our centre had been repulsed long before that on our left had, the attacking corps, which, as has been observed, was not pursued (but by the 20th dragoons, not exceeding 150), had time (above an hour) to re-assemble, and to occupy such ground as might afterwards facilitate the retreat of their right, and that the enemy were actually and visibly formed in one or more lines at about three miles in front of the centre-From these and other fair military grounds, as allowed by sir A. Wellesley; from those that occurred in sir H. Burrord's first interview with sir A. Wellesley; from the utmost certainty of the immediate arrival of sir J.Moore's corps, which, if they had not stopped at Mondego bay, would have been at Maceira on the 21st; sir H. Burrard declined making any further pursuit that day, or ordering the army to march next morning early.In this opinion sir H. Burrard states brigadier-general Clinton and col. Murray concurred.]-On the 22d, sir H. Dalrymple

arrived and assumed the command of the army. It appears that lieut general sir II. Dalrymple having, on the 7th of August, received your majesty's commands of the 15th July, to take the command of the forces to be employed in Portugal and Spain, and that lieut.-general sir H. Burrard was to be second in command, he sailed with the first fair wind from Gibraltar on the 13th of August, communicated with Lord Collingwood off Cadiz, and on the 19th with admiral sir C. Cotton off the Tagus, from whom he received information of the army under sir A. Wellesley, then landed in Portugal, and also that brigadier-general Ackland, with his brigade, was on the coast, looking for an opportunity of joining him. Sir H. Dalrymple sailing along the coast with an intention of making Mondego bay, heard of the action of the 21st; and that sir H. Burrard was arrived; this determined him to make for Maceira bay, where transports were at anchor. He landed in Maceira bay early in the forenoon of the 22d, proceeded to Vimiera, about two miles and a quarter distant, and after a short conversation with his two predecessors in command, whose instructions were those by which he was to act, he ordered the army to march early in the morning of the 23d, undoubtedly as soon as it could be put in motion after his arrival. It appears that in this situation of things the French general Kellerman arrived about noon of the 22d at Vimeira, with proposals for a suspension of arms, in order to settle a definitive convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French army. Lieutenant-generals sir Harry Burrard and sir Arthur Wellesley assisted the commander of the forces in the discussions that took place on this subject, and it appearing to them, under all circumstances, as commanding a force acting in alliance with the sovereign of Portugal, and combating in their country (from whence we then derived no material assistance), against an enemy in actual possession of their capital, their fortresses, and, in a military point of view, of their kingdom, that a convention, or capitulation, if the opportunity offered, which should speedily and honourably expel the French army from Portugal, was expedient and advisable, a cessation of arms was agreed upon, to terminate at 48 hours no tice. The leading articles of a convention were also settled, and general Kellerman returned towards Lisbon, about nine at night, with the instrument stated in the extra Gazette of the 16th of Sept. but not to be considered as effectual without the concurrence of admiral sir C. Cotton.-Early

on the 23d, in the morning, lieut.-col. Murray, quarter-master-general, set out with the proposed agreement, to procure the concurrence of the admiral, and returned in the night of the 24th,, with sir Charles Cotton's answer, that he could not accede, but that he would enter into treaty with the. Russian admirals-It appears that sir Charles Cotton having declined to sanction the Russian article, the commander of the forces conceived the armistice to end, and determined on sending lieutenant-colonel Murray to announce the recommencement of hostilities, at the end of forty-eight hours, in order, if general Junot chose it, that we might treat on the remaining articles as a basis. This officer had powers to treat without delay. He had the commander of the forces' letter of the 25th, and certain memoranda of sir Arthur Wellesley, as laid before the board, which shewed the exact footing on which he was to act, as also general Kellerman's sentiments on the Russian question. Early on the 27th, communication was had from general Junot and lieutenant-colonel Murray, that a treaty was in agitation which was answered. It appears that when the proposed treaty (ratified by general Junot) of the 28th of August, was brought by capt. Dalrymple on the 29th to head-quarters Ramalhal, all the lieutenant-generals (Burrard, Moore, Hope, Fraser, Wellesley) were present, lord Paget excepted (because not long previously summoned.) The proposed treaty was, however, formally discussed. Minutes of proposed alterations were taken by sir A. Wellesley, as laid before the board, and the commander of the forces has no reason to believe that sir J. Moore, or any of the lieutenant-generals that came with him, expressed any disapprobation of the state and terms of the negociation.-The treaty with the alterations proposed were re-transmitted to lieut.-col. Murray.-It appears when the treaty concluded by lieut -col. Murray on the 30th, was brought by him to Torres Vedras on the 31st for ratification, the lieutenant-generals present were convened, and sir A. Wellesley was sent for. Lord Paget, who was at a distance, did not come, nor did sir A. Wellesley, his corps having marched that morning. The other lieutenant-generals met (Burrard, Moore, Fraser, Hope), the alterations made by lieut.-col. Murray were approved, and the treaty then ratified by the commander of the forces (sir H. Dalrymple) with the approbation of the lieutenant-generals present.Some of the articles of the treaty of the 28th, before objected to by the lieutenant

