between the moment of the latter coming within range and that of closing with the defenders, the interposition of the parapet would, speaking theoretically, place one of the latter on an equality with three assailants. Every improvement in the science of projectiles has been in favour of the lamb against the wolf; and it is evident that the advantages to the defenders must increase in the triple proportion of the range, accuracy, and rapidity of fire. Thus, the same man behind a parapet, who, when armed with stones or darts, might be equal to three assailants, would, when furnished with a weapon firing ten shots in a minute at an effective range of six hundred yards, be equal in theory to fifty assailants, or, if we suppose only every fifth shot to tell, to ten assailants advancing to the attack over open ground.

The present range, accuracy, and rapidity of fire impart to all irregulars, when acting on the defensive, a greater value than they formerly possessed in the threefold proportion of those elements; and the consideration is one of paramount interest to England, since her Volunteers, by reason of their proficiency in shooting, would, in this view, be little inferior to trained soldiers in defending an entrenched position.

As the art of fortification advanced, towns were completely surrounded by parapet walls, and various devices were adopted in their construction, with the purpose of increasing the superiority of defensive fire, of which the most important was the provision of flanking defence.

The reduction of an ancient fortress, too strong to be carried by sudden assault, was undertaken, as in modern times, in a methodical and scientific manner, the system of attack being regulated according to the nature of the defences. In the absence of any sufficient means of forcing a passage through a solid rampart too lofty for escalade, the assailants resorted to the erection of a huge mound of earth, pushing forward the mass gradually until it touched the walls, and raising it to the level of the summit, from whence the besiegers might pour their stormers over the defences. Many passages in the Old Testament refer to this method of capturing besieged cities, as (Deut. xx. 20), where the Israelites are commanded to 'build bulwarks against the city' until it should be subdued; and yet more expressly in the denunciation against Sennacherib (2 Kings, xix. 32), proclaiming that he should not shoot an arrow into Jerusalem, nor come before it with a shield, nor cast a bank against it.'

was superseded by the method of effecting an entrance into a besieged place by breaching the wall with battering-rams and engines hurling masses of rock and other missiles with great force. To effect this, however, these engines had to be brought close up to the wall; and the necessity of protecting the soldiers employed in running up these engines or rams, and in working them when in position, gave rise to the system of approaches, the rudest idea of which is expressed in the moveable towers or sheds on wheels, which were pushed up to the walls. This system has, in modern days, .only been elaborated to suit the altered conditions introduced by science in military operations.

As the power of artillery increased, it became necessary to substitute for the parapet wall a rampart built of a thick mound of earth, the excavation of which formed the ditch. This mound was faced or scarped with brick or masonry to such a height as to render access to the interior impossible except by scaling-ladders; and to prevent this scarped wall, forming the inner side of the ditch, from being brought down in ruins by a distant fire, it was protected by raising on the outer edge of the ditch an earthen mound or parapet higher than, and sloping gradually towards, the surrounding country.

The increased range and accuracy of hollow projectiles have rendered the old system of closely surrounding a town with a continuous rampart or enceinte both useless and dangerous, unless supplemented by a system of detached forts sufficiently in advance to keep an enemy's artillery beyond that distance from which he might destroy the place by his shells. It was the absence of such advanced works at Sedan that enabled the Germans to place their artillery on the heights surrounding the fortress, and compelled the surrender of the French army enclosed within its walls.

A series of such forts disposed on a large circumference constitute a vast entrenched camp, the forts themselves armed with the heaviest known ordnance and requiring comparatively small garrisons, yet affording the most favourable battle positions for a large army, whose flanks would rest on two of the forts and whose front would be effectually protected by their fire.

