all the elements of the problem he had ignored only one, but that one was the Italian nation. And the nation, rising up in anger, swept the ingeniously fashioned cage he had made for it to the winds of heaven.

To the suasive arts of the Entente-diplomatists Italy's decision has been ascribed by some, while others blame the inactivity which allowed it to be so long deferred. In truth, both praise and blame are groundless. Quiescence and dignity were all that the situation called for in Rome; and the representatives of the Allies were eminently qualified to display them to the best advantage. Italy's right to choose was religiously respected; and Sonnino, whose silence was absolute, his mistrust morbid, and his methods conspirative, would have brooked nothing that smacked of interference. Suspecting one day a colleague of frankness towards an Ambassador, he at once deprived him of the privilege of learning how the negotiations were proceeding.

The appositeness of the Ambassadors' bearing was shown in the contrast it offered to the well-meaning demonstrativeness of a Minister of one of the smaller States, whose enthusiasm for our cause and impatience of Sonnino's slowness hurried him into naïve assurances that his Government, at any rate, would lose no time in throwing in its lot with the Allies either before Italy or together with her. Now that King Victor is at war against Austria, this artless diplomatist is constrained, on meeting Sonnino, to assume an expression amorphous enough to cover the offer of a military convention or a declaration of war as his Government may hereafter determine.

No; Italy's decision is not the work of statesmen or diplomatists, foreign or domestic. It is the ready response of a people to the call of highest duty, a heartening instance of the law of eclectic affinity among civilised nations.

E. J. DILLON.

Art. 15.-THE PROGRESS OF THE WAR.

I-BY LAND.

THE Austro-German offensive in Galicia, which resulted in the recovery of Przemysl and Lemberg; the entry of Italy into the war on the side of the Allies; and the landing of a Franco-British force on the Peninsula of Gallipoli-these have been the chief military events during the past three months.

At the end of March the situation in Galicia was as follows. The opposing armies were facing each other on the line of the rivers Dunajetz and Biala, from the junction of the former with the Upper Vistula to the region of Gorlice. Thence the line ran roughly parallel to the main watershed of the Carpathian Mountains, for the most part on the northern slopes, as far as the neighbourhood of the Wyskow Pass, south of which it had been bent back, by the Austrian offensive in Eastern Galicia, to the Dniester in the vicinity of Halicz. The further advance of the Austrians having been stopped either by the thaw which set in about March 15, or by the arrival of Russian reinforcements, or, most probably, by both causes combined, the Russians had begun a general offensive movement between the road to Bartfeld and the Uzok Pass.

It is unnecessary to follow the ensuing operations in detail. They resulted, by the middle of April, in the advance of the Russian line to Stropko in the Ondava valley, to Wrava in the Laborcz valley, and to points a few miles south of the main watershed on the front between the Lupkow and Uzok Passes. A concentric attack on the region of the Uzok was also in progress. At this stage the enemy brought important forces into action on the Lupkow-Uzok front, accompanied by a proportion of heavy artillery. Our Allies were checked, and thrown on the defensive.

The effect of this sudden display of force was, probably, to induce the Russians, who were intent on the offensive, to set their available reserves in motion towards what seemed to be the scene of decisive action. The enemy, with their customary astuteness, had other designs in view; and the concentration on the Carpathian

front was partly a ruse, and partly an item in a more extensive plan of operations. They had meanwhile assembled, in great secrecy, an overwhelming force on the front in Western Galicia, composed in great part of German formations, the whole being under the command of General von Mackensen. The Russian positions on the Dunajetz and Biala were of great strength, but they were comparatively weakly held, and our Allies were taken by surprise. The Russian General Staff appear to have had the first intimation of what was impending about April 20; and a week later the great offensive in Western Galicia was heralded by an attack in the vicinity of Gorlice which threw the left flank of General Dimitrieff's Third Army back towards Jaslo. On May 1 the main attack began at Ciezkowice on the Biala, under an overwhelming fire of heavy artillery. The Russians, inadequately provided with guns, short of ammunition, and assailed by vastly superior numbers, fell back, fighting stubbornly, to the line of the Wisloka. Here they attempted to make a stand; but the enemy forced the passage at several points on May 5 and 6, compelling a further retirement to the Wislok, and ultimately to the San, behind which the Third Army was deployed on May 14. Meanwhile the retirement of the Third Army had exposed the right flank of the Eighth Army in the Carpathians, necessitating a general withdrawal on the entire front between the Bartfeld road and the Wyskow Pass. This retrograde movement was followed up by hostile forces advancing as follows: the Third Austrian Army, by the Lupkow group of passes, on Sanok; the Second Austrian Army by the Uzok group, on Sambor; and Von Linsingen's composite Austro-German Army by the Beskid group, on Stryj. On Von Linsingen's right the Archduke Eugen's Army continued to operate in the neighbourhood of Nadvorna and Delatyn, based on the Jablonitza Pass, while General Pflanzer occupied the line of the Pruth.