generals were altered in that of the 30th, and some other good alterations had been inserted, not before suggested. A comparison of the treaty of the 28th, and that ratified, will shew the alterations -The meetings of the lieutenant-generals, the commander of the forces did not call, or ⚫ consider as regular councils of war. He sought to benefit from their talents and experience, by consulting them on exigent cases, and by pursuing the measure he might himself deem most for the good of your majesty's service, after availing himself of the advantage he might draw from their reasonings, and he does not recollect there was any dissentient opinion on the 31st, as to the ratification of the convention.-It appears that sir J. Moore's corps having arrived at Mondego Bay on the 20th of Aug. began to disembark; that they re-embarked, and arrived off Maciera Bay on the 24th; that from the 25th to the 29th they landed under considerable difficulties, and successively joined the army at Torres Vedras.It appears that some of the principal advantages to arise from the convention were in the contemplation of the generals.-That it immediately liberated the kingdom of ·Portugal from the dominion of the French, thereby restoring to the inhabitants their capital and fortresses, their principal seaporis, their personal liberty, property, religion, and established government.---That it relieved a great extent of Spanish frontier from all apprebensions of an enemy, and the whole of Spain from that of having an enemy behind them, and allowed all parts of Spain to take more effective measures for its general defence; as well as permitted Portugal immediately to contribute for their mutual support. That it enabled the British army immediately to enter Spain, if required, by central routes, while it transported the French force to a very distant part of their own coast, far removed from the Spanish frontier.-That it immediately released 4,000 Spanish soldiers, and sent them to the defence of Catalonia; it also released from the Portuguese frontier another body of 2,000 Spanish troops. The Portuguese army also became disposable for the common cause.-To the men of war and transports, which, at this season of the year, with great difficulty could keep their station near the coast, and on whose presence the supplies and operations of the army depended, the opening of the Tagus afforded immediate shelter.It is further urged by the generals, as much more than probable, that if the enemy had been required to lay down their arms, and sur

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render prisoners of war, they would not have complied; but, if driven to extremity, they would have retired upon Lisbon, reinforced by 6000 Russians, who must have been thus compelled to share their fate; and in the temporary attack of this city, much calamity and destruction must have ensued Also, that masters of the Russian fleet, and of the boats and shipping in the Tagus, the passage of the river was ensured to them; that they could have defended, for a considerable time its east bank, and prevented the occupation of the Tagus by our fleet that, with the strong fortresses of Alentejo in their possession, they could have protracted a destructive war, to the great detriment of Portugal and the Spanish cause, by finding employment for the greater part of the British army, for the remainder of the year, and whose difficulties and losses in such operations must have been very considerable.-It appears, that the forts on the Tagus were taken possession of on the 2d of September, by the British troops, and the port was then opened to our shipping: that on the 5th the army had its right at St. Juliens, and its left on the heights of Bellas: that on the 8th or 9th a British corps marched into Lisbon, to ensure the tranquillity of that city, during the embarkation of the enemy, who were all sent off (except the last division, purposely detained) before the end of the month, and part of the British army was then actually on its route towards the Spanish frontier.-It appears that, during the discussion, and afterwards during the execution of the Convention, much firmness was shewn in resisting the pretensions and interpretations of the enemy; every stipulation being restricted to its fair, honourable, and grammatical meaning, and the French not allowed to carry off, but obliged to disgorge plunder, which they affected to consider as private property.It appears that pains were taken to misrepresent and raise a clamour in Portugal against this convention; but when it was generally known, and its effects felt, the people of Lisbon, and of the country, seem to have expressed their gratitude and thanks for the benefits attending it.-It has been urged by sir Hew Dalrymple, and allowed by major-general Spencer, that in Egypt, in 1801 (after the victory of the 21st of March, the French having thrown their whole force into Alexandria and Grand Cairo, about 10,000 men in each place), that at the siege of Alexandria, in August, the country was in the full possession of the British and Turks.. The garrison, cut-off