In general terms, the advantages of such a system are:-1. They oblige an enemy to commence his approaches at a great distance from the place they are designed to protect, thereby preventing its being destroyed by distant bombardment, and rendering it necessary, before such a result can be achieved, that the besiegers should reduce two or more of the adjacent forts by regular ap

2. The circumference

miles; 8. Nogent, three miles; 9. Charenton, two miles; 10. Ivry, one mile and three-quarters; 11 and 12. Bicêtre and Montrouge, each one mile from the enceinte; 13. Vanves, one mile and a quarter; 14. Issy, one mile and a half; 15. Valérien, three miles. These forts are all of perfect construction, the smallest being capable of holding 4000 men.

At the time when the forts were constructed the extreme range of hollow projectiles did not exceed two and a half miles; and the mind of the engineer failed to grasp the idea that a time would come, as it has come, when the effective range of shells would be five miles. It should, therefore, be remembered that it was with a view to the conditions of artillery science at the time of their construction that the forts were located; and the disadvantage to the present defence of Paris occasioned by the intervening progress of that science is very considerable. On the north and east, indeed, the forts afford even now a sufficient protection to the city; but the western and southern fronts are weak, for reasons we shall endeavour to explain.

First, on the west, it will be observed, by reference to a map, that the Seine, flowing from the point of its southern bend at Sevres to that of its northern bend at St. Denis, covers the enceinte for an extent of fourteen miles, and is nowhere at a greater distance from the ramparts than two miles; that is to say, everywhere within easy range of the guns from the ramparts. The river here serves the purpose of a wet ditch, the passage of which could not prudently be attempted by an enemy at any point.

One mile from the river and three miles from the enceinte, due west from the centre of the Bois de Bologne, was placed the fort of Valérien, which for its size and strength merits the appellation of a fortress; and this was the only exterior defence along the front of fourteen miles above referred to. Now, the distance of Valérien from St. Denis, the nearest fort on the north, is eight miles; and from Issy, the nearest fort on the south, is six miles; leaving, therefore, a considerable space on each side where the besiegers might approach their batteries to the Seine without the risk of serious injury from the guns of the different forts.

To remedy this defect, the French, after Sedan, interpolated two new works-the redoubts of Courbevoie and Genevilliersbetween Valérien and St. Denis; and two others, those of Montretout and Sêvres, between Valérien and Issy; but, before these could be armed, they were forcibly occupied by the Germans, and although the latter

subsequently abandoned all but Sêvres, they have been useless to the defence.

Turning now to the south, and commencing from the left, we find the forts Issy, Vanves, Montrouge, Bicêtre, Ivry, located on a range of heights running nearly parallel to the enceinte, at an average distance of one mile and a half. But towards the country there is a second range, parallel to and 200 feet higher than the first, viz. that of Clamart, Chatillon, and Villejuif, which, being only a mile from the line of forts, affords sites for the besiegers' batteries, distant only two and a half miles from the enceinte. Thus the forts which, under the conditions existing at the time of their construction, would have been effective in protecting the city from vertical fire, are not now effective for that purpose. From the heights of Clamart and Chatillon a range of five miles would command the whole of Paris south of the Seine. It is not necessary, therefore, that the besiegers should capture these forts as a preliminary to a bombardment. What is the reason, then, why no such measure has been adopted?

The general mode in which the Germans have waged their war ought to be a sufficient proof that no considerations of sentiment or humanity would be allowed to interfere with any method which might promise success at the earliest possible moment. And we are convinced that the one only reason why two millions of human beings, the greater part being helpless women and children, have been spared the horrors of a bombardment, has been the recognition by the German leaders that in an artillery duel they would have been overmatched. According to a Berlin telegram, dated 19th October, the complete siege train had arrived before Paris before that date, but no attempt has yet been made to mount the guns.

In ordinary sieges the advantage to the assailant consists in the power to choose one corner or angle of the besieged place for attack, and, by the construction of numerous batteries on a long curved line embracing that angle, to obtain a convergent or concentrated fire on the works adjacent to the angle, in reply to which the fire of the besieged must be divergent, an advantage which results surely in silencing the fire of the place.

