for the dead bird. Colonel Hutchinson relates | dog could so reason in one instance he would that two partridges were shot at once, one being in others, and would give much more unekilled and the other wounded; the latter ran quivocal proofs for Mr. Darwin to bring for away, and was caught by the retriever, who on ward. her return came across the dead bird; she stopped, evidently greatly puzzled, and after one or two trials, finding she could not take it up without permitting the escape of the winged bird, she considered a moment, then deliberately murdered it by giving it a severe crunch, and afterwards brought away both together. This was the only known instance of her having wilfully injured any game.' Mr. Darwin adds: 'Here we have reason, though not quite perfect, for the retriever might have brought the wounded bird first and then returned for the dead one, as in the case of the two wild ducks.' -vol. i. pp. 47, 48. 6 Here we reply we have nothing of the kind, and to bring reason' into play is gratuitous. The circumstances can be perfectly explained (and on Mr. Darwin's own principles) as evidences of the revival of an old instinct. The ancestors of sporting dogs of course killed their prey, and that trained dogs do not kill it is simply due to man's action, which has suppressed the instinct by education, and which continually thus keeps it under control. It is indubitable that the old tendency must be latent, and that a small interruption in the normal retrieving process, such as occurred in the cases cited, would probably be sufficient to revive that old tendency and call the obsolete habit into exercise. But perhaps the most surprising instance of groundless inference is presented in the following passage :— 'My dog, a full grown and very sensible animal, was lying on the lawn during a hot and still day; but at a little distance a slight breeze occasionally moved an open parasol, which would have been wholly disregarded by the dog, had any one stood near it. As it was, every time that the parasol slightly moved, the dog growled fiercely and barked. He must, I think, have reasoned to himself in a rapid and unconscious manner, that movement without any apparent cause indicated the presence of some strange living agent, and no stranger had a right to be on his territory.'-vol. i. p. 67. Mr. Darwin, however, speaks of reasoning in an unconscious manner,' so that he cannot really mean any process of reasoning at all; but, if so, his case is in no way apposite. Even an insect can be startled, and will exhibit as much evidence of rationality as is afforded by the growl of a dog; and all that is really necessary to explain such a phenomenon exists in an oyster, or even in the much talkedof Ascidian. Thus, then, it appears that, even in Mr. Darwin's especially-selected instances, there is not a tittle of evidence tending, however slightly, to show that any brute possesses the representative reflective faculties. But if, as we assert, brute animals are destitute of such higher faculties, it may well be that those lower faculties which they have (and which we more or less share with them) are highly developed, and their senses possess a degree of keenness and quickness inconceivable to us. Their minds being entirely occupied with such lower faculties, and having, so to speak, nothing else to occupy them, their sensible impressions may become interwoven and connected to a far greater extent than in us. Indeed, in the absence of free will, the laws of this association of ideas obtain supreme command over the minds of brutes: the brute being entirely immersed, as it were, in his presentative faculties. There yet remain two matters for consideration, which tend to prove the fundamental difference which exists between the mental powers of man and brutes:-1. The mental equality between animals of very different grades of structure, and their non-progressiveness; 2. The question of articulate speech. Considering the vast antiquity of the great animal groups, it is, indeed, remarkable how little advance in mental capacity has been achieved even by the highest brutes. This is made especially evident by Mr. Darwin's own assertions as to the capacities of lowly animals. Thus he tells us that (Gelasimius) making its burrow, threw some 'Mr. Gardner, whilst watching a shore-crab shells towards the hole. One rolled in, and The consequences deduced from this trivial incident are amazing. Probably, however, Mr. Darwin does not mean what he says; but, on the face of it, we have a brute credited with the abstract ideas 'movement,' 'causation,' and the notions logically arrang- &c., are here made use of in reference to the psy The words 'mind,' 'mental,' 'intelligence,' ed and classified in subordinate genera-chical faculties of brutes, in conformity to popu'agent,' 'living agent,' strange living agent.' lar usage, and not as strictly appropriate. He also attributes to it the notion of a right' of territorial limitation,' and the relation of such limited territory' and 'personal ownership.' It may safely be affirmed that if a 6 + Mr. Darwin (vol. i. p. 360) refers to Dr. Seudder's discovery of a fossil insect in the Devonian formation of New Brunswick, furnished with the well-known tympanum or stridulating apparatus of the male Locustidæ.' three other shells remained within a few inches | For in what respect is the intelligence of the of the mouth. In about five minutes the crab ape superior to that of the dog or of the elebrought out the shell which had fallen in, and phant? It cannot be said that there is one carried it away to the distance of a foot; it then saw the three other shells lying near, and point in which its psychical nature approxievidently thinking that they might likewise roll mates to man more than that of those fourin, carried them to the spot where it had laid footed beasts. But, again, where is the the first.'