plies the possession of the last two (representative) kinds. All persons, we think, must admit the truth of the following proposition: sentative) kinds of action by no means im- | course, implies that there is no mental power whatever except sensation. For if the existence of another faculty were allowed by him, it is plain that the action of that other faculty might modify the effects of mere sensation in any being possessed of such additional faculty. Two faculties are distinct, not in degree but in kind, if we may possess the one in perfection without that fact implying that we possess the other also. Still more will this be the case if the two faculties tend to increase in an inverse ratio. Yet this is the distinction between the instinctive and the intellectual parts of man's nature. As to animals, we fully admit that they may possess all the first four groups of actions that they may have, so to speak, mental images of sensible objects combined in all degrees of complexity, as governed by the laws of association. We deny to them, on the other hand, the possession of the last two kinds of mental action. We deny them, that is, the power of reflecting on their own existence or of enquiring into the nature of objects and their causes. We deny that they know that they know or know themselves in knowing. In other words, we deny them reason. The possession of the presentative faculty, as above explained, in no way implies that of the reflective faculty; nor does any amount of direct operation imply the power of asking the reflective question before mentioned, as to what' and 'why.' According to our definition, then, given above, the faculties of men and those of other animals differ in kind; and brutes low in the scale supply us with a good example in support of this distinctness; for it is in animals generally admitted to be wanting in reason-such as insects (e.g. the ant and the bee) that we have the very summit and perfection of instinct made known to us. We will shortly examine Mr. Darwin's arguments, and see if he can bring forward a single instance of brute action implying the existence in it of the representative reflective power. Before doing so, however, one or two points as to the conditions of the controversy must be noticed. In the first place, the position which we maintain is the one in possession that which is commended to us by our intuitions, by ethical considerations, and by religious teaching universally. The onus probandi should surely therefore rest with him who, attacking the accepted position, maintains the essential similarity and fundamental identity of powers the effects of which are so glaringly diverse. Yet Mr. Darwin quietly assumes the whole point in dispute, by asserting identity of intuition where there is identity of sensation (vol. i. p. 36), which, of Secondly, it must be remembered that it is a law in all reasoning that where known causes are sufficient to account for any phenomena we shall not gratuitously call in additional causes. If, as we believe to be the case, there is no need whatever to call in the representative faculty as an explanation of brute mental action;-if the phenomena brutes exhibit can be accounted for by the presentative faculty-that is, by the presence of sensible perceptions and emotions together with the reflex and co-ordinating powers of the nervous system;-then to ascribe to them the possession of reason is thoroughly gratuitous. Thirdly, in addition to the argument that brutes have not intellect because their actions can be accounted for without the exercise of that faculty, we have other and positive arguments in opposition to Mr. Darwin's view of their mental powers. These arguments are based upon the absence in brutes of articulate and rational speech, of true concerted action and of educability, in the human sense of the word. We have besides, what may be called an experimental proof in the same direction. For if the germs of a rational nature existed in brutes, such germs would certainly ere this have so developed as to have produced unmistakeably rational phenomena, considering the prodigious lapse of time passed since the entombment of the earliest known fossils. To this question we will return later. We shall perhaps be met by the assertion that many men may also be taken to be irrational animals, so little do the phenomena they exhibit exceed in dignity and importance the phenomena presented by certain brutes. But, in reply, it is to be remarked that we can only consider men who are truly mennot idiots, and that all men, however degraded their social condition, have self-consciousness properly so called, possess the gift of articulate and rational speech, are capable of true concerted action, and have a perception of the existence of right and wrong. On the other hand, no brute has the faculty of articulate, rational speech: most persons will also admit that brutes are not capable of truly concerted action, and we contend most confidently that they have no self-consciousness, properly so called, and no perception of the difference between truth and falsehood