But the vast circumference of Paris, which is the principal cause of its strength, renders this method inapplicable. The attack and defence are practically limited to a long straight line; and the besieged have built quite as many earthen batteries between two adjacent forts, for the defence, as the Germans have constructed for the attack. Supe

The composition of the German siege train must be as yet mere matter of conjecture. Trustworthy details of the armament of Paris are likewise wanting; but as a matter of probability, it ought to be superior both in number and power to that of the besiegers, since the French could have mounted the heaviest known guns at their leisure, and neither the number nor the weight of these was limited before the war by difficulties of transport, which have formed so serious a hindrance to the German operations.

It would be of small advantage to the besieged that they should possess a superior artillery, if they were obliged to distribute their guns equally all round the defences to provide against a possible attack at any point, while the enemy could mass the whole of his heavy guns for the attack of two or three adjacent forts. But these are not the conditions of the case we are considering. Both from their sorties and other means of intelligence the French possess accurate information as to the locality of the German siege trains, and consequently as to the points threatened with attack; and we cannot doubt, therefore, that by means of the circular railway they have been able to concentrate at those points the greater number of their heavy guns, and that these would be found to be at once more numerous and more powerful than those of the besiegers.*

larger gap than would be created by the reduction of any other three forts, uncovering as it would do the long line of ramparts extending from behind Montrouge to behind Valérien; and because from the sites of Issy and Vanves, supposing them captured; a five-mile range would command all the best parts of the city of Paris, as well north as south of the Seine.

But from the preceding remarks it will be gathered that we do not estimate highly the German chances of success in such an attempt. The earthen batteries of the besieged are interpolated between permanent works erected with masonry, while the besiegers' batteries are all of earth. Some idea may be formed of the difficulty of keeping guns covered under a fire from the artillery of the day, from the result of an experiment made at Shoeburyness in 1863, where the Armstrong 100-pounder shell gun, firing from a distance of 2000 yards, made a clear breach thirty feet wide in a hard-rammed earthen parapet twenty feet thick in three hours. Since that date artillery science has made great advances, and the same result would be now obtained by a gun firing from a distance of 7000 yards. These views are supported by the following extract from a letter of the Times' correspondent at Versailles, dated 27th November:

'I was a little surprised to find the German lines so far retired. It was explained by the advance of the French lines at Villejuif and by the erection of the new batteries which enfiladed part of the former position; and I learnt that my old observatory at the Bavarian redoubt had been utterly razed to the ground by those ruthless forts.'

* A correspondent of the Times' has lately shown reason for supposing the following details to be correct :

The French forts are armed with heavy ship guns-viz., 10-inch, throwing a projectile of 500 lbs.; 9-inch, throwing 300 lbs.; 7-inch, throwing 180 lbs.; and other pieces ranging from 6-inch downwards. Besides these heavy guns have been cast in the Paris foundries for arming the new earthen batteries interpolated between the forts, and at some places constructed considerably in advance; as at Mont Avron, in front of Rosny; Hautes Bruyères and Moulin Saquet, in front of Bicêtre and Ivry; and a new work one mile in front of Valérien, which has lately thrown a shell as far as the outskirts of

Versailles.

The most powerful gun at the command of the besiegers is believed by the same writer to be one having a calibre of 9 inches, and decidedly inferior to the French 104-inch gun.

fire of the forts has occasioned both much loss and no little extra trouble to the German engineers.

As a sort of compensation to the garrison for their short rations, the besiegers are subject to some special disadvantages from the peculiarity of their position.

As all idea of reducing Paris by force was abandoned, the attitude of the besiegers became purely defensive, and the hardships occasioned by the constant wearying watchfulness necessitated thereby have been very serious. For many weeks it was felt that sorties in force might be expected at any moment: rendering it necessary to keep large bodies of men at their different alarm-posts at all hours, ready for instant action; and reminding us of the good old border days, when the troopers

'Carved at the meal with gloves of steel, And drank the red wine through the helmets barr'd.'

