But such unwelcome questionings on a vital matter of national existence are generally silenced-and that too by a people who are prudent in the ordinary transactions of business-either by the vague superstition, which has outlived many more valuable idiosyncrasies, that England will surmount any difficulties in which she may be involved, or by the still more mischievous conviction that, for some unknown reason, an invasion of English soil is impossible. We are not of those who think poorly of English capacity or courage. Though the race has undergone many changes, much yet remains of the old mastiff temper which, through the frequent struggles of medieval warfare made the somewhat rugged islanders respected on numberless European battle-fields; and there is no finer page in English history than that which records the stern, unwavering spirit in which our countrymen in India faced an insurrection so sudden and ferocious as to have no parallel since the days of Mithridates. But no natural courage can be the equivalent of superior arms, or can compensate for a deficiency in all the scientific and professional appliances by the aid of which modern wars are decided. No national superstitions or traditions can guarantee an army, which, from the very hypothesis, must fight on the defensive with imperfectly trained troops and under the dispiriting influences of inferior numbers and equipments, from the liability to panic and failure. As the Prussians at Jena, the Austrians in the short campaign of 1866, the French in 1870, illustrated this undeniable proposition; so, if national pride allowed us, we might not only remember that there was a period in our annals when, though victorious by sea, we were not equally fortunate by land, but we might even recall scenes in the Crimea when English soldiers showed no immunity from. the influences of a disastrous panic. There are, indeed, some who are accustomed to assume the existence of right and the protec tion of Providence in our public quarrels; but the practice is not confined to Englishmen, and the irreverent dictum of the First Napoleon, that the God of Battles is on the side of the strongest battalions, received at least an illustration both in America and in Germany, where that sacred name was so often and so freely invoked.

to disturb the calculations of her well-con- | anxiety in a matter where nothing should be. sidered policy. Even the measurements of left to chance. our ships, the armaments of our fortifications, the resources of our southern and eastern counties, are, doubtless, recorded with mathematical precision in the Berlin archives, readily available, should ever an emergency arise. It may-we trust it will-never be necessary; but they are wise in their generation, wiser far than we who, surrounded with everything that can tempt the ambition or greed of others, trade on the accidents of our good fortune and depend upon the forbearance of our rivals. Happier also, it may be added, where the consciousness on the part of a nation that they are ready and able to hold their own against all comers begets a manhood and an elevation of feeling undreamt of in the philosophy of the mere political economist, and braces up the lax morality of a too self-indulgent generation. But it is said, so long as our iron-clad fleet exists, and the silver streak' of sea separates us from the Continent, we need not disquiet ourselves with troublesome speculations, and still more troublesome preparations of defence. This is the poetry, not the severe practice of life. It is the flattering unction which weak men lay to their consciences when they seek for an excuse from some irksome duty. Are even our latest naval experiences such as to give us unlimited confidence in the construction of our ships and the organisation of our Admiralty? Do the misadventures of the 'Captain,' the 'Megara,' and the Agincourt' suggest no misgiving to the easy-going mind of the ordinary Englishman? Is modern science so slow and barren in its development, that we can conceive of no new projectile above or below water, no new application of chemical powers which may once again revolutionise the conditions of naval warfare, and at least neutralise the superiority to which we pretend? When we remember the surprises of which modern hostilities are made up; that the war of Secession in America was fought out with muzzle-loaders; that the Southern cruisers had often no better armour than a few chains or plates hung round the ship; that the Danish war first witnessed the use of the needle-gun; that the Italian campaign first proved the superiority of the rifled field-artillery; and that the first ship sunk in 1859 was an Italian iron-clad, which foundered under the attack of an Austrian frigate of the old wooden type, we must acknowledge that the rapidity in the changes of the art of destruction is, at least, as remarkable as their magnitude. Once, however, assume that we are liable to any such surprise in our naval or military preparations, and there is room for

But it is thought (and where thought is so entirely regulated by wish, little reasoning is needed) that invasion is simply impossible. Opposuit natura.' But to say this is to say, in effect, that fertility of resource, and military genius, and unwearied preparation