and right and wrong. Let us now consider Mr. Darwin's facts in | force of the distinction between him and favour of an opposite conclusion. brutes as regards the representative, reflective faculties. It rather follows as a matter of course from his animality that he should manifest phenomena common to him and to 1st. His testimony drawn from his own experience and information regarding the lowest races of men. 2nd. The anecdotes he narrates in favour brutes. That man has a common nature of the intelligence of brutes. In the first place, we have to thank our author for very distinct and unqualified statements as to the substantial unity of men's mental powers. Thus he tells us :— The Fuegians rank amongst the lowest barharians; but I was continually struck with surprise how closely the three natives on board H.M.S." Beagle," who had lived some years in England, and could talk a little English, resembled us in disposition, and in most of our mental qualities.'-vol. i. p. 34. Again he adds: 'The American aborigines, Negroes and Europeans differ as much from each other in mind as any three races that can be named; yet I was incessantly struck, whilst living with the Fuegians on board the "Beagle," with the many little traits of character, showing how similar their minds were to ours; and so it was with a full-blooded negro with whom I happened once to be intimate.'-vol. i. p. 232. Again:-Differences of this kind (mental) between the highest men of the highest races and the lowest savages, are connected by the finest gradations' (vol. i. p. 35). Mr. Darwin, then, plainly tells us that all the essential mental characters of civilised man are found in the very lowest races of men, though in a less completely developed state; while, in comparing their mental powers with those of brutes, he says, No doubt the difference in this respect is enormous' (vol. i. p. 34). As if, however, to diminish the force of this admission, he remarks, what no one would dream of disputing, that there are psychical phenomena common to men and to other animals. says of man that He 'He uses in common with the lower animals inarticulate cries to express his meaning, aided by gestures and the movements of the muscles of the face. This especially holds good with the more simple and vivid feelings, which are but little connected with the higher intelligence. Our cries of pain, fear, surprise, anger, together with their appropriate actions, and the murmur of a mother to her beloved child, are more expressive than any words.'—vol. i. p. 54. But, inasmuch as it is admitted on all hands that man is an animal, and therefore has all the four lower faculties enumerated in our list, as well as the two higher ones, the fact that he makes use of common instinctive actions in no way diminishes the with them is perfectly compatible with his having, besides, a superior nature and faculties of which no brute has any rudiment or vestige. Indeed, all the arguments and objections in Mr. Darwin's second chapter may be met by the fact that man, being an animal, has corresponding faculties, whence arises a certain external conformity with other animals as to the modes of expressing some mental modifications. In the overlooking of this possibility of coexistence of two natures lies that error of negation to which we before alluded. Here, as in other parts of the book, we may say there are two quantities a and a+x, and Mr. Darwin, seeing the two as but neglecting the x, represents the quantities as equal. We will now notice the anecdotes narrated by Mr. Darwin in support of the rationality of brutes. Before doing so, however, we must remark that our author's statements, given on the authority (sometimes secondhand authority) of others, afford little evidence of careful criticism. This is the more noteworthy when we consider the conscientious care and pains which he bestows on all the phenomena which he examines himself. Thus for example, we are told on the authority of Brehm that 'An eagle seized a young cercopithecus, which by clinging to a branch, was not at once carried off; it cried loudly for assistance, upon which other members of the troop, with much uproar rushed to the rescue, surrounded the eagle, and pulled out so many feathers that he no longer thought of his prey, but only how to escape.'-vol. i. p. 76. We confess we wish that Mr. Darwin had himself witnessed this episode. Perhaps, however, he has seen other facts sufficiently similar to render this one credible. In the absence of really trustworthy evidence we should, however, be inclined to doubt the fact of a young cercopithecus, unexpectedly seized, being able, by clinging, to resist the action of an eagle's wings. We are surprised that Mr. Darwin should have accepted the following tale without suspicion : 'One female baboon had so capacious a heart that she not only adopted young monkeys of other species, but stole young dogs Her kindness, however, did not go so far as to and cats which she continually carried about. share her food with her adopted offspring, at which Brehm was surprised, as his monkeys always divided everything quite fairly with their | him only half an hour before. A train of old own young ones. An adopted kitten scratched associations, dormant during five years, had the above-mentioned affectionate baboon, who thus been instantaneously awakened in his certainly had a fine intellect, for she was much mind.'