For the same reason the German troops who, in the early days of the siege, dwelt comfortably in houses and villages, were compelled to exchange these for encampments in the open, the sites of which were chosen with a view to rapidity of concentration. It is probable that great hardships and much sickness have been occasioned to the besiegers by this attitude of constant watchfulness. We must now turn to the actual events of the campaign, which the foregoing remarks are designed to illustrate.

the masses.

The whole military and political system of France was at this time in a state of hopeless confusion, without any directing head. The absurd arrangement of entrusting the Prefects with the military command of their respective departments, was producing its natural results in disconnected and useless efforts and conflicting authority. Marseilles and Lyons were threatened with a red republican insurrection, which was only prevented by the good sense and patriotism of The Prefect of Lyons, without a shadow of justification, arrested General Mazure in command of the troops in that city; and Admiral Fourichon, in disgust because this arbitrary and senseless act was approved by his colleagues of the Government delegation at Tours, resigned the Portfolio of War. On the other hand, thirteen departments banded together to demand the nomination of a general independent of ministerial authority, to organise the defence of the western provinces. Numerous bodies of Francs-tireurs wandered independently over the country, inspiring as much terror among the inhabitants as the Germans themselves; and at Tours, under the eyes of the Government delegation, the officers of one of these corps were besieged in their hotel and threatened with death by their mutinous followers. The only hope of extrication from this chaos was in the advent of some capable and energetic man, who should be endowed with supreme authority, and with resolution to enforce it.

The chief interest of the war centred round Paris and Metz. The operations elsewhere have been of minor importance, and have exercised no appreciable influence. The sieges of Schelestadt, Neuf Brisach, Belfort, &c., being exterior to their general line of operations, were only undertaken by the Germans for the purpose of completing the conquest of Alsace, which they had determined to annex to Germany; and our limits forbid any further reference to them.

The fall of Toul and Strasburg, both after a brilliant defence, in the last week of September, liberated 80,000 German troops, part of whom were sent to reinforce the investment of Paris; while the remainder, about 70,000, were formed into an army under the command of General Von Werder, to be employed in subjugating Lyons and the south-east.

Meanwhile a French army had been gathering on the Loire, having its headquarters at Bourges, about 55 miles south of Orleans, a place containing a large cannon foundry, and of strategical importance, situated as it is within the loop formed by the Loire, and at the junction of the different roads leading to Tours, Blois, Orleans, Gien, and Nevers, all commanding passages over the river.

In the early days of the great siege the Germans drew their subsistence from the zone of country surrounding Paris; but that becoming exhausted, their foraging columns were necessarily detached farther and farther from their supports on all the different roads radiating from the capital; and as large bodies could not be spared for this service, the troops employed therein incurred risk increasing with the distance to which they were detached. Thus the Germans were repulsed with some loss in two attempts to enter St. Quentin, a town lying 100 miles northeast from Paris. They were likewise twice defeated and deprived of the provisions they had collected at Dreux, 50 miles due west from the capital. In revenge they burnt the thriving village of Cherizy near the town, as well as all the farms and houses along their line of retreat to Houdan. At Ablis, a beautiful village 45 miles from Paris, cn the Chartres railroad, a squadron of Prussian Hussars, there billeted, were surprised in the night by Francs-tireurs; as a punishment for which Ablis was afterwards burnt with circumstances of great atrocity.

Early in October the German parties pressed so closely upon Orleans, that General Reyan, with the advanced guard of the Army of the Loire, which had by this time attained a real existence under General La Motterouge, although sadly deficient in discipline and equipment, advancing north of the city, encountered and drove back the Germans from Artenay to Etampes. This sign of life on the part of the French it was thought prudent to stifle at once by detaching from the investing force before Paris the 1st Bavarian Corps under Von der Tann, who on the 10th of October, with his own corps, the 22nd Prussian division, and Prince Albrecht's cavalry, attacked General Reyan at Artenay, and drove him back to the forest of Orleans. Reyan had with him only 15,000 men and