so, there is a supposed creation of matter and the creation of matter is inconceivable-implies the establishment of a relation of thought between nothing and something, a relation of which one term is absent, an impossible relation." *

Yet he concedes that life, or a vitalizing power, precedes organization or structure. Thus, it is only removing one step further back the intervention of creative power. It is not our purpose to discuss the theory of Evolution here, beyond its bearing upon intellectual development. It is the old Aristotelian method revived in its most rigid coarctation; the external, the sensible, is regarded as the only source of certain knowledge; the phenomena of the intellectual, the spiritual, are to be solved only by the physical environment.

Doubtless a like method of arriving at true knowl

* Principles of Biology, p. 3., c. 2.

† A theory has been insisted upon by some speculatists, that the whole development is the result merely of "conditions of existence;" of a nisus without any functional predetermination; but Lewes reluctantly admits that the theory is untenable. He refers to that "marvel of marvels in nature," the passing of the ovum or spermatozoon into a complete organism, reproducing forms and constitutional peculiarities of parents, and even of remoter ancestors. "A microscopic cell of albuminous compounds, wholly without trace of organs, not appreciably distinguishable from millions of other cells, contains within it the possibilities of an organism so complex and special as that of a Newton and a Napoleon." He thinks that the Aristotelian notion of "potential existence" is in this instance warranted. (Fortnightly Rev., June, 1868, Art. Darwin's Hypoth.)

The case above stated furnishes the most complete refutation of the Development theory, so far as it is made to depend upon conditions; it is an assumption of organic power without organs,—of a nisus without any pre-existing functions. To say that it is caused by "conditions" is using words without meaning, unless some intrinsic force is supposed. Even chemical compounds of inorganic substances do not result wholly from exterior conditions, there must be preexisting aptitude of the several elements.

edge, whether in the domain of the material or psychical, is appropriate, that is to say, by observation and collation of facts; but the facts must be such as are cognate to the particular subject. The laws of society are not to be determined by a mere inventory of individual occurrences; they are too vast in number to be gathered up in their totality, nor can they be discriminated with the requisite precision. Generalizations from a limited number of facts are all that can be looked for, and these constitute only proximate results. Neither can a law be found that is fixed and invariable like that of gravitation and other properties of matter. The infinitely complex nature of the human mind, the vast diversity of influences affecting the conduct of men, interpose a barrier to any absolutely certain forecaste of the future in any minuteness of detail, whether in a social or political aspect.

So, the phenomena of the human mind are not to be solved by a mere census of similitudes and differences throughout the human race. The chief part of our knowledge in Psychology is derived from our own consciousness. What lies within a man's individual experience he knows, without exterior observation, though his judgment may be confirmed or modified to some extent by the reported consciousness of others.

If the old question should be raised again, as to the philosophical verity of these inward derived conceptions, what shall be said of that large class of human opinions which are based upon instinctive beliefs? Is no account to be made of them because the instincts impelling to such belief are not susceptible of anatom

cal demonstration in the comparison of the different orders of animals, from the Amoeba and Polypus to the species Man? Moral and religious ideas are coextensive with humanity. Of comparatively low degree in a condition of barbarism, they become more pure and clear by advance of knowledge, yet are not dependent upon scientific evidence as the ground of belief. This moral advancement is rather by the culture of those natural instincts from which such ideas originated.*

Science may dispel erroneous views of natural phenomena, but cannot create perceptions of right and wrong. In an early period of civilization men may be deluded by a class possessing or claiming to have superior knowledge. But no Astrologer, Prophet, or Hierophant could ever lead a people away from the common instincts of humanity. Generally, in fact, such predicators of the future or promulgators of

* * *

*

*The argument of Spencer is more superficial than we should expect from one who generally reasons with much logical acumen. But his irreligious bias has interfered with his clearness of judgment. "Early ideas, he says, are not generally true ideas. What we call the progress of knowledge is the bringing of thoughts into harmony with things, and it implies that first thoughts are either wholly out of harmony with things, or in very incomplete harmony with them. * * The primitive notions of mankind as to the structure of the heavens, were wrong, and the notions which replaced them were successively wrong." So be says as to the form of the earth, the nature of the elements, etc., men were at first wrong. "Hence (he concludes), the hypothesis that living beings resulted from special creations being a primitive hypothesis, is probably not a true hypothesis." (Principles of Biology, p. 3, c. 2.

The same form of argument is used by him and others against all religious belief. The fallacy consists in rejecting the entirety on account of partial error; and the correction of error and whatever advancement has been made in religious knowledge has been wrought, not by Physical or Positive Philosophy, but by the general culture of all our faculties, as well moral and religious as intellectual

sacred laws, have only availed themselves of these popular tendencies, sometimes it may be for their own self-aggrandizement, but oftener for the elevation of the commonalty to a higher moral perception.

Finally, there is the sense of the spiritual. What could all human knowledge, derived merely from observation of the physical world, do toward generating a recognition of a personal being to whom we are subject, in whom is the attribute of holiness, and to whom we owe reverence and devotion? Yet, the instinctive direction of the human mind to such a being and to the religious consciousness resulting from our supposed relation to him, is as plainly impressed upon our nature by the power that called us into existence, and is at least as reliable, as the instincts of lower animals, which serve them in place of rational calculations, and which we know to be invariably true monitions.

XII.

DIVERSITIES OF THE HUMAN RACE.

ETHNICAL CHARACTER AS AFFECTED BY CLIMATE AND OTHER LOCAL INLUENCES.

THE theory of Wallace has been already adverted to,* viz., that variations in races of men became developed before there was intellectual activity sufficient to counteract the effect of climate, but that after the functions of the mind were brought into exercise no further physical changes took place, and the differences which had already occurred became fixed-that the influence of external condition would thereafter have affected the mind, and the more favored race, that is, a race which enjoyed a climate and locality favoring intellectual advancement, would become ascendant over others.†

It is assumed in this theory that man in his first form of existence had merely animal instincts without the exercise of intellectual functions. It must also be assumed that this condition was of long continuance, for, by the hypothesis, all parts of the earth had been peopled; or else it is necessary to suppose that there was a simultaneous creation of the ancestry of all

* Ante, Evolution. + Wallace, Origin of Races.