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and in complete ignorance on the part of our own Government that such preparations had been made. What we therefore think chimerical does not so represent itself to the minds of the highly-trained and practical soldiers of other nations; and the following extract from a letter of the Times' correspondent with the German Army of the Loire is well worthy of consideration. Its value, of course, is not so much as indicating the quarter from which aggression may come, as the light in which this question is viewed by others, and the scientific feasibility of an

for a definite end, and gigantic means concentrated in a single hand and directed by the highest intelligence, are absolutely neutralised by a few miles of sea and the happy accident that may give us a superior fleet of iron-clads at the critical juncture and on the precise theatre of action. To say this, is to forget what we and others have done in former times, our own disembarcation under fire in Egypt, and our equally fortunate landing in the Crimea; to ignore the passage of the Danube before Wagram, and the vast, and, but for the unexpected return of the English fleet from the West Indies, the perhaps suc-attack, in their opinion:cessful preparations for the invasion of England from Boulogne; in fact, to shut out from consideration every triumph of military genius over physical obstacles from the days of Hannibal to those of Napoleon. It is, of course, easy to represent this as the doctrine of alarmists, but, the men of largest experience and highest professional knowledge at home have deliberately recorded their anxiety on the subject, and the ablest officers abroad have studied it as a curious problem in strategy. The Duke of Wellington, who, being long dead, yet from his unrivalled authority speaks even now in his famous letter of 1847 to his countrymen-Sir J. Burgoyne, who was the last survivor of a remarkable generation, and whose recent death we all deplore Lord Palmerston, whose long official life as divided between considerations of military and foreign policy, and who in and out of season repeated that 'the Channel was now bridged by steam,' and that England was not safe from a sudden and secretly organised attack-are at least a proof that such anxiety is not fanciful. Nor has anything occurred to invalidate their opinion, or materially to alter the conditions under which it was formed. Our ablest officers of the present day are not less alive to the risk; and the highest authority to which appeal can be made, because speaking with a full and professional knowledge of the subject-the Defence Commission of 1859-did not hesitate to say that, in their opinion, neither fleet, nor standing army, nor volunteers, nor even the three combined, could be relied on as sufficient in themselves for the security of the kingdom against foreign invasion.' Instamus tamen immemores;' we shut our ears to the Cassandra warnings of statesmen, of soldiers, of scientific men; we consign their reports to the waste-paper basket, or to the equally useful pigeon-holes of the War Office, and we refuse even to recognise so pregnant a fact as the concentration last year, in the northern ports of France alone, of a flotilla capable of transporting 40,000 men and 12,000 horses, before the declaration of war,

'Here as at Versailles a rather favourite topic of conversation is the invasion of England, with its probabilities of success and its means of accomplishment. . . . It is considered that an army once across could live uncommonly needed, it is true, but there is no fortified place well by requisitions. Ammunition would be to stop the direct march upon London-exactly four days. How many field-guns could be brought to bear upon them? Prince Frederick Charles had more than 400 during the battle of Orleans. How many breech-loading rifles are there to put into the hands of the Militia and Volunteers? All these questions are being put and answered by officers in the German armies; grows savage at the taste of blood.'-28th Defor man has much of the tiger in him, and cember, 1870.

But if ever we bring ourselves to contemplate the possibility, however remote, of an invasion, we flatter ourselves, with curious perversity, into the notion that we should meet the contingency under ordinary, and not wholly unfavourable, conditions; that our main resources by sea and land would be available, and that, at the several points of weakness along our extended line of empire, we should have no other serious strug gles to anticipate. But the exact reverse of this sanguine forecast would probably be nearer the truth; for, even if an unfavourable combination of external circumstances were not made the occasion of attack, serious danger to England would easily quicken into flame the disaffection of Ireland, and the latent, but always active, fanaticism of our Mahomedan subjects. To say nothing of the large and continuous supplies which would immediately become indispensable for Ireland and India, and of the equally heavy reinforcements in ships, stores, and men to our North American, West Indian, Australian, and China stations, the under-manned and inadequately provided fortresses of Halifax, Bermuda, Gibraltar, Malta-the bases of our maritime and military operations-would alone severely tax our resources as at present constituted. Meanwhile, it must not be