-vol. i. p. 334. great superiority of a dog or an ape over a least as remarkable an instance of the power bird? The falcon trained to hawking is at of education as the trained dog. The tricks which birds can be taught to perform are as complex and wonderful as those acted by the mammal. The phenomena of nidification, and some of those now brought forward by Mr. Darwin as to courtship, are fully comparable with analogous phenomena of quasi-intelligence in any beast. Mr. Darwin adds or quotes the astonishing remark, It would, I think, be difficult to distinguish this act from one performed by man by the aid of reason.' Again, he tells us: 'Mr. Lonsdale informs me that he placed a pair of land-shells (Helix pomatia), one of which was weakly, into a small and ill-provided garden. After a short time the strong and healthy individual disappeared, and was traced by its track of slime over a wall into an adjoining well-stocked garden. Mr. Lonsdale concluded that it had deserted its sickly mate; but after an absence of twenty-four hours it returned, and apparently communicated the result of its successful exploration, for both then started along the same track and disappeared over the wall.'-vol. i. p. 326. Whatever may be the real value of the statements quoted, they harmonize with a matter which is incontestable. We refer to the fact that the intelligence of brutes, be they high or be they low, is essentially one in kind, there being a singular parity between animals belonging to groups widely different in type of structure and in degree of development. This, however, is but a small part of the argument. For let us descend to the invertebrata, and what do we find ?-a restriction of their quasi-mental faculties proportioned to their constantly inferior type of structure? By no means. We find, e. g., in ants, phe nomena which simulate those of an intelligence such as ours far more than do any phenomena exhibited by the highest beasts. Ants display a complete and complex political organization, classes of beings socially distinct, war resulting in the capture of slaves, and the appropriation and maintenauce of domestic animals (Aphides) analogous to our milk-giving cattle. Mr. Darwin truthfully remarks on the great difference in these respects between such Apart from the small modifications which creatures as ants and bees, and singularly experience occasionally introduces into the inert members of the same class--such as the habits of animals-as sometimes occurs after scale insect or coccus. But can it be preman has begun to frequent a newly-discov- tended that the action of natural and sexual ered island-it cannot be denied that, look-selection has alone produced these phenomeing broadly over the whole animal kingdom, na in certain insects, and failed to produce there is no evidence of advance in mental them in any other mere animals even of the power on the part of brutes. This absence very highest class? If these phenomena are of progression in animal intelligence is a very due to a power and faculty similar in kind to important consideration, and it is one which human intelligence, and which power is latent does not seem to be adverted to by Mr. Dar- and capable of evolution in all animals, then win, though the facts detailed by him are it is certain that this power must have been exceedingly suggestive of it. evolved in other instances also, and that we should see varying degrees of it in many, and notably in the highest brutes as well as in man. If, on the other hand, the faculties of brutes are different in kind from human intelligence, there can be no reason whatever why animals most closely approaching man in physical structure should resemble bim in psychical nature also, When we speak of this absence of progression we do not, of course, mean to deny that the dog is superior in mental activity to the fish, or the jackdaw to the toad. But we mean that, considering the vast period of time that must (on Mr. Darwin's theory) have elapsed for the evolution of an Orang from an Ascidian, and considering how beneficial increased intelligence must be to all in the struggle for life, it is inconceivable (on Mr. Darwin's principles only) that a mental advance should not have taken place greater in degree, more generally diffused, and more in proportion to the grade of the various animals than we find to be actually the case. This reflection leads us to the difference which exists between men and brutes as regards the faculty of articulate speech. Mr. Darwin remarks that