in the Thames, and at Portland and else- | 20-inch smooth bores may be inferior to where-are in too backward a state to ad- our 12-inch 25-ton guns, still the difference mit of their receiving any armament for a between the two cases is this, their forts are long time to come. If we are allowed a built and armed, and are efficient and suffew years more of peace and leisure, the ficient for the purposes for which they were time wasted on experimenting may not be erected; ours are, and for a long time to considered as misspent, nor the time lost in come will be, only in progress, and the guns the continued changes of plan which these to be mounted on them are not yet forged. experiments led to. But should we become The Americans, consequently, do not require involved in war with any maritime Power to keep any fleet in commission for defensive during that period, the delay may lead to purposes, and what navy they have afloat disasters of incalculable magnitude; while they can send roaming over the world, feeleven now our well-known unprotected state ing that it is not wanted at home. They invites attack, and may draw us into a war keep up no standing army, except for purwhich, had we been known to be prepared, poses of police or for their Indian wars, and no one would have ventured upon. there is no talk among them of militia or volunteers for defensive purposes. Not only, therefore, do the Americans feel all the pride of strength and security, but the saving they are able to make in their naval and military estimates is ten times the interest of the outlay on their fortifications.

While we have thus been experimenting, hesitating, and economising, our shrewder cousins across the Atlantic have gone to work in a very different spirit. No sooner did they perceive, during their great civil war, that their flank was exposed to attack by a foreign fleet that might take the part In one other respect the Americans have of the Southerners in the quarrel, than they set us an example we should have done well set to work to defend their harbours by the to follow. After the civil war they sold or erection of great casemated batteries, sup- dismantled all the less efficient vessels of ported by others of a more temporary their navy which had been built in haste to nature. Since peace was restored these meet the emergency of the moment, but works have been vigorously pursued, and they retained a sufficient number of their are now so complete that not only Boston small monitors and gunboats to act as auxiliand New York may be considered as unas- ary floating defences to the forts. So strongsailable, but every creek and harbour only was this want felt by our Commission of their eastern seaboard is so defended as to be free from any danger of attack from without. It is true the works so erected are open to criticism, and there is little doubt but that, if a squadron armed with the heavy artillery our ships carry, were allowed a forenoon's quiet practice on them, they might be rendered untenable. They are armed, however, by 15- and 20-inch Colambiads, throwing solid shot of 500 and 1000 lbs. weight, and in such numbers as must certainly ensure the infliction of an enormous amount of damage on any squadron that came within their range. Even if the forts did not sink or destroy the ships of the attacking squadron, the injuries received must be such that the fleet must go somewhere to refit. For this purpose we have a floating-dock in Bermuda, and some indifferent and ill-protected accommodation at Halifax, but utterly inadequate for such a purpose. The French have nothing, and no other navy possesses any means of refitting their fleet on that side of the Atlantic; while the prospect of recrossing the occan to repair damages after such an encounter, is one which the boldest sailor would hardly like to contemplate. Although therefore it must be admitted that the American forts are not so perfect as ours, and that their

1859-60, that they recommended an immediate outlay of one million for this purpose. The money was never voted, but the Minister assured Parliament that the amount would be placed at the disposal of the Admiralty, and that they would see to the work being carried out. Nothing, however, was done till some two years ago, when the firm of Armstrong and Co. built at Newcastle a gunboat of a novel description, called the Staunch,' to carry a single 12-ton gun. She was purchased by the Government for 64507., and, armed complete and ready for sea, is estimated to cost some | 80007. After a year's delay, a sister boat was built, and since then, it is understood, eight or ten more are ordered. The Admiralty have thus at last ventured to incur a liability for 80,000l. to 100,000l. out of a million placed at their disposal ten years ago. If, however, the expenditure of a million were deemed expedient for the purpose at that time, it is infinitely more so now, inasmuch as during the interval a whole tem of defence by torpedoes has been invented, and, by the introduction of electricity, brought to a wonderful degree of perfection. Torpedoes, however, are of very little use unless protected by the guns of some fort sufficiently powerful to keep a