-vol. i. p. 45. astonished at being scratched, and immediately examined the kitten's feet, and without more ado bit off the claws.' (!!)-vol. i. p. 41. Has Mr. Darwin ever tested this alleged fact? Would it be possible for a baboon to bite off the claws of a kitten without keeping the feet perfectly straight? Again we have an anecdote on only second-hand authority (namely a quotation by Brehm or Schimper) to the following effect:: 'In Abyssinia, when the baboons belonging to one species (C. gelada) descend in troops from the mountains to plunder the fields, they sometimes encounter troops of another species (C. hamadryas), and then a fight ensues. The Geladas roll down great stones, which the Hamadryas try to avoid, and then both species, making a great uproar, rush furiously against each other. Brehm, when accompanying the Duke of Coburg-Gotha, aided in an attack with fire-arms on a troop of baboons in the pass of Mensa in Abyssinia. The baboons in return rolled so many stones down the mountain, some as large as a man's head, that the attackers had to beat a hasty retreat; and the pass was actually for a time closed against the caravan. It deserves notice that these baboons thus acted in concert.'-vol. i. p. 51. Now, if every statement of fact here given be absolutely correct, it in no way even tends to invalidate the distinction we have drawn between instinct' and 'reason'; but the positive assertion that the brutes acted in concert,' when the evidence proves nothing more than that their actions were simultaneous, shows a strong bias on the part of the narrator. A flock of sheep will simultaneously turn round and stare and stamp at an intruder; but this is not concerted action,' which means that actions are not only simultaneous, but are so in consequence of a reciprocal understanding and convention between the various agents. It may be added that if any brutes were capable of such really concerted action the effects would soon make themselves known to us so forcibly as to prevent the possibility of mistake. We come now to Mr. Darwin's instances of brute rationality. In the first place he tells us : 'I had a dog who was savage and averse to all strangers, and I purposely tried his memory after an absence of five years and two days. I went near the stable where he lived, and shouted to him in my old manner; he showed no joy, but instantly followed me out walking and obeyed me exactly as if I had parted with No doubt! but this is not 'reason.' Indeed we could hardly have a better instance of sions. What is there here which implies the mere action of associated sensible impresobjects and their association? Had there more than memory, impressions of sensible joy and wonder, though such signs would been reason there would have been signs of not alone prove reason to exist. It is evident that Mr. Darwin's own mode of explanation is the sufficient one-namely, by a train of associated sensible impressious. Mr. Darwin surely cannot think that there is in this case any evidence of the dog's having put to himself those questions, which, under the circumstances, a rational being would put. Mr. Darwin also tells us how a monkeytrainer gave up in despair the education of monkeys, of which the attention was easily distracted from his teaching, while 'a monkey which carefully attended to him could always be trained.' But 'attention' does not imply reason.' The anecdote only shows that some monkeys are more easily impressed and more retentive of impressions than others. Again, we are told, as an instance of reason, that Rengger sometimes put a live wasp in paper so that the monkeys in hastily unfolding it got stung; after this had once happened, they always first held the packet to their ears to detect any movement within.' But here again we have no need to call in the aid of reason.' The monkeys had had the group of sensations 'folded paper' associated with the other groups-noise and movement' and 'stung fingers.' The second time they experience the group of sensations folded paper' the succeeding sensations (in this instance only too keenly associated) are forcibly recalled, and with the recollection of the sensation of hearing, the hand goes to the car. Yet Mr. Darwin considers this unimportant instance of such significance that he goes on to say: Any one who is not convinced by such facts as these, and by what he may observe with his own dogs, that animals can reason, would not be convinced by anything I could add. Nevertheless, I will give one case with respect to dogs, as it rests on two distinct observers, and can hardly depend on the modification of any instinct. Mr. Colquhoun winged two wild ducks, which fell on the opposite side of a stream; his retriever tried to bring over both at once, but could not succeed; she