limits of that state should consist. The resolutions asserted a constitutional right to demand from congress a declaration upon this point, and avowed a determination to raise the troops should such declaration be withheld. After the determination of the British government not to surrender the posts was known, the militia ordered to be raised to garrison them, who were not in actual service, were discharged.

1

NOTE-No. IV.

In the formation of this treaty, a question came on to be considered and decided which involved a principle that on an after occasion, and in a different case, excited a ferment never to be forgotten by those who took an active part in the politics of the day. The whole commerce of the Creek nation was in the hands of M'Gillivray, who received his supplies from a company of British merchants, free from duty, through the territories belonging to Spain. This circumstance constituted no inconsiderable impediment to the progress of the negotiation. M'Gillivray derived emoluments from the arrangement which he would not consent to relinquish; and was not without apprehensions, that Spain, disgusted by his new connexions with the United States, might throw embarrassments in the way of this profitable traffic. In addition to this consideration, it was, on the part of the United States, desirable to alter the channel through which the Indians should receive their supplies, and thereby to render them more dependent on the American government. But it would be necessary to exempt the goods designed for the Indian nation from the duties imposed by law on imported articles, and the propriety of such an exemption might well be questioned.

With that cautious circumspection which marked his political course, the president took this point into early consideration, and required the opinion of his constitutional advisers respecting it. The secretary of state was of opinion that the stipulation for importing his goods through the United States, duty free, might safely be made. "A treaty made by the president with the concurrence of two-thirds of the senate, was," he said, "a law of the land," and a law of superior order, because it not only repeals past laws, but can not itself be repealed by future ones. The treaty then will legally control the duty act, and the act for licensing traders in this particular instance. From this opinion there is no reason to suppose that any member of the cabinet dissented. A secret article providing for the case was submitted to the senate, and it has never been understood that in advising and consenting to it, that body was divided.

NOTE-No. V.

This question was investigated with great labour, and being one involving principles of the utmost importance to the United States, on which the parties were divided, the subject was presented in all the views of which it was susceptible. A perusal of he arguments used on the occasion would certainly afford much gratification to the curious, and their insertion at full length would perhaps be excused by those who recollect the interest which at the time was taken in the measure to which they related, and the use which was made of it by the opponents of the then administration; but the limits prescribed for this work will not permit the introduction of such voluminous papers. It may however be expected that the outline of that train of reasoning with which each opinion was supported, and on which the judgment of the president was most probably formed, should be briefly stated.

To prove that the measure was not sanctioned by the constitution, the general principle was asserted, that the foundation of that instrument was laid on this ground, "that all powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states or to the people." To take a single step beyond the boundaries thus specially drawn around the powers of congress, is to take possession of a boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of definition.

The power in question was said not to be among those which were specially enumerated, nor to be included within either of the general phrases which are to be found in the constitution.

The article which contains this enumeration was reviewed; each specified power was analysed; and the creation of a corporate body was declared to be distinct from either of them.

The general phrases are,

1st. To lay taxes to provide for the general welfare of the United States. The power here conveyed, it was observed, was "to lay taxes," the purpose was "the general welfare." Congress could not lay taxes adlibitum, but could only lay them for the general welfare; nor did this clause authorize that body to provide for the general welfare otherwise than by laying taxes for that purpose.

2dly. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the enumerated powers.

But they can all be carried into execution without a bank. A bank, therefore, is not necessary, and consequently not authorized by this phrase.

It had been much urged that a bank would give great facility or convenience in the collection of taxes. Suppose this were true; yet the constitution allows only the means which are necessary, not those which are convenient. If such a latitude of construction be allowed this phrase, as to give any non-enumerated power, it will go to every one; for there is no one which ingenuity may not torture into a convenience, in some way or other, to some one of so long a list of enumerated powers. It would swallow up all the list of enumerated powers, and reduce the whole to one phrase. Therefore it was that the constitution restrained them to necessary means, that is to say, to those means without which the grant of the power must be nugatory.

The convenience was then examined. This had been stated in the report of the secretary of the treasury to congress, to consist in the augmentation of the circulating medium, and in preventing the transportation and retransportation of money between the states and the treasury.

The first was considered as a demerit. The second, it was said, might be effected by other means. Bills of exchange and treasury drafts would supply the place of bank notes. Perhaps indeed bank bills would be a more convenient vehicle than treasury orders; but a little difference in the degree of convenience can not constitute the necessity which the constitution makes the ground for assuming any non-enumerated power.

