aliens and strangers who are continually intermeddling with our public concerns, will not always pass current with the people of America. Nor is it possible that any part of our empire can be long held in a state of vassalage even under the philosophic Jefferson. We revolted from Great Britain because her parliament taxed us without consent. Our colonies may adopt our principles. Even the limited monarchy proposed in the bill now under discussion in the House of Representatives, will not probably be established, and it is next to a certainty that the session will terminate leaving Mr. Jefferson in complete possession of all the despotic power which were lately acquired by the Spanish monarchy."

A fair idea, by the way, of America's historic government of dependencies can be gained without even venturing beyond her borders.

In the case of the Indian we have the abject failure of a democracy really trying to act fairly by the savage races-its precursors on the soil.

The result is to be ascribed in this instance to bad policy in its dealings with the Indians, in the second to the greed and corruption of the officials appointed to deal with the aborigines.

The state of the Indian territory which boasts half a million inhabitants, has long been a scandal; but it was made much worse by the appointment, in 1893, of the Dawes Commission. This body consists of four members who employ about a hundred clerks and servants. Its sole original mission was to effect new treaties with the five tribes of Indians occupying the country. Increased jurisdiction has been given to it by succeeding Congresses, and a new and increased appropriation. It did nothing except muddle matters, and for ten years has been popularly known as the "The Rock of Ages for shipwrecked politicians."

Up to the close of 1901, America was appropriating ten to fourteen million dollars a year to the Indians, and thousands of people were contributing largely to Indian education and missions. Yet the result of this system is not at all satisfactory. The education of generations of young Indians in well-equipped boarding schools had little or no effect upon the Indians on the reserves, where in many cases they were as savage as in the days of Pocahontas, and quite as incapable of maintaining themselves, leaving the Government to suffer through their idleness and poverty.1

In the case of Cuba, America has, after much external pressure, literally redeemed her promise given before the war, to bestow self-government on the island.

But sovereignty is sometimes none the less real because judiciously veiled. Americans have surrendered much, but not everything; they still retain a right of veto and of intervention that practically makes of Cuba a vassal State. The foreign relations of the republic

1 In 1902, America adopted a new policy, set out by President Roosevelt in his first message to Congress in December, 1901. The policy consisted in breaking up the tribal funds, giving to each man his individual allotment, and as rapidly as possible making the Indians citizens of America, instead of as formerly under tribal government, separate minor nations under the wardship under the United States Government. The President said-" In the schools the education should be elementary and largely industrial. The need of higher education among the Indians is very very limited. On the reservations care should be taken to try to suit the teaching to the needs of the particular Indians.

"There is no use in attempting to induce agriculture in a country suited only for cattle raising, where the Indian should be made a stock-grower."

The President strongly condemned the ration system which "promotes beggary, pauperism, and stifles industry," and he pointed the way to the passing of the Indian problem when he said, "The Indian should be treated as an individual-like the white man.' "

If this policy be continued, Indian reservations, Indian customs and habits will soon be something of the past.

are absolutely in the hands of the Washington Government, which have also a veto power over legislation increasing the Cuban debt, while it reserves to itself the right to intervene "for the preservation of Cuban independence, and the maintenance of a Government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty." Naval and coaling stations, too, have been demanded and ceded. Cuba, in short, while virtually a sovereign State in the management of its domestic affairs, is for all other purposes under a very strict American suzerainty. Such arrangements are seldom satisfactory. Sooner or later the desire to be all one thing or all the other is almost sure to upset them, and though there may be reasons of geography and relative strength why what has happened between us and the Boers need not necessarily be repeated between the Americans and the Cubans, still it will be surprising if their present relations continued indefinitely or even for any considerable period.

The Free Cuba, an independent and sovereign State, which was the dream of her revolutionary leaders, has been definitely abandoned, and a Cuba of limited powers -an American Protectorate-has arisen, not dissimilar to the protectorate which England exercises over Egypt.

It rests mainly with the Americans themselves to say whether the experiment will succeed. The United States are the obvious market for Cuban produce. In the old days, Spain provided an outlet, but that outlet has now been stopped by the action of the United States in releasing the island from Spanish rule. All the more reason why Americans should make up the deficiency by admitting Cuban sugar and tobacco at

reduced rates. President Roosevelt has urged this course upon Congress with all his force and earnestness, as a policy to which the country stands committed by every consideration of duty and honour. He has pressed for fifty per cent. reduction of the Dingley tariff in favour of Cuba. Governor Wood has certified that a reduction of 333 per cent. is the very least that will benefit the island. Yet the Senate, at the bidding of the beet-sugar and other "interests," has refused to vote a remission of more than 20 per cent. This is a most ominous and significant step; it shows that the Senate has yet to learn the true spirit of empire. It is trying to govern Cuba in the interest of Americans instead of in the interests of Cubans. The consequence is that in its general commercial position the island is little better off to-day than it was under Spanish rule: and unless Americans speedily make some substantial concessions, the first President of the Cuban Republic may also be the last.

President Roosevelt's Cuban policy by no means commends itself to all his supporters. Nevertheless, it were strange if his power and influence, backed by his Cabinet and the House of Representation were not able to prevail over the Senate and open the gates of the tariff to Cuba. Curiously enough the Democrats unanimously support the President in his insistence that America is bound in honour to give commercial assistance to Cuba. Consequently there may be some foundation for the widespread belief that the Sugar Trust is the cause of the deadlock; but it is much more likely to be the Senate's desire to display his power over a President whom they cannot control, and whose sudden

exaltation the party leaders of Hannatype view with dismay. If so, they are making a dangerous experiment: the President's steadfastness in the Cuban policy has already won him the regard of the nation at large, with whom the Upper Chamber is not, to put it mildly, popular.

Cuba's annexation is a foregone conclusion, if the capitalists and jingoes have their way, and it will not be the worst thing that could happen to the island. The wonder is that it has not fallen long before into the hands of the Great Republic. John Quincy Adams, in 1823, when Secretary of State, predicted an annexation within fifty years.

"From a multitude of considerations," he wrote "Cuba has become an object of transcendent importance to commercial and political interests of our Union. Its commanding position, the nature of its productions and of its wants, give it an importance in the sum of our national interests with which that of no foreign territory can be compared, and little inferior to that which binds the different members of the Union together. Also, if it be not annexed, what is to be feared, and doubtless on good grounds, are the periodical revolts and miserable pronunciamientos which have distinguished the political history of all the other Latin-American republics. Why should Cuba be exempt from these? Her origin, her history, her people, her climate are the same."

On the other hand, I am ready to admit that, if the President's policy fail, Cuba, assured of the support of the other Latin nations of the Western hemisphere, who distrust and dislike America, may drift away, first commercially, and then politically, from the latter's domination.