of the distinctively human characters this has 'justly been considered as one of the chief' (vol. i. p. 53). We cannot agree in this. Some brutes can articulate, and it is quite conceivable that | tal faculties of man and of brutes, that idenbrutes might (though as a fact they do not) tity cannot be established; as we are not so associate certain sensations and gratifica- likely for many years to meet with a naturations with certain articulate sounds as, in a list so competent to collect and marshal facts certain sense, to speak. This, however, in support of such identity, if any such facts would in no way even tend to bridge over there are. The old barrier, then, between the gulf which exists between the representa-presentative instinct' and 'representative tive reflective faculties and the merely pre- reason' remains still unimpaired, and, as we sentative ones. Articulate signs of sensible believe, insurmountable. impressions would be fundamentally as distinct as mere gestures are from truly rational speech. Mr. Darwin evades the question about language by in one place (vol. i. p. 54) attributing that faculty in man to his having acquired a higher intellectual nature; and in another (vol. ii. p. 391), by ascribing his higher intellectual nature to his having acquired that faculty. Our author's attempts to bridge over the chasm which separates instinctive cries from rational speech are remarkable examples of groundless speculation. Thus he ventures to say We now pass to another question, which is of even greater consequence than that of man's intellectual powers. Mr. Darwin does not hesitate to declare that even the moral sense' is a mere result of the development of brutal instincts. He maintains, the first foundation or origin of the moral sense lies in the social instincts, including sympathy; and these instincts no doubt were primarily gained, as in the case of the lower animals, through natural selection.' (vol. ií. p. 394.) Everything, however, depends upon what we mean by the 'moral sense.' It is a patent fact that there does exist a perception of 'That primeval man, or rather some early to certain actions. the qualities 'right' and 'wrong' attaching However arising, men progenitor of man, probably (the italics are have a consciousness of an absolute and imours) used his voice largely, as does one of the gibbon-apes at the present day, in producing mutable rule legitimately claiming obedience true musical cadences, that is in singing; we with an authority necessarily supreme and may conclude from a widely-spread analogy absolute-in other words, intellectual judg that this power would have been especially ex-ments are formed which imply the existence erted during the courtship of the sexes, serving of an ethical ideal in the judging mind. to express various emotions, as love, jealousy, triumph, and serving as a challenge to their rivals. The imitation by articulate sounds of musical cries might have given rise to words expressive of various complex emotions.' And again: 'It does not appear altogether incredible, that some unusually wise ape-like animal should have thought of imitating the growl of a beast of prey, so as to indicate to his fellow monkeys the nature of the expected danger. And this would have been a first step in the formation of a language.'-vol. i. p. 56. But the question is, not whether it is incredible, but whether there are any data whatever to warrant such a supposition. Mr. Darwin brings forward none: we suspect none could be brought forward. It is not, however, emotional expressions or manifestations of sensible impressions, in whatever way exhibited, which have to be accounted for, but the enunciation of distinct deliberate judgments as to the what,' 'the how,' and 'the why,' by definite articulate sounds; and for these Mr. Darwin not only does not account but he does not adduce anything even tending to account for them. Altogether we may fairly conclude, from the complete failure of Mr. Darwin to establish identity of kind between the men has to be accounted for; neither its applicaIt is the existence of this power which tion nor even its validity have to be considered. Yet instances of difference of opinion respecting the moral value of particular concrete actions are often brought forward as if they could disprove the existence of moral intuition. Such instances are utterly beside the question. It is amply sufficient for our purpose if it be conceded that developed reason dictates to us that certain modes of action, abstractedly considered, are intrinsi cally wrong; and this we believe to be indisputable. It is equally beside the question to show that the existence of mutually beneficial acts and of altruistic habits can be explained by 'natural selection.' No amount of benevo lent habits tend even in the remotest degree to account for the intellectual perception of 'right' and 'duty.' Such habits may make the doing of beneficial acts pleasant, and their omission painful; but such feelings have essentially nothing whatever to do with the perception of 'right' and 'wrong,' nor will the faintest incipient stage of the perception be accounted for by the strongest development of such sympathetic