forgotten that, independently of all shortcomings in the number, quality, and training of our men, in transport and equipment, in surplus stores, in guns and gunpowder, in an elastic and uniform organisation of the various disjointed and almost conflicting parts of our so-called Army; independently, also, of the unwelcome doubt which will at times force itself on our minds, whether or no we really have a sea-going fleet sufficient to satisfy all reasonable calls upon it in time of war, and to meet every probable combination of other maritime nations,-we doubtedly are deficient in turret-ships and light gunboats for the protection of the coast, and in defences for the great seaports, which, with the necessary magazines and requirements of modern war, cannot be improvised. We have no fortified harbour on the Eastern coast, no positions to delay an invader on his march to London, no knowledge of the local resources in food, horses, carts. Long before the outbreak of the recent hostilities, the German Government had, as it is well known, carefully tabulated the resources of the various French villages and farms for the purpose of requisitions. But it would seem that our military authorities have still to learn even the topography of our Southern Counties, when we hear from the War Min-invasion, the defeat of our troops, the incalister that not only was it necessary to send the Quartermaster-General and the Head of the Engineers to Berkshire to survey and examine, but that Sir H. Grant was informed by Colonel L. Lindsay that there was a large area of country in that county' available for the manœuvres of 30,000 men, apparently as much to the surprise of the English War Office as if the tract in question had been situated in the heart of New Zealand.

might float unsuspected and secure; Antwerp, which was once described as a pistol held at the head of England; or Cherbourg, which, during the whole campaign of last year and amidst all the catastrophes of the time remained one of the great centres of French power. It is formidable, too, to remember that, whilst we must be prepared to resist a landing at every point, an invader has his choice not only of a multitude of small and undefended harbours where stores and artillery could be conveniently disemun-barked and secured, but of no inconsiderable range of open beach where local circumstan ces would enable him to cover with the heavy guns of his ironclads-heavier than any artillery which we could probably bring to bear the landing of his troops, and thence to move them into tenable positions for subsequent operations.

On the other hand, it is formidable to take into calculation the accurate knowledge possessed by foreign statesmen of our minutest resources; the professional and scientific organisation of Continental War Offices; the gigantic forces; the vast supplies of material; the control of railways, telegraphs, and shipping by experienced strategists, able to act with secrecy and speed, unfettered in their operations by public criticism and supported by the undivided strength of their respective Governments; the certain power of steam; the uncertain advantages which science, as applied to military subjects, is yearly and monthly developing; the existence on the European seaboard of some large harbours (for in such calculations every nation must be assumed to be, by choice or compul sion or the changing condition of political events, a possible enemy) such as Kiel, the prize of the Danish war; or Jahde, in the sinuous recesses of which a whole navy

And, assuming a landing once effected, who can doubt its tremendous consequences! Even, if ultimately unsuccessful, it would break the spell and prestige of insular securìty, it would shake our commercial credit to its centre, it would entail upon us for the fnture a far heavier burden of military defence than the country now bears to contemplate. But to conceive the results of a successful

culable but fruitless sacrifices, the march on London, and the helpless prostration of the country, is a task in which no effort of im-" agination could probably approach the real facts. The author of the Battle of Dorking,' with all his singular power of description, wisely leaves this part of the national calamity in cloudy outline. The fall of Paris, the crushing weight of requisitions and indemnities, the annihilation of public life which we have witnessed in France, would probably be beggared by the collapse of internal trade and external commerce, and the final break-up of all the elements of our old and artificial society. Heavily weighted in the race of commercial competition; consuming with improvidence the resources on which much of that commerce depends; loved by none, envied by many; with enormous wealth to tempt, and with little power to defend; undermined by a pauperism that is growing up by the side of and in deadly contrast to our riches; with power passing from the class which had been used to rule and to face political dangers, and which had brought the nation with honour unsullied through former struggles, into the hands of the lower classes, uneducated, untrained to the use of political rights, and swayed by demagogues, we talk as if Providence had ordained that our Government should always borrow at 3 per cent., and that trade must