Before proceeding further it will be convenient to consider the enemy's plan of campaign. A glance at the map will show that Von Mackensen's advance, which constituted the main offensive on which the success of the whole plan depended, was a purely frontal attack on the strong defensive line of the Dunajetz and Biala rivers. It will also be observed that it was less effective

as a threat to the communications of the Russian forces in the Carpathians than the previous offensive in Eastern Galicia. The latter was directed in rear of the main Russian armies, and therefore had to be opposed by forces specially assembled for the purpose, whereas the advance in Western Galicia encountered an army established in an entrenched position which had withstood repeated attacks. It may be asked, Why did the enemy decide to abandon a line of advance on which they had already made some progress for one which was strategically less favourable, and which necessitated new dispositions and the concentration of fresh forces in a distant region? The answer is, that the conditions had changed to an extent which caused the new line of attack to offer possibilities outweighing the strategical advantages which the original line had presented in the first instance. The episode is an illustration of the fundamental truth that war is not subservient to rules. The art of strategy consists in adapting the operations of the forces available to the circumstances of the moment, and is not to be found merely in the geometrical system of lines and angles by which the Jomini school of strategists sought to solve the greater problems of war.

The pause in the operations in South-eastern Galicia, necessitated by the thaw which set in about March 15, deprived the enemy of the advantage of surprise which they had enjoyed at the outset, and enabled the Russians to concentrate troops and complete their arrangements for defence. The co-operation of forces by way of the Carpathian Passes, the purpose of which was explained in the last article, had been made impracticable by the successful defence of the Russian positions which barred the advance in the direction of Stryj and Stanislau. On the other hand, while the Russian position in Southeastern Galicia had been strengthened, that on the Dunajetz line had probably been weakened by the withdrawal of troops to oppose the enemy's advance in the south-east, and to pursue the offensive on the Hungarian frontier in the Carpathians. The line of the Dunajetz might, therefore, be expected to be the most vulnerable part of the Russian front in Galicia. Another important consideration was the inadequacy of the available railway communications for the supply of the large force

which would be needed for the resumption of operations in South-eastern Galicia, with a reasonable prospect of success, after the spring floods should have subsided; while the railway facilities in Western Galicia were relatively good. This consideration by itself would suffice to decide the question; for the successful attack of entrenched positions can only be accomplished by the concentrated action of masses of men and heavy artillery, the supply of which with food and ammunition depends on a well-organised system of railway transport. It was pointed out in a previous article that the great German attacks invariably followed the lines of railway. In the present instance the main lines of attack were defined by the two railways which cross the San at Jaroslau and Sanok, the bulk of the artillery following the former route. Despite the facilities thus provided for the transport of ammunition, there are unmistakable indications that the advance was retarded by the difficulty of keeping the guns supplied. The delay, and the relaxation of the offensive, which succeeded the more violent engagements-as, for example, after the forcing of the Dunajetz near Tarnow, and the Wisloka at Debicacannot otherwise be satisfactorily explained.

It was, apparently, intended that Von Mackensen should force the passage of the San north of Przemysl, and then turn in a south-easterly direction so as to envelop the fortress on the north-east and to join hands with Boehm Ermolli's Austrian army, which was to advance between Przemysl and the Dniester. The passage was effected in the neighbourhood of Jaroslau on May 15; but in the subsequent fighting the army appears to have become diverted from its proper course, and several days were occupied in effecting the necessary change of front. The converging attacks to the north-east and south-east of Przemysl were then pressed with great vigour for many days, but failed to reach the Lemberg railway, on which the garrison depended for its supplies. The fortress itself does not appear to have been attacked directly until the end of May, when German troops closed in on the northern front, and the left wing of the Third Austrian Army enveloped the southern and western defences. After the passage of the San had been forced, Przemysl, however, lost its value as a supporting point