feelings. Liking to do acts which happen to be good, is one thing; seeing that actions are good, whether we or others like them or not, is ture, such blindness simply ipso facto elimiquite another. nating every vestige of morality from an action. Mr. Darwin's account of the moral sense is very different from the above. It may be expressed most briefly by saying that it is the prevalence of more enduring instincts over less persistent ones-the former being social instincts, the latter personal ones. He tells us : As man cannot prevent old impressions continually repassing through his mind, he will be compelled to compare the weaker impressions of, for instance, past hunger, or of vengeance satisfied or danger avoided at the cost of other men, with the instinct of sympathy and goodwill to his fellows, which is still present and ever in some degree active in his mind. He will then feel in his imagination that a stronger instinct has yielded to one which now seems comparatively weak; and then that sense of dissatisfaction will inevitably be felt with which man is endowed, like every other animal, in order that his instincts may be obeyed.'-vol. i. p. 90. Mr. Darwin means by 'the moral sense an instinct, and adds, truly enough, that 'the very essence of an instinct is, that it is followed independently of reason' (vol. i. p. 100). But the very essence of moral action is that it is not followed independently of reason. Having stated our wide divergence from Mr. Darwin with respect to what the term 'moral sense' denotes, we might be dispensed from criticising instances which must from our point of view be irrelevant, as Mr. Darwin would probably admit. Nevertheless, let us examine a few of these instances, and see if we can discover in them any justification of the views he propounds. As illustrations of the development of self-reproach for the neglect of some good action, he observes: 'A young pointer when it first scents game, apparently cannot help pointing. A squirrel in a cage who pats the nuts which it cannot eat, as if to bury them in the ground, can hardly be thought to act thus either from pleasure or pain. Hence the common assumption that men must be impelled to every action by experiencing some pleasure or pain may be erroneous. Although a habit may be blindly and implicitly followed, independently of any pleasure or pain felt at the moment, yet if it be forcibly and abruptly checked, a vague sense of dissatisfaction is generally experienced; and this is especially true in regard to persons of feeble intellect.'-vol. i. p. 80. Now, passing over the question whether in the 'pointing' and 'patting referred to there may not be some agreeable sensations, we contend that such instincts have nothing to do with morality,' from their blind na 6 Mr. Darwin certainly exaggerates the force and extent of social sympathetic feelings. Mr. Mill admits that they are often wanting;' but Mr. Darwin claims the conscious possession of such feelings for all, and quotes Hume as saying that the view of the happiness of others communicates a secret joy,' while the appearance of their misery throws a melancholy damp over the imagination.' One might wish that this remark were universally true, but unfortunately some men take pleasure in the pain of others; and Larochefoucauld even ventured on the now well-known saying, 'that there is something in the misfortunes of our best friends not unpleasant to us.' But our feeling that the sufferings of others are pleasant or unpleasant has nothing to do with the question, which refers to the judgment whether the indulging of such feelings is 'right' or 'wrong.' If the social instinct' were the real basis of the moral sense, the fact that society approved of anything would be recognised as the supreme sanction of it. Not only, however, is this not so, not only do we judge as to whether society in certain cases is right or wrong, but we demand a reason why we should obey society at all; we demand a rational basis and justification for social claims, if we happen to have a somewhat inquiring turn of mind. We shall be sure avowedly or secretly to despise and neglect the performance of acts which we do not happen to desire, and which have not an in tellectual sanction. The only passage in which our author seems as if about to meet the real question at issue is very disappointing, as the difficulty is merely evaded. He remarks, 'I am aware that some persons maintain that actions performed impulsively do not come under the dominion of the moral sense, and is not a correct statement of the intuitive cannot be called moral' (vol. i. p. 87). This view, and the difficulty is evaded thus: But it appears scarcely possible to draw any clear line of distinction of this kind, though the distinction may be real! It seems to us, however, that there is no difficulty at all in drawing a line between a judgment as to an action being right or wrong and every other kind of mental act. Mr. Darwin goes on to say: 6 'Moreover, an action repeatedly performed by us, will at last be done without deliberation *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Mor als,' Edit. 1751, p. 132. or hesitation, and can then hardly be distinguished from an instinct; yet surely no one will pretend that an action thus done ceases to be moral. On the contrary, we all feel that an act cannot be considered as perfect, or as performed in the most noble manner, unless it is done impulsively, without deliberation effort, in the same manner as by a man in whom the requisite qualities are innate.'