visions of the future, unfolded on the canvass of prophecy: it is for these reasons that we oppose this theory with such earnestness and warmth.

But having shown, as we think unanswerably, that the old and admitted principles of natural history require us to regard the varieties of the human race as belonging to the same species, and having shown that the last and most ingenious evasion of this argument is an utter failure, we may sit down content with what the word of God has clearly asserted, and the vast majority of the first naturalists of the world have believed that men were not the offspring of diverse origins, but that God has made of one blood all nations of men to dwell on the face of the whole earth.

ART. II.-THE DOCTRINE OF THE LOGOS IN THE INTRODUCTION TO JOHN'S GOSPEL, CHAP. I, 1-18.

[FIRST PAPER.]

We have read, with much satisfaction, the investigation of this interesting but difficult passage, by Professor Stuart, in the January and April numbers of the Bibliotheca Sacra for 1850. We had, some time before, formed our own opinion of the interpretation to be assigned these verses, by a careful study of their scope as well as phraseology; and are gratified to find so many of the results of our inquiries confirmed by the views of so eminent an expositor and critic. How far we are following in his wake, and where we deviate from it or pursue a cross track, those who may feel interested to know, can best ascertain by a collation of the dissertations above referred to with our own lucubrations, exhibited in a simple and independent manner. These we now commit to our readers, not with the presumptuous thought of arraying ourselves against a veteran scholar of so vastly superior erudition; but with the humbler aim, partly of propagating and partly of reviewing some of the conclusions to which he has arrived.

We may premise that we can see no good reason for supposing that John borrows the term Aóyos in this peculiar application, either from the nomenclature of oriental Gnosticism or the dialectics of Alexandrian Platonism. The writings of Philo he can scarcely have ever read, or if he had, he would have more distinctly referred to them; and the Gnostic heresy was not yet sufficiently developed to FOURTH SERIES, VOL. III.-24

call forth a direct confutation, nor were its speculations much more within the range of the Evangelist's reading. Neither can we think that he adopts the Rabbinical usage of the phrase, “Word of Jehovah" for this class of literature has little more to do with the New Testament than the two former; and the impersonation of the Divine attribute of wisdom in the Proverbs, and other passages of the Old Testament and Apocrypha, is totally diverse from this setting forth of a real distinctive Being. Yet the general impress of all these appropriations of this term, indistinctly and remotely operating upon the mingled tenets and dialect of Ephesus, may have unconsciously inclined the Evangelist to its employment, and especially would assist his readers in apprehending its meaning, as an epithet already familiar to them in similar theosophical uses. The primordial distinctions of semi-divine emanations, in particular, had long been current in the east, and were in fact the germ from which Gnosticism soon became evolved as a system. These incipient dogmas could hardly have failed of circulation to some dangerous extent in Asia Minor, at the time of John's writing the Gospel, and the polemical aspect of several passages in it--indeed, of this very introduction, to say nothing of the Apocalypse *-seems to corroborate the statement, made apparently from tradition by Irenæus, that he wrote it with a special view of neutralizing the errors of Cerinthus. These considerations may aid us in the interpretation of this term, as showing the sense in which John would have expected his readers to understand him; but the truer mode of determining the import which he wished to convey, is, after all, to fix the exact shade of signification of the term itself, under the relations imposed by the circumstances and context. This is peculiarly necessary in treating the phraseology of so subjective a writer as John, who speaks so constantly from the deep-toned suggestions of his own vividly spiritual mind, that the chief difficulty in appreciating his pointed, sententious language lies in placing one's self distinctly in his own commanding point of view. The legitimate signification of the word, in itself considered, moreover, must have been the actual basis of all these secondary applications; and therefore, at this distance of time, and removal of

Rev. ii, 6, 15. Compare 1 John ii, 22; iv, 3; 2 John 7. The Apocalypse is probably the first in point of time, and the Gospel the last, of John's writings. Davidson's conclusion on this subject (Introduction to the New Testament, i, 330,) seems about the true one, that "an anti-gnostic spirit pervades this Gospel, not [so much] because John's design was to furnish a direct antidote to it [the false gnosis,] but because his object was so general as naturally to include it." The term Aóyoç occurs in this sense only here and in 1 John i, 1; [v, 7;] Rev. xix, 13.

association, this alone can furnish us with a correct guide in developing them. Without investigating the more recondite etymology, the word 2óyos, as a pure verbal noun from the root λéyw (I speak) in its middle form, means precisely speech, both in its subjective capability and objective exercise-the ratio et oratio of the Latins. From this endowment and function, the distinguishing attribute of man, the sense passed over naturally into the result or product of the faculty; namely, a word, or articulate sign of thought, and thence was extended to the general signification of a symbol of some idea, whether spoken or written. In this particular instance of its adoption, we are obviously not to look for anything other than a metaphorical acceptation of the word; namely, as denoting some exterior representation, which should serve the same purpose between the speaker and the addressed, as the ordinary vehicle of thought does between man and man. But as it is also employed in an emphatic sense, and with express reference to the Godhead, it can only mean by a strict grammatical and rhetorical interpretation, some great medium of communication on the part of God with his creatures. The incarnation that follows, further limits this sense to some personality, in distinction from the mere objective revelation contained in the Bible; making it, as Professor Stuart aptly renders, Ocòç Aóyos, God revealed, to which might be added actively, that it is God revealing himself. To sum up the meaning of Aóyoç, then, as here required, it may be expressed in one word as the Divine MANIFESTATION; not merely the exponent of the Divine character and will to others, but the very bodying forth of the Divine nature in himself. This is precisely John's conception of Christ, and his whole introduction and Gospel are constructed with the sole view of exhibiting and illustrating his Master in this aspect. From this comprehensive fundamental import, too, all the particular significations above referred to, are immediately and obviouslyderived, and this in a way that neither makes them interfere with each other, nor detract from the sublimity of the theme. With these preliminary remarks, we pass to the consideration of the passage in detail.

Verse 1. Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ Λόγος.] The assertion ἐν ἀρχῇ is placed first in