sys

tached for that purpose may be outnumber- tage equal to that afforded to the attacking ed and overpowered as MacMahon was at party. It may of course be that a larger Wörth, and the victorious fleets combined force could by its means be despatched may be more than a match for what re- from Cherbourg, Brest, Antwerp, or Jahde, mains to us. The fact is, and no one and more rapidly thrown on our shores by probably doubts it, that powerful as our steamers than could be done by Napoleon present fleet is, we have no such reserve I.'s flat-bottomed boats from Boulogne and of iron-clad vessels as would enable us to Calais. But in both instances, though the supply the place of those we might be de- bridge may be formed, a superior fleet will prived of by a reverse at sea, and no suf- inevitably break it down, and till the attackficient means of repairing or refitting those ing party feel sure that they can prevent that escaped, in anything like the time re- this being done, the attempt will not be quisite to place us in a position of safety. made. In other words, the invasion of this It must also be borne in mind that iron-clad country will not take place till the enemy vessels cannot be extemporised. Two years has such a superiority at sea as will enable are probably the least time in which one of him to bring over and land his troops and the first class can be built and ready for stores, and allow him time to advance into commission, and even those of the second the country and fight such a decisive battle class require at least twelve months to com- as may enable him to obtain possession of plete. As wars are now conducted, it will the capital. During the last great war we consequently be too late to think of much had that superiority, and, if we had had the increase, if any, after the struggle has com- men, could at any time after the battle of menced. Trafalgar have landed an army on any part of the French coast we chose, and have maintained its communications with its base for any time that was required. If the conditions as to the command at sea were reversed, it is evident any other power might do the same by us. If, however, the invader is cut off from his base before he has time to effect the main object of the campaign, his army, however powerful at first, would almost certainly be worn out by de

ous than it is hoped we are, must eventually be compelled to surrender as prisoners of

war.

In order to understand such a problem as the invasion of England, of which no actual experience exists, it is necessary to assume some hypothetical data which shall represent the facts of the case as nearly as possible. Any one may make such additions or deductions from these assumptions as in his judgment may be required, but it is ne

Under these circumstances no one can feel surprise that men are anxiously inquiring what our means of resistance are if an enemy should force our first line of defence by gaining the requisite ascendancy in the Channel. If, for instance, the French or any other equal or nearly equal fleet could be equipped and fitted for sea, more rapidly than ours, or were able to select some time when our fleet was absent and engaged else-grees, and, unless we were more pusillanimwhere, few will doubt that they might, in the present incomplete and unfortified state of our dockyards, convert a temporary ascendancy into a permanent disaster. When the recommendations of the Commission of 1860 are fully carried out-if they ever are -this would not be the case, and the fleet would probably have leisure to resume the superiority, which is assumed as the first condition of the problem, that it now possesses. But in the event of the fleet being overpowered or destroyed, the Channel, in-cessary to state them in order to be intellistead of being a defence, is practically a means for facilitating the invasion of the country. It is easier to transport men and materials by sea than by rail, it is easier to conceal the knowledge of the point intended to be attacked, and the first blow can consequently be delivered far more suddenly and effectively by sea than by land. But to do this the enemy must feel sure of his naval superiority at sea. Abstractedly it is not true-though so frequently assertedthat steam has bridged the Channel.

It

would of course be so, if the enemy employed steam and we were debarred from its use, but the power of concentrating rapidly our means of defence is an advan

gible. Let us assume therefore that for some reason or other Prussia had agreed to accept the now famous Benedetti Secret Treaty. No one understood better than the Emperor Napoleon, that the invasion of Belgium meant war with England, and we by our declarations in Parliament at the close of the last session accepted that interpretation. This being so the 300,000 men who in July last were available for the invasion of Germany, were equally so for a British Belgic war.