But the danger which we would fain signal is not confined to the risk which must always attend upon actual military weakness. It is seriously complicated by the estimate which is formed of us by our neighbours; for in international relations the foreign and the military policies are so connected that it is hard to consider the one to the exclusion of the other. We believe that for many years our foreign policy has failed to conciliate respect, and has even contributed to swell a body of opinion unfavourable to us. It would be an ungrateful task to analyse that opinion; but

come to us, because we live in a foggy little | from the chairs of Professors, in the signifiisland set in a boisterous sea. cant attitude of foreign Governments, in the unhappily still more significant attitude of our own Ministers we may observe how wide a chasm yawns between the England of today and of former times. But if any doubt of our real position lingered in the minds of foreign politicians, it must have been effectually dispelled by the ingenuous and absolutely unparalleled disavowal by the Prime Minister of Mr. Odo Russell, when engaged at Versailles on one of the most delicate and difficult of modern negotiations. Of all the blunders of an infelicitous Session none has exceeded this; and, were it not written down past recall, we should hesitate to think that à Prime Minister could have been found with so little worldly wisdom as to make the declaration, or a Parliament seemingly so dull to the old instincts of the country as to acquiesce in it.

no

one familiar with the governments and nations of the Continent can pretend that it is a flattering one. It is probably a mixture of dislike and surprise, and-by far the most serious-ever growing contempt. We are in a great measure an enigma to our neighbours. They recognise our extraordinary resources, they observe our lavish expenditure in military matters, they remember that we have in former times fought well, and that even recently in the Crimea, in India, in Abyssinia, amidst much official mismanagement and error, there are traces of the old fire. But they also see the periodical panics through which we pass, the paltry preparations, immediately succeeded by still more paltry economies, the transparent fallacies of the Government, and the equal willingness of the people to be deceived. Fortunately the moral lectures, in which our Foreign Ministers once indulged, and in which, it must be ed, the British people took no small pleasure, have ceased. Our utter military helplessness probably made their continuance impossible. But, however offensive, they were less dangerous. The arrogant tone of self-righteousness in which they were couched implied at least some latent reserve of power, and, corresponding to a certain extent with the then more evenly balanced condition of the European Commonwealth, they were calculated to impose on the imagination. But now, in Continental phraseology, we are 'effaced' from the roll of great powers, and it is not only known that we have no means of fighting, but it is thought that we will not fight. Nor can we complain of it as unreasonable if foreigners enquire whether those who showed such unmistakeable reluctance to support Savoy and Denmark, and Luxembourg and Turkey, would be very eager to compromise themselves on behalf of Switzer land, or Holland, or Belgium. We wish that we could think that we have exaggerated the feeling of foreign nations as regards England. The evidence is wanting only to those who will not see it. In conversation, in the Press,

Mean

It is, then, these-or rather a succession of mistakes such as these-that have gradually brought England into discredit, and which constitute an actual and very serious element of danger. Danger-because great nations, in their contempt for us, may easily presume too far upon our acquiescence in insult, and may, without intending it, provoke us into a war for which we are entirely unprepared. Danger again-because the smaller nations, who formerly looked to us as a natural friend and protector, now learn to distrust our promises and our power of assistance, and are compelled to form other aradd-rangements in their own interests. while, though on every exchange and moneymarket men are hurrying back with feverish zest to the speculations which recent hostilities had suspended, the political horizon looks at least doubtful. To say nothing of the conspiracies against society and property, which are barely kept down by the strong hand of military force, the war-clouds still hang over France, and all Europe has learnt a lesson of sword-law which many years of peace and commerce cannot unteach. Every continental nation, from Russia to Egypt, is passing its population through military discipline, and is assuming the character of a vast standing camp; whilst one of the chief apostles of Positivism in this countrythough it must be owned that the doctrine, both in itself and in the language in which it is clothed, sounds singular on his lips-does not scruple to warn us that the tremendous drama of which we have been spectators is only the opening scene of one much larger and more terrible, and that the English people take but a 'schoolboy view' of the subject.