then, though never before known to ruffle a feather, deliberately killed one, brought over the other, and returned ward. for the dead bird. Colonel Hutchinson relates | dog could so reason in one instance he would that two partridges were shot at once, one being in others, and would give much more unekilled and the other wounded; the latter ran quivocal proofs for Mr. Darwin to bring for away, and was caught by the retriever, who on her return came across the dead bird; she stopped, evidently greatly puzzled, and after one or two trials, finding she could not take it up without permitting the escape of the winged bird, she considered a moment, then deliberately murdered it by giving it a severe crunch, and afterwards brought away both together. This was the only known instance of her having wilfully injured any game.' Mr. Darwin adds: 'Here we have reason, though not quite perfect, for the retriever might have brought the wounded bird first and then returned for the dead one, as in the case of the two wild ducks.' -vol. i. pp. 47, 48. 6 Here we reply we have nothing of the kind, and to bring reason' into play is gratuitous. The circumstances can be perfectly explained (and on Mr. Darwin's own principles) as evidences of the revival of an old instinct. But perhaps the most surprising instance of groundless inference is presented in the following passage :— Mr. Darwin, however, speaks of reasoning in an unconscious manner,' so that he cannot really mean any process of reasoning at all; but, if so, his case is in no way apposite. Even an insect can be startled, and will exhibit as much evidence of rationality as is afforded by the growl of a dog; and all that is really necessary to explain such a phenomenon exists in an oyster, or even in the much talkedof Ascidian. Thus, then, it appears that, even in Mr. Darwin's especially-selected instances, there is not a tittle of evidence tending, however slightly, to show that any brute possesses the representative reflective faculties. But if, as we assert, brute animals are destitute of such higher faculties, it may well be that those lower faculties which they have (and which we more or less share with them) are highly developed, and their senses possess a degree of keenness and quickness inconceivable to us. Their minds being entirely occupied with such lower faculties, and having, so to speak, nothing else to occupy them, their sensible impressions may become interwoven and connected to a far greater extent than in us. Indeed, in the absence of free will, the laws of this association of ideas obtain supreme command over the minds of brutes: the brute being entirely immersed, as it were, in his presentative faculties. There yet remain two matters for consideration, which tend to prove the fundamental difference which exists between the mental powers of man and brutes:-1. The mental equality between animals of very different grades of structure, and their non-progressiveness; 2. The question of articulate speech. was, 'My dog, a full grown and very sensible animal, was lying on the lawn during a hot and still day; but at a little distance a slight breeze occasionally moved an open parasol, which would have been wholly disregarded by the dog, had any one stood near it. As it every time that the parasol slightly moved, the dog growled fiercely and barked. He must, I think, have reasoned to himself in a rapid and unconscious manner, that movement without any apparent cause indicated the presence of some strange living agent, and no stranger had a right to be on his territory.'-vol. i. p. 67. The consequences deduced from this trivial incident are amazing. Probably, however, Mr. Darwin does not mean what he says; but, on the face of it, we have a brute credited with the abstract ideas 'movement,' 'causation,' and the notions logically arranged and classified in subordinate generaagent,' 'living agent,'' strange living agent.' He also attributes to it the notion of a right' of 'territorial limitation,' and the relation of such limited territory' and 'personal ownership.' It may safely be affirmed that if a Considering the vast antiquity of the great animal groups, it is, indeed, remarkable how little advance in mental capacity has been achieved even by the highest brutes. This is made especially evident by Mr. Darwin's own assertions as to the capacities of lowly animals. Thus he tells us that (Gelasimus) making its burrow, threw some 'Mr. Gardner, whilst watching a shore-crab shells towards the hole. One rolled in, and &c., are here made use of in reference to the psy The words 'mind,' 'mental,' 'intelligence,' chical faculties of brutes, in conformity to popп lar usage, and not as strictly appropriate. Mr. Darwin (vol. i. p. 360) refers to Dr. Sendder's discovery of a fossil insect in the Devonian formation of New Brunswick, furnished with the well-known tympanum or stridulating apparatus of the male Locustidæ.' three other shells remained within a few inches | For in what respect is the intelligence of the of the mouth. In about five minutes the crab ape superior to that of the dog or of the elebrought out the shell which had fallen in, and phant? It cannot be said that there is one carried it away to the distance of a foot; it then saw the three other shells lying near, and point in which its psychical nature approxievidently thinking that they might likewise roll mates to man more than that of those fourin, carried them to the spot where it had laid footed beasts. But, again, where is the the first.'