Purchase has conferred the following benefits on the nation : promo 1st. It has given a rapid flow of tion without cost to the taxpayer. Out of 127,000l. voted for full-pay retirements, 61,000l. go to the cavalry and infantry, and 66,000l. to the artillery and engineers. If purchase is destroyed, and a sum equivalent to that which the artillery and engineers now get is voted for the cavalry and infantry, this sum of 127,000l. must be increased to 700,000l. If the retirements be placed on the footing that the Special Committee of the House of Commons, presided over by Mr. Childers, declared was requisite for the artillery and engineers, this sum must be increased to 1,700,000%. 2nd. In every profession, where men enter young, numbers must come in who are put there by their friends and who are unsuited, from many causes, for the duties. Purchase gets rid of these men rapidly and quietly. Out of 1000 men who enter the army as ensigns, it appears that 442, or twofifths, leave before they become captains, and 185, or nearly one-fifth more, leave as captains. Thus, more than three-fifths of the whole number leave before they become Field-officers. Hence the State is no longer burdened with either employing or pensioning men whose tastes and feelings are not adapted to a military life. Compare this with the non-purchase corps, the artillery and engineers, in which officers enter to serve for their lives, and in which the Duke of Cambridge said the service suffered because it was almost impossible to get rid of inefficient officers. on several occasions, by direct payments to the Exchequer, and by indirect payments to the same account, that is by buying up the commissions of officers whose half-pay then ceased to be a charge on the Treasury.' Mr. Cardwell assured the House of Commons, in a quotation from Shakespeare, that honour, not gold, is the soldier's guerdon. Assuredly honour, not gold, has been the purchasing officer's guerdon. When purchase is abolished, what' prospect is there that a better or any system at all will be substituted? Purchase acts now as a kind of natural selection. Those men who are unsuited for the army go away, without expense to the country; those men who are suited remain. But it is said that promotion is to be by selection. How can selection be exercised in an army like the English army, scattered all over the world? Is it not more than likely that promotion will fall to the fortunate men who can remain. at home, and hang about London? What portion of our military arrangements has always proved successful? The regimental: therefore break it down. What portion has usually failed? The staff, founded on selection: Therefore introduce selection generally. " We freely admit that the very name of purchase' creates a prejudice against the system, which the majority of persons don't take the trouble to understand, and when a powerful ministry purposes its abolition we consider that it is doomed. But let the country clearly understand the cost. In addition to the eight or twelve millions, which are required for the purchase of commis3rd. Independent officers are obtained. sions, another million must be provided anIn the present state of the art of war inde-nually for retirement, representing an enorpendent officers are all-important. The opinions of the author of The Prussian Infantry, 1869,' are at least worthy of respect, and he tells us, speaking of peace reviews, An officer does not act according to his own military view, but according to the principles which he knows are held by the superior officer, with whom the final decision lies.' The anomalies perpetrated 'sink deep into the minds of the troops, and poison the judgment of the officer who is not intellectually self-dependent.' 4th. Purchase is an admirable bargain for the nation. Mr. Clode, in his book, 'The Military Forces of the Crown,' tells us The purchasing officers of the line have done more than provide a retirement for nonpurchasing officers of their own branch of the service, they have given a retirement to officers of the non-purchase corps (ie. Artillery and Engineers), and to others who have never been contributors. Their fund has been diminished mous permanent cost. For a small portion of this sum London might be fortified, and the Forth, Clyde, Mersey, Tyne, and Humber secured from a foreign foe. Which would render the country most secure? Which, in Mr. Cardwell's own words, 'is the most likely to render danger or the apprehension of danger in the future altogether unknown?' II. It is proposed by the Bill to withdraw from the Lieutenants of Counties the powers they now have in regard to the auxiliary forces. This is undoubtedly a wise reform, if it be worked properly. But we are not informed how these forces are to be officered. Taking away a bit of parchment from a militia officer signed by a Lieutenant of a county, and giving him a similar bit of parchment signed by the Queen, does not alter the efficiency of the man. stated that the