In all this there is a formidable concur

There is not here the space to review the melancholy history of the so-called Army Bill, or to discuss the principles upon which our national defences should or may be reconstituted. Nor is there now the time to analyse and apportion the blame of the discreditable failures in our military legislation of last Session. The Prime Minister has sought to fasten on the Opposition a charge of obstruction, through an undue exercise of those powers of discussion which the rules of Parliament have hitherto sanctioned. They might not unfairly retort that he, for the first time, has enforced upon his supporters an abstention from debate, which is at least equally destructive of the old Parliamentary system. If the one practice is licence, the other cannot be liberty: and where a Prime Minister has shown tact, an Opposition has not generally been wanting in forbearance. But in truth these recriminations are of a very secondary nature, and all the more that whatever blame has been cast upon members of the Opposition for the length of their criticisms, no one has ventured to find fault with the subject matter of those speeches. We must look somewhat deeper for the causes of

rence of opinion and facts, which might teach | more illusory. Such a theory is too shallow prudent men to set their house in order be- to impose upon the soldier, or statesman, or fore the night comes, when no one may historian. Offensive and defer.sive operawork; but in a time and country when the tions are only relative terms; and a bombardart of government has become a hand-to- ment of Copenhagen in 1801, or the passage mouth traffic in Radical votes, this is precise- of the Ticino in 1859, though invested with ly the course most distasteful to our demo- the semblance of aggressive war, may be in cratic reformers. They object to reconstitute the truest and strictest sense only measures the army on a sound basis, lest they should of defence. create a power antagonistic to themselves. They are like the French Republicans, who will not accept the principle of the sovereign will of the people, unless that will is expressed in the form of a republic; or some of their own political connection* in England, who, though anxious to cripple are afraid to abolish the House of Lords, lest its members should find their way into the Lower House, and so strengthen the Conservative forces in that body. Their sense of fairness and patriotism is fortunately not shared by the great body of their countrymen; but unhappily there are a considerable number who deceive themselves into the honest belief that our position as a great trading country must be a neutral and, even if involved in war, a defensive one. But amidst the many lessons of last year, they might have learned that the profession of neutrality is not less odious to the belligerents than its practice is difficult. The elastic jurisprudence of the conquering side allows, as its actual interests lay claim to, an amount of 'benevolence' or 'sympathy' which must soon render the assumption of neutrality as dangerous as it is held to be contemptible. Nor is the difficulty lessened by substituting the favourite term of 'non-recent mismanagement; and we fear that, intervention' for that of neutrality. In many, perhaps in most, circumstances, nonintervention is possible and wise, but as a fixed and uniform rule of policy it is inapplicable to this or to any other great country. Short as is the public memory on these subjects, it would be well to remember how largely the untempered assertion of peace doctrines and the deputation of amiable enthusiasts to the Emperor Nicholas contributed to the Crimean war; and, feeble as is the general sense of national obligations, it cannot be wholly put out of sight, by those who pretend to take part in the government of England, that we are still bound by treaties and engagements which we cannot keep without the support of material force, and which we cannot evade without signal discredit. It need hardly be added that the supposition that our insular position must necessarily give a purely defensive character to our military operations is, if possible, still

* See '"* Times" Report of a Meeting as to the House of Lords.' August, 1871.

apart from temporary and exceptional cir cumstances in the House of Commons, the blame must be mainly, though unequally, divided between the country and the Government. It would be as distasteful as it would be unfair in such a case to draw an indictment against a whole nation;' but it is also impossible to acquit the English people of all responsibility.. They, or at least that part which is allowed to assume the right of speaking for them, have ostentatiously passed from the extreme of panic to that of indifference, thereby in a great measure condoning the errors of the Government. That these persons should be only a part, or even a small minority, of the nation, and that they should be led away by ignorant enthusiasm, by the theories of the economists, or by the unsertpulous objections of stump-orators, is no excuse for that more solid and sensible portion of the community who here, as in America, laugh at the transparent fallacies of deceivers and deceived, but who have not the moral courage to emancipate themselves from the thraldom of those who claim to represent