Besides, the existing state banks would, without doubt, enter into arrangements for lending their agency. This expedient alone suffices to prevent the existence of that necessity which may justify the assumption of a non-enumerated power as a means for carrying into effect an enumerated one.

It may be said that a bank whose bills would have a currency all over the states, would be more convenient than one whose currency is limited to a single state. So it would be still more convenient that there should be a bank whose bills should have a currency all over the world; but it does not follow from this superior conveniency,

that there exists any where a power to establish such a bank, or that the world may not go on very well without it.

For a shade or two of convenience, more or less, it can not be imagined that the constitution intended to invest congress with a power so important as that of erecting a corporation.

In supporting the constitutionality of the act, it was laid down as a general proposition, "that every power vested in a government is in its nature sovereign, and includes by force of the term, a right to employ all the means requisite and fairly applicable to the attainment of the ends of such power; and which are not precluded by restrictions and exceptions specified in the constitution, are not immoral, are not contrary to the essential ends of political society.

This principle, in its application to government in general, would be admitted as an axiom; and it would be incumbent on those who might refuse to acknowledge its influence in American affairs to prove a distinction; and to show that a rule which, in the general system of things, is essential to the preservation of the social order, is inapplicable to the United States.

The circumstance that the powers of sovereignty are divided between the national and state governments, does not afford the distinction required. It does not follow from this, that each of the portions of power delegated to the one or to the other, is not sovereign with regard to its proper objects. It will only follow from it, that each has sovereign power as to certain things, and not as to other things. If the government of the United States does not possess sovereign power as to its declared purposes and trusts, because its power does not extend to all cases, neither would the several states possess sovereign power in any case; for their powers do not extend to every case. According to the opinion intended to be combated, the United States would furnish the singular spectacle of a political society without sovereignty, or a people governed without a government.

If it could be necessary to bring proof of a proposition so clear as that which affirms that the powers of the federal government, as to its objects, were sovereign, there is a clause in the constitution which is decisive. It is that which declares the constitution of the United States, the laws made in pursuance of it, and the treaties made under its authority to be the supreme law of the land. The power which can create the supreme law in any case, is doubtless sovereign as to such case.

This general and indisputable principle puts an end to the abstract question, whe ther the United States have power to erect a corporation: for it is unquestionably incident to sovereign power to erect corporations, and consequently to that of the United States, in relation to the objects intrusted to the management of the government. The difference is this; where the authority of the government is general, it can create corporations in all cases; where it is confined to certain branches of legislation, it can create corporations only in those cases.

That the government of the United States can exercise only those powers which are delegated by the constitution, is a proposition not to be controverted; neither is it to be denied on the other hand, that there are implied as well as express powers, and that the former are as effectually delegated as the latter. For the sake of accuracy it may be observed, that there are also resulting powers. It will not be doubted that if the United States should make a conquest of any of the territories of its neighbours, they would possess sovereign jurisdiction over the conquered territory. This would rather be a result of the whole mass of the powers of the government, and from the nature of political society, than a consequence of either of the powers specially enumerated.

This is an extensive case in which the power of erecting corporations is either implied in, or would result from some or all of the powers vested in the national government.

Since it must be conceded that implied powers are as completely delegated as those which are expressed, it follows that, as a power of erecting a corporation may as well be implied as any other thing, it may as well be employed as an instrument or mean of carrying into execution any of the specified powers as any other instrument or mean whatever. The question in this as in every other case must be, whether the mean to be employed has a natural relation to any of the acknowledged objects or lawful ends of the government. Thus a corporation may not be created by congress for superintending the police of the city of Philadelphia, because they are not authorized to regulate the police of that city; but one may be created in relation to the collection of the taxes, or to the trade with foreign countries, or between the states, or with the Indian tribes, because it is in the province of the federal government to regulate those objects; and because it is incident to a general sovereign or legislative power to regulate a thing, to employ all the means which relate to its regulation, to the best and greatest advantage.

A strange fallacy seems to have crept into the manner of thinking and reasoning upon this subject. The imagination has presented an incorporation as some great, independent, substantive thing-as a political end of peculiar magnitude and moment; whereas it is truly to be considered as a quality, capacity, or mean to an end. Thus a mercantile company is formed with a certain capital for the purpose of carrying on a particular branch of business. The business to be prosecuted is the end. The association in order to form the requisite capital is the primary mean. Let an incorporation be added, and you only add a new quality to that association which enables it to prosecute the business with more safety and convenience. The association when incorporated still remains the mean, and can not become the end.