abolition of purchase will enable the regular Army to be fused with the Militia. How this will be accomplished It has been we are not informed; but, as we are told by the advocates of the abolition of purchase that it will take thirty years to do away with the obstacle, the process of fusion will be slow. And, in the meanwhile, is the country the stronger for the change? Mr. Trevelyan very properly impressed upon his audience in Edinburgh that 'the organisation must not only begin at once, but it must be complete. On examination, we find that, while the Militia are to be removed from the authority of the Lieutenant, the chief magistrate of the county, they are partially to be placed under the Justices of the Peace, who are to provide the barracks; and the cost of these barracks is to be borne by local rates and not imperial funds. Nothing interferes with the efficiency of the Militia more than the billeting system; yet, while Mr. Cardwell takes the patronage of the regiment out of the hands of the Lieutenant of the County, he vests the provision of barracks, and consequent efficiency of the regiment, in the Justices, and attempts to charge the local rates, already strained to the utmost, with an expenditure for imperial purposes. III. Army Enlistment for a period not exceeding twelve years, to be spent partly in the Reserve and partly with the colours, as the Secretary of State for War and the soldier may agree on. We are not informed of the effect of these arrangements upon the pension received by the soldier. Will he receive a pension at the end of twelve years or not? How will this affect recruiting? The whole object of short service is to get a large Reserve force. But if the supply of recruits fails, what is to become of the Reserve? The pension a soldier receives, at the end of his service, is usually one great inducement to enlist. We get, or may calculate on getting some 30,000 recruits yearly. Should we obtain so many if there were no pensions? Again, it may be fairly asked, is it right to rest such an important matter as the formation of an army reserve on the wishes or will of the soldiers themselves? There is no proportion fixed between the numbers of men in the active army and the Reserve; and, judging by recent speeches in both Houses of Parliament, there is every likelihood of a large proportion of the army being placed in the Reserve, and still counted as effective by the Minister for War, thus leaving the effective force of the country to be played with, as it ever has been, solely to suit the convenience of the Government of the day. The proposal to drill the Militia recruits for six months is undoubtedly a good one; but when will the country, so far as its national defence is concerned, be benefited by this proposal? and how will it affect recruiting for the Militia? Will recruits be obtained as easily when they have to be drilled for six months as for one month? V. The Laws of the Ballot are altered. Instead of being, as now it is, the actual law of the country, it is to be used only in cases of great emergency. Then Parliament must be summoned, and the sovereign, by an Order in Council, may direct the Militia to be recruited by the ballot. Now, if there is one thing more than another in which modern discovery has revolutionized the art of war, it is the necessitythe paramount necessity-of being ready. To talk of raising the militia by ballot when an emergency has taken place, is simply to talk of insuring the house after the fire breaks out. It has been well said that England, from the fact of being an island, bounds every state, and, consequently, her frontier, or coast-line, is exposed to attack on every point. Her wealthy metropolis, perfectly defenceless, is only two days' march from her frontier; her great commercial cities, equally undefended, are chiefly on her frontier; and, when she is attacked, the game is not the same for the two belligerents: one stakes its fleet and a small portion of its army, the other stakes her existence. emergency' takes place. When can we put the men in line? That is the question. Will it be in three or six months? and what under existing circumstances do three or six months mean? • An Again we turn to Mr. G. O. Trevelyan; and he tells us 'Nothing conduced so much to the ruin of the Emperor Napoleon as his taking one half of a new system without having the determination to accept it in all its parts. He relied on the Mobiles, and did not dare to turn them into soldiers.' Mr. Cardwell does not rely on voluntary enlistment when an army alone is wanted, viz., 'an emergency'; but he does not dare to prepare an army beforehand. He alters one of the oldest laws of this country, the liability to universal service for home defence, and limits it to an emergency.' Is the country any the stronger for this alteration? Is the national defence one whit improved? VI. The Articles of War are to be applied to the Volunteer force when under arms for a review. This simply annoys the