-vol. i. p. 334. great superiority of a dog or an ape over a least as remarkable an instance of the power bird? The falcon trained to hawking is at of education as the trained dog. The tricks which birds can be taught to perform are as complex and wonderful as those acted by the mammal. The phenomena of nidification, and some of those now brought forward by Mr. Darwin as to courtship, are fully comparable with analogous phenomena of quasi-intelligence in any beast. Mr. Darwin adds or quotes the astonishing remark, It would, I think, be difficult to distinguish this act from one performed by man by the aid of reason.' Again, he tells us: 'Mr. Lonsdale informs me that he placed a pair of land-shells (Helix pomatia), one of which was weakly, into a small and ill-provided garden. After a short time the strong and healthy individual disappeared, and was traced by its track of slime over a wall into an adjoining well-stocked garden. Mr. Lonsdale concluded that it had deserted its sickly mate; but after an absence of twenty-four hours it returned, and apparently communicated the result of its successful exploration, for both then started along the same track and disappeared over the wall.'-vol. i. p. 326. Whatever may be the real value of the statements quoted, they harmonize with a matter which is incontestable. We refer to the fact that the intelligence of brutes, be they high or be they low, is essentially one in kind, there being a singular parity between animals belonging to groups widely different in type of structure and in degree of development. This, however, is but a small part of the argument. For let us descend to the invertebrata, and what do we find ?-a restriction of their quasi-mental faculties proportioned to their constantly inferior type of structure? By no means. We find, e. g., in ants, phenomena which simulate those of an intelligence such as ours far more than do any phenomena exhibited by the highest beasts. Ants display a complete and complex political organization, classes of beings socially distinct, war resulting in the capture of slaves, and the appropriation and maintenance of domestic animals (Aphides) analogous to our milk-giving cattle. Mr. Darwin truthfully remarks on the great difference in these respects between such creatures as ants and bees, and singularly inert members of the same class--such as the scale insect or coccus. But can it be pre Apart from the small modifications which experience occasionally introduces into the habits of animals-as sometimes occurs after man has begun to frequent a newly-discov-tended that the action of natural and sexual ered island-it cannot be denied that, look- selection has alone produced these phenomeing broadly over the whole animal kingdom, na in certain insects, and failed to produce there is no evidence of advance in mental them in any other mere animals even of the power on the part of brutes. This absence very highest class? If these phenomena are of progression in animal intelligence is a very due to a power and faculty similar in kind to important consideration, and it is one which human intelligence, and which power is latent does not seem to be adverted to by Mr. Dar- and capable of evolution in all animals, then win, though the facts detailed by him are it is certain that this power must have been exceedingly suggestive of it. evolved in other instances also, and that we should see varying degrees of it in many, and notably in the highest brutes as well as in man. If, on the other hand, the faculties of brutes are different in kind from human intelligence, there can be no reason whatever why animals most closely approaching man in physical structure should resemble him in psychical nature also, When we speak of this absence of progression we do not, of course, mean to deny that the dog is superior in mental activity to the fish, or the jackdaw to the toad. But we mean that, considering the vast period of time that must (on Mr. Darwin's theory) have elapsed for the evolution of an Orang from an Ascidian, and considering how beneficial increased intelligence must be to all in the struggle for life, it is inconceivable (on Mr. Darwin's principles only) that a mental advance should not have taken place greater in degree, more generally diffused, and more in proportion to the grade of the various animals than we find to be actually the case. This reflection leads us to the difference which exists between men and brutes as regards the faculty of articulate speech. Mr. Darwin remarks that of the distinctively human characters this has 'justly been considered as one of the chief' (vol. i. p. 53). We cannot agree in this. Some brutes can |