To this reasoning respecting the inherent right of government to employ all the means requisite to the execution of its specified powers, it is objected, that none but necessary and proper means can be employed; and none can be necessary, but those without which the grant of the power would be nugatory. So far has this restrictive interpretation been pressed as to make the case of necessity which shall warrant the constitutional exercise of a power, to depend on casual and temporary circumstances; an idea, which alone confutes the construction. The expedience of exercising a particular power, at a particular time, must indeed depend on circumstances, but the constitutional right of exercising it must be uniform and invariable. All the arguments, therefore, drawn from the accidental existence of certain state banks which happen to exist to-day, and for aught that concerns the government of the United States may disappear to-morrow, must not only be rejected as fallacious, but must be viewed as demonstrative that there is a radical source of error in the reasoning.

But it is essential to the being of the government that so erroneous a conception of the meaning of the word necessary should be exploded.

It is certain that neither the grammatical nor popular sense of the term requires that construction. According to both, necessary often means no more than needful, requisite, incidental, useful, or conducive to. It is a common mode of expression to say that it is necessary for a government or a person to do this or that thing, where nothing more is intended or understood than that the interests of the government or person require, or will be promoted by doing this or that thing.

This is the true sense in which the word is used in the constitution. The whole turn of the clause containing it indicates an intent to give by it a liberal latitude to the exercise of the specified powers. The expressions have peculiar comprehensiveness.

They are "to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by the constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or office thereof." To give the word “ necessary" the restrictive operation contended for, would not only depart from its obvious and popular sense, but would give it the same force as if the word absolutely or indispensably had been prefixed to it.

Such a construction would beget endless uncertainty and embarrassment. The cases must be palpable and extreme in which it could be pronounced with certainty that a measure was absolutely necessary, or one without which a given power would be nugatory. There are few measures of any government which would stand so severe a test. To insist upon it would be to make the criterion of the exercise of an implied power a case of extreme necessity; which is rather a rule to justify the overleaping the bounds of constitutional authority than to govern the ordinary exercise of it.

The degree in which a measure is necessary can never be a test of the legal right to adopt it. The relation between the measure and the end; between the nature of the mean employed towards the execution of a power, and the object of that power must be the criterion of constitutionality, not the more or less necessity or utility.

The means by which national exigencies are to be provided for, national inconveniences obviated, and national prosperity promoted, are of such infinite variety, extent, and complexity, that here must of necessity be great latitude of discretion in the selection and application of those means. Hence the necessity and propriety of exercising the authority intrusted to a government on principles of liberal construction.

While on the one hand, the restrictive interpretation of the word nccessary is deemed inadmissible, it will not be contended on the other, that the clause in question gives any new and independent power. But it gives an explicit sanction to the doctrine of implied powers, and is equivalent to an admission of the proposition that the government, as to its specified powers and objects, has plenary and sovereign authority. It is true that the power to create corporations is not granted in terms. Neither is the power to pass any particular law, nor to employ any of the means by which the ends of the government are to be attained. It is not expressly given in cases in which its existence is not controverted. For by the grant of a power to exercise exclusive legislation in the territory which may be ceded by the states to the United States, it is admitted to pass; and in the power "to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property of the United States," it is acknowledged to be implied. In virtue of this clause, has been implied the right to create a government; that is, to create a body politic or corporation of the highest nature; one that, in its maturity, will be able itself to create other corporations. Thus has the constitution itself refuted the argument which contends that, had it been designed to grant so important a power as that of erecting corporations, it would have been mentioned. But this argument is founded on an exaggerated and erroneous conception of the nature of the power. It is not of so transcendent a kind as the reasoning supposes. Viewed in a just light, it is a mean which ought to have been left to implication, rather than an end which ought to have been expressly granted.

The power of the government then to create corporations in certain cases being shown, it remained to inquire into the right to incorporate a banking company, in order to enable it the more effectually to accomplish ends which were in themselves lawful.

To establish such a right it would be necessary to show the relation of such an institution to one or more of the specified powers of government.

It was then affirmed to have a relation more or less direct to the power of collecting