VolunIV. The Militia are to be raised by volunteers and does no good, for it is manifestly tary enlistment, and the period of drill ex- | impossible to enforce it. tended for a period of six months, at the VII. The Government has power on an option of the Secretary of State for War. emergency to take possession of the rail ways. This is undoubtedly a wise and fitting provision, and would aid national defence. We have now considered the Government proposals for reorganising the Army and improving the national defence, for enabling our military forces to meet the altered conditions of the art of war, and for giving us that security and that protection which the enormous sum we annually pay entitles us to expect. And we find that they amount to nothing - absolutely nothing. We are to spend this year 2,800,000l. extra in order to put us in nearly the same position in which we were eighteen months ago; but as for any system-any measures for dealing with this all-important subject other than in a superficial way-any sign of a broad and comprehensive review of national defence' -any attempt to lay the deep foundations of a system which may render danger and the apprehension of danger in the future altogether unknown'-they are not to be found in the Government proposals. It is with feelings of the deepest regret, the most profound sorrow, that we are forced to come to this conclusion. Leave the abolition of purchase out of the question, what does the proposed scheme contain for good or evil? Absolutely nothing. Some years ago we saw a magnificent ocean-going steamer on a rock within sight of her port, crowded with passengers, loaded with freight and specie. She was uninjured. Could she be floated off she might be saved. Those employed to rescue her sought to do so by attaching large indiarubber cylinders to her sides, but in vain. Each time the tide rose and the strain of the great chains was thrown on the flimsy material, it tore to bits and the air escaped. Day after day of favourable weather was afforded, to the astonishment and wonder of all who knew that stormy coast. It seemed as if every chance that Providence could give, was given; but neglecting the experience of those who understood such matters, nothing was tried but bags of indiarubber filled with air. Suddenly a gale arose; the workmen had to fly for their lives; and the splendid ship rapidly became an utter wreck. England may be fitly compared to that ship: she is now unhurt, uninjured on a rock. It requires but skill and courage to float her off-to place her, as of old, on the crest of the waves. Providence has given her warnings, has afforded her space and time, to apply those remedies which a just induction from recent events clearly demonstrates to be the true ones. Mr. Cardwell is attempting to float her off by the aid of empty promises-the abolition of purchase, the use of the ballot on emergencies, placing the Volunteers under the Mutiny Act on Easter Monday, and such likebags filled with air, that will undoubtedly rend to ribbons when the strain of war comes on them. May that Providence which has guided England so far save her too from becoming a wreck! What hope is there for the future? We confess we see but little. Mr. Gladstone's Government promised us two years ago a happy, peaceful, and contented Ireland, through the medium of a Land Bill and a Church Abolition Bill. Few thoughtful men believed them. They have recently asked for a Secret Committee to investigate the state of that unhappy country. They now promise to 'render the apprehension of danger unknown for the future' by the Army Regulation Bill. Does any one believe them? Who will say that two years hence a Secret Committee may not be sitting to investigate the causes of some terrible national disaster, produced by inefficient military organisation? We may well exclaim with General Trochu, Comment l'esprit militaire demeurait-il dans le pays avec de tels enseignements longtemps continués ?' Marshal Niel implored the Emperor to alter the French military arrangements, to shorten the length of service, to localise the corps, to form a large reserve, and retain the regular army only as a training school. All the ablest and best French officers (and despite recent events there are many such) urged this course; but the Emperor feared the powerful party who opposed any attempt at the introduction of universal military ser vice. We see the result. It is written with the bayonet on the heart of France. Painful to think that such things may happen to us. Have we any just, any well-founded reason, to believe that we alone are to be secure! NOTE TO THE ARTICLE ON 'The Lives of the Lord Chancellors of Ireland,' in No. 259. p. 107.-In mentioning the eminent men who have held the Great Seal at Ireland since Lord to name one of the most eminent of all, SIR Plunket's retirement, we accidentally omitted JOSEPH NAPIER, to whose legal knowledge, high character, and political integrity we gladly pay our tribute of respect. |