-vol. i. p. 88. or on which he lives really belongs to another, and he relinquishes it. He may continue to judge that he has done a proper action, of justice has involved him. To assert that whilst tortured by the trials in which his act these acts are merely instinctive would be absurdly false. In the cases supposed, obedience is paid to a clear intellectual perception and against the very strongest instincts. To this must be replied, in one sense, That we have not misrepresented Mr. 'Yes;' in another, 'No.' An action which Darwin's exposition of conscience' is manihas ceased to be directly or indirectly delib- fest. He says that if a man has gratified a erate has ceased to be moral as a distinct act, passing instinct, to the neglect of an endurbut it is moral as the continuation of those ing instinct, he will then feel dissatisfied preceding deliberate acts through which the with himself, and will resolve with more or good habit was originally formed, and the less force to act differently for the future. rapidity with which the will is directed in This is conscience; for conscience looks the case supposed may indicate the number backwards and judges past actions, inducing and constancy of antecedent meritorious that kind of dissatisfaction, which if weak volitions. Mr. Darwin seems to see this we call regret, and if severe remorse' (vol. i. more or less, as he adds: He who is forced p. 91.) 'Conscience' certainly looks back to overcome his fear or want of sympathy and judges,' but not all that looks back and before he acts, deserves, however, in one judges' is 'conscience.' A judgment of way higher credit than the man whose in- conscience is one of a particular kind, namenate disposition leads him to a good actly a judgment according to the standard of without effort.' As an illustration of the genesis of remorse, we have the case of a temporary though for the time strong ly persistent instinct conquering another instinct which is usually dominant over all others.' Swallows at the proper season seem all day long to be impressed with the desire to migrate; their habits change; they become restless, are noisy, and congregate in flocks. Whilst the mother-bird is feed ing or brooding over her nestlings, the maternal instinct is probably stronger than the migratory; but the instinct which is more persistent gains the victory, and at last, at a moment when her young ones are not in sight, she takes flight and deserts them. When arrived at the end of her long journey, and the migratory instinct ceases to act, what an agony of remorse each bird would feel, if, from being endowed with great mental activity, she could not prevent the image continually passing before her mind of her young ones perishing in the bleak north from cold and hunger.'-vol. i. p. 90. Let us suppose she does suffer agony,' that feeling would be nothing to the purpose. What is requisite is that she shall judge that she ought not to have left them. To make clear our point, let us imagine a man formerly entangled in ties of affection which in justice to another his conscience has induced him to sever. The image of distress his act of severance has caused may occasion him keen emotional suffering for years, accompanied by a clear perception that his act has been right. Again, let us suppose another case: The struggling father of a family becomes aware that the property moral worth. But for this, a gourmand, looking back and judging that a particular sauce had occasioned him dyspepsia, would, in the dissatisfaction arising from his having eaten the wrong dish at dinner, exercise his conscience! Indeed, elsewhere (vol. i. p. 103) Mr. Darwin speaks of the standard of morality rising higher and higher,' though he nowhere explains what he means either by the 'standard' or by the higher;' and, indeed, it is very difficult to understand what can possibly be meant by this 'rising of the standard,' if the 'standard' is from first to last pleasure and profit. We find, again, the singular remark:-' If any desire or instinct leading to an action opposed to the good of others, still appears to a man, when recalled to mind, as strong as or stronger than his social instinct, he will feel no keen regret at having followed it' (vcl. i. p. 92). Mr. Darwin is continually mistaking a merely beneficial action for a moral one; but, as before said, it is one thing to act well and quite another to be a moral agent. A dog or even a fruit-tree may act well, but neither is a moral agent. Of course, all the instances he brings forward with regard to animals are not in point, on account of this misconception of the problem to be solved. He gives, however, some examples which tell strongly against his own view. Thus, he remarks of the Law of Honour-The breach of this law, even when the breach is known to be strictly accordant with true morality, has caused many a man more |