nius of their Chief, and his power of select- | tence, on sufferance, at the mercy of her ing and influencing those best suited for his stronger neighbour. So, too, must Austria, purposes, and then by his inspiring the masses and so must all nations, unless those excepwith blind, but unreasoning, confidence in tionally favoured, who wish to remain mashis star, by leading them from victory to ters of their own destinies. Perhaps the victory in battle-fields all over Europe. The worst feature of the new system is that, defect of this system is that everything de- when every citizen is a soldier, disarmament pends on the leader, and it broke down signal- becomes impossible, and when all have arms ly in the present war, in consequence of their in their hands the temptation to use them is favourite generals being discredited in the great. Should this prove to be the case, first encounters, and no one coming forward war may again become the normal state of to take their places. The Prussian army is Europe, and peace only be obtained at fitful organised on a totally different system. The intervals during the exhaustion of one or names of Moltke, or of the Princes who more of the contending nations. command the German armies, though all respectable, are not names to call forth enthusiasm as men of genius; but that is of little consequence. The staff, the regimental officers, the privates, all know their duties, and are sufficiently intelligent to understand that the success of the whole must depend on each fraction doing the duty which it is specially told off to perform. From the commander-in-chief to the last recruit there is an intelligent perception of the part to be played, and an unhesitating determination to do it, which is the perfection of discipline, and, so far as we can see, renders it impossible to disintegrate such an army. It may be overwhelmed by numbers, it may be beaten by circumstances which in war no one can foresee, but, man for man, an army so intelligently or ganised is superior to any army yet put on foot at any age or by any country. When the proportions of this great array of armed men first dawned upon us in July last, all Europe was struck with the magnificence of the spectacle. A whole nation rising as one man to repel an unjust invasion of their soil. Now, however, that, we have had opportunities and leisure to scan its features more narrowly, it seems a portent which may be disastrous to the liberties of Europe. One of the boasts of our modern civilization was, that we had relegated the business of war to regular soldiers, and freed peaceful citizens and the industrial classes from its burthens, except in the shape of taxes. The Prussian system has abolished this distinction. In Germany now every citizen is a soldier, and either for home service or foreign wars must, when called upon, join his regiment, on pain of being shot as a deserter. It is a return to the state of Europe before the Thirty Years' War; but it is done, and cannot now be undone. Unless France, the moment she recovers her power of self-government, sets to work to organise the whole of her male population on the Prussian system, she must be content to hold her liberties, her very national exis Against this it may be argued that any army recruited as the German army is must naturally be averse to war, and eager for peace when what it considers its legitimate ends are attained. It certainly has not shown these tendencies in either the Austri an or French wars, and, besides this, the consciousness of irresistible strength is a terrible temptation either to use or abuse it; and though Germany may, after this war, wish for peace and rest contented, when other nations are equally armed, causes of quarrel can never be long wanting. Ought we, then, in the new organization of our military forces to copy the Prussian system? For our home army-irrespective of India and the colonies-it might be well that we should, at least to a certain extent, do so, but it is no use entertaining the question at present; for it is quite certain that neither the people nor our rulers are sufficiently convinced of the imminence of the danger for the one to propose or the other to submit to such a system. It required the disaster of Jena, and seven years' subsequent occupation of Prussia by the French army, to store up a sufficient amount of hate to induce the Germans to submit to the dreadful tyranny of their military system, and to pass every male, without exception, through the army. Now that, after fifty years of self-negation, they are reaping the fruits of it, perhaps they do not regret their sacrifices; but we certainly are not prepared for any such effort of patriotism, and nothing probably but a disaster equal in extent and in consequences to that of Jena, would ever convince the inhabitants of these islands of what it is necessary to go through if they would be great. Even in circumstances like the present, it is more than questionable if the English would listen to a proposal for a conscription such as exists in France and in most countries of Europe. We even hesitate about employing the ballot for the militia, and, in fact, want to be not only safe, but powerful, without undergoing any of the inconveniences or making any of the sacrifices which all other nations are prepared to submit to in order to attain these ends. Worse than this, we are not even prepared to spend our money in our own defence. When France and Germany were borrowing their ten, twenty, and thirty millions for war purposes, and we were boast ing that we were prepared to fight either of them in defence of Belgium, our Ministers came down to the House and asked for a credit of two millions! Even that was not to increase our means of defence, but merely to supply the deficiencies which the wretched cheeseparings of the two previous years had made in our means. Had they asked for ten millions it would not have been a penny too much, and had they resolutely set about spending it we might even now be in a very different position. The first result of this littleness of our governors was our being nearly involved in a war with Russia. Had they asked for ten millions, Prince Gortschakoff's circular would never have been penned; but when it was