No one probably would be so absurd as to suppose that in the event of this course being determined upon, the French__would quietly have marched their army to Brussels

could supply more men if they had the same facilities of transport.

and set themselves down to besiege Antwerp, allowing the English at their leisure to fit out their fleet, recruit their army, and The question is, what force could we opto succour the Belgians at their own time, pose to such an army. Taking the most and in the manner most convenient to them- favourable view of the case, we could, by selves. When a nation resolves on going to draining Ireland and scraping together every war with two allied powers, one of whom is available man, put 50,000 men-infantry comparatively weak, the other relatively and cavalry-into the field, with 200 guns much stronger, it would be madness to waste all fully equipped. It is no use going into time, and to a certain extent the resources the details of their organisation or equipof the army, in first settling with the smaller ment. They may be good or they might be power, especially when as in this instance better. This, at least, may be taken for the smaller could afford no succour to the granted, that at home, and for defensive larger, and then only to attack the protect- purposes, they are at least equal, or more ing power when it has had leisure to collect than equal, to any body of troops of equal its forces and prepare for the struggle. A numbers that can be brought against them. much more likely plan of campaign would Whatever may be said about its shortcoming, have been to settle accounts with England it is an excellent army; but it possesses one first, and then Belgium might have been radical defect for our purposes-it is too conquered without difficulty. We may as- small. To make it really effective, it ought sume that the course of proceeding would to be increased to three times its present exhave been somewhat as follows. The French tent, or say 150,000 or 200,000 available fleet would have been secretly mustered and men. Even, however, if by any conceivable fully equipped and ready to issue from its system of enlistment we could raise such a rendezvous simultaneously with the declara- number of men, the expense would be such tion of war reaching London or Paris, and as to put the idea quite out of the question. if it had caught our fleet scattered or unpre- Dividing the army estimates by the number pared, it might have defeated it in detail of men borne in the books, a British soldier and dispersed it, and having bombarded our costs the nation 1007. per annum ;* and unprotected dockyards, have blockaded our though if the army were doubled or trebled, ports and remained masters of the channel. the average cost might be reduced, such an This being done we must either have been increase as we are talking of would entail content to sign an ignominious peace and an annual expenditure of eight to ten milabandon our ally, or have been prepared to lions beyond our present estimates. To prostand the result of an invasion. If this took pose such an increase for such a purpose place, it would probably be in some such would be simply ridiculous for this if for no manner as this. So soon as the possession other reason, that a much smaller addition of the Channel was secured, 100,000 or some to our Navy estimates would in a few years such body of men would be thrown on give us a fleet that would enable us to defy shore at some predetermined spot, with all the navies of the world, and, with proper their artillery, ammunition, and three days' vigilance, ought to render our shores perprovisions, but not necessarily with a single fectly safe against invasion. horse or any of the impediments of war. Their first business would be to seize the strategical points in the neighbourhood of their landing place, and entrench themselves, dragging their field-guns into position to protect the camp. This done the transports would be free to go and come, bringing additional men, stores, horses, &c., till the army was in a position to move out say 150,000 strong and 600 guns, all fully equipped for war, and leaving say 50,000 to guard the camp and protect their base. In the middle of July last it might have taken France ten days or a fortnight to accomplish this, but if uninterrupted-which is one of the conditions of the problem-she certainly could have done it in that time-and have had an additional 100,000 men in reserve to follow up the first success if wanted; and there are other nations of Europe who

At the same time there is no doubt but that a good deal might be done to increase our regular forces without additional expense, if military men could be brought to look on it, for the nonce, as a merely defensive force. A battery of artillery of 6 guns, for instance, requires for its complete war equipment 259 officers and men, and 272 horses, or 46 men and 48 horses per gun. For distant foreign service all this may be necessary; but at home, among friends, and for merely defensive purposes, the 200 fully equipped guns we are now supposed to possess might easily be made into 300 by any officer of genius, not swaddled in the red tape of routine. In like manner with the

A French soldier, calculating in a similar

manner, costs 401. per annum, while a Prussian one costs only 30%.