seen that all the Ministry dared to think of spending was this paltry sum, all the world made up their minds that our friendship was not worth seeking, and our enmity not to be feared. Yet this surely is not the feeling nor the wish of the country if it could be properly ascertained. With an infinitesimally small amount of grumbling we spent a few years ago on the Abyssinian expedition, in order to rescue a consul from the hands of a mad savage, a sum of money rather in excess of the total which the War Department has been able to wring during the last ten years from the House of Commons for the fortification of our dockyards and arsenals. Yet no one probably would be inclined to assert that the punishment of King Theodore was as important an object as the safety of our own shores. Or to take another example when we were much poorer than we now are, we spent twenty millions of money to emancipate our slaves, and were never the worse for it; and no-one now regrets the expenditure. If people really understood that such an amount was wanted, not to free men who had never known liberty, but to prevent a whole nation of free men from being enslaved, would they grudge it? The real question is, who among our rulers will have the courage to risk his seat by daring to tell the nation the truth in this matter? Not certainly the Premier; though in a speech he delivered at the Mansion House in July last he asserted and dwelt with particular emphasis on the fact that our annual accumulation of savings, over and above our regular income, could not be estimated at less than one hundred millions a year. Yet a few weeks afterwards he tremblingly ventured to ask the House of Commons for a dole of two millions to protect the enormous capital that produced this annual saving! While this miserable pretext of economy is the ruling passion of our statesmen, what is most to be feared is the adoption of half measures. Something that will silence those who are anxious for the safety and honour of their country, and tide over the difficulty for the moment, leaving the rest to the chapter of accidents. If it does involve us in war or disaster it is easy to plead that it was impossible to foresee it, and it may be some one else who has to bear the brunt of it. If, however, wiser counsels prevail, and we are prepared to spend what money is required, there are two lines of policy that may be pursued. The first would be to withdraw ourselves within our shell, and trust to the Channel and our fleet to defend our shores. It is a selfish line to take, and it may answer; but if it is to be adopted let every public dockyard, and every private one that will take a contract, be instantly set to work to build not only seagoing vessels, but gunboats and monitors, and all the smaller forms of craft required for home defence. Our present iron-clad fleet cost about ten millions, and if we are allowed time to spend a like amount we may have a Navy and Reserve equal to all our exigencies, and able to cope with any that can now, at least, be brought against it. In this case let us have no more talk of any increase of our Army beyond what is wanted for Indian and Colonial reliefs, and let no money be spent on the Militia and Volunteers, and no more talk of relying on them for our defence. This done, should our fleet be beaten, and the Channel forced, we must be prepared to submit, and had better do it, without bloodshed and destruction to property, to the stronger man who has broken into our house, and be content to give up our separate national existence. It is an intelligible policy, but a very ignoble one, and one which few Englishmen, if they understood its bearing, would be found to endorse, and if it should not prove successful it is a surrender of everything that is worth living for. If, on the other hand, we are prepared to defend ourselves, even if our first line is forced and an enemy on our shores, do not let us deceive ourselves with the idea that an Army of 50,000 or 60,000 men, with a halftrained Militia and a body of Volunteers who do not form part of the same organisa- | look their position fairly in the face, and to tion with the Militia and the Army-is any realize the possibility of such a fate befalldefence at all. ing us, as has overtaken France, there may Unless the men who are to take part in yet be time to avert such a catastrophe. the defence of the country are very nume- We are neither so old nor so effete as to rous, unless they all form part of one organi- want either the spirit, or the men, or the sation however diverse their functions may means requisite for the purpose. Our real be, and unless they are supported by internal danger lies in the careless ignorance which fortifications, any attempt on their part to hides from us the dangers by which we are resist would be merely to expose themselves surrounded, and prevents us taking those to defeat and destruction. Six months ago measures by which alone they can be avoidno nation was so confident of her own powers ed. What we do want are statesmen, like and of her absolute security from attack as those of Prussia, who sixty years ago foresaw France. Yet now her fate is such that it what was needed, and during half a century would be well if we took warning from it have had the steadfastness to persevere in before it is too late. It may be that the perfecting those organisations which have verdict of history will be that France fell raised her to her present greatness. More through the corruption of the Empire. If we even than this, we want that the mass of the shared a like fate, the verdict would proba- nation should rouse itself from the lethargy of bly be that it was because we were as we security in which it is now slumbering; and, have been often called-a nation of shop-like true patriots, that we should prepare keepers, and refused to spend, out of our enormous wealth, the comparatively small sums requisite to ensure our safety. To the thoughtful few who have leisure to study these questions, and knowledge sufficient to appreciate their significance, the conclusions to be drawn from the statements we have just made, may appear as selfevident as they do to ourselves; but by the mass of Englishmen, it is to be feared, they may be regarded as the mere grumblings of discontent. With them eight hundred years of immunity from invasion in the past, is a promise of a like period of safety for the future. It is in vain to point out that during the first half of that time we occupied the position of being the invaders of French soil, and during the latter half-with the exception of the scare from the Spanish Armada -France has been the only nation from whom we have had anything to fear; while fortunately for us, though most powerful on land, the French never were a maritime people, and never were able to wrest from us the dominion of the sea. It seems equally in vain to point out that France no longer occupies that exceptional position, and that, instead of a number of small incoherent states, Europe and America are aggregating themselves into a few greater dominions, and organizing themselves on a more warlike basis than has ever been known before. It may be that no one of the five or six great masses into which the civilized world is consolidating itself, at present possesses a fleet equal to our own, but it is easy to foresee combinations which would give the required superiority, and, unless we are warned in time, may expose us to all the horrors under which unhappy France is now suffering. If Englishmen could only be induced to ourselves to make those sacrifices of time and money which alone can save the British Empire from dismemberment, and these islands from the horrors of invasion. THE game of whist, after two centuries of elaboration, has now become a favourite amusement in all ranks of society, and especially with persons of great intelligence and ability. Numerous societies have been established expressly for its practice, and at many of the West End clubs it is played daily, particularly in the afternoon, when the mental faculties are more active than in the evening. At these little gatherings may be seen men of high rank, sitting at the same tables with others eminent in literature, science, art, or the public service-all testifying, by the earnestness with which their attention is fixed on the game, to its great intellectual attractions. In the best private circles, too, and in domestic society generally, its high character is becoming better appreciated, although the style of play is still far from what it ought to be. Whist is of English origin, but its popularity is not confined to this country. On the Continent it has become fully naturalized; the finest player that ever lived was a Frenchman, and the most elaborate works on whist are by foreign authors. It has, in fact, extended over the whole earth; there is not a spot where European civilization prevails, where whist is not practised and prized. A published collection of Whist Studies' dates from the tropics; in the rigour of the North American winter whist forms the occupation of the frozen-up inhabitants for months together; and in the wilds of Australia the farmers play at whist for 'sheep points, with a bullock on the rubber.' We need not hesitate to give a place in our pages to an intellectual occupation of such high and universal interest; and we propose, first, to offer a concise history of the game; next to describe the chief characteristics of its most modern and improved form and, lastly, to add a few remarks on whist playing. The early history of whist is involved in some obscurity. It is not to be supposed that a game of this high character should have sprung at once perfect into being; it has been formed by gradual development from elements previously existing. As early as the beginning of the sixteenth century a card game was in common use, of which both the name and the chief feature enter prominently into the construction of whist. This was called triumph-corrupted into trump-and the essence of it was the predominance of one particular suit, called the triumph or trump-suit, over all the others. It was of Continental origin, like most of the card games in use at that period. A work published in Italy in 1526 speaks of it under the name of Trionfi, and it is mentioned by Rabelais as la Triumphe, among the games played by Gargantua. From France it was imported into England, where it soon became popular in good society, as we find a reference to it in a quarter where it would hardly be looked for, namely, in a sermon preached by Latimer at Cambridge the Sunday before Christmas, Unto an enemy's triumph.' This passage has been the subject of several comments; but the repeated allusions to card playing leave no doubt as to the reference in the last word. The game of Triumph appears to have been played in several different ways, some of which resembled our present Ecarté; they had, however, little similarity to whist, except in the feature of the predominance of hich was common to them ginning of the seventeenth had acquired in England which is also preserved in uffe. It has often excited word for an ornament to ts should have come to be pose; but it is possible that only another corruption of nch triomphe, as there is in the sounds. At any rate ynonymous, as Cotgrave, in English Dictionary,' 1611, nch word triomphe to mean called ruffe or trump; and lossary says 'ruff meant a ta dominatrix. praneously with this change, had also undergone, in Engifications which caused it to from the original foreign g these was the attachment ntages, or honours,' to the -ds of the trump-suit. This itself an ancient invention, ame called 'les Honeurs' in out the importation of it into. ve the game a new character, name of Ruff-and-honours,' n being called 'French ruff' ours was played with a pack ds, the ace ranking the highere four players, two being the other two, and each reards; the remaining four were on the table, and the top one to determine the trump suit. o happened to hold the ace the privilege of taking the nge for four cards of his own, alled ruffing. The score was party that won most tricks ward to win the set. Three e joint hands were reckoned wo tricks, and four honours to me very near to whist, and hist in an imperfect form. changes in the constitution of the radical alteration of the to have taken place early in h century. The first form of gnation was Whisk, a word in 'Taylor's Motto,' by Taylor, et, published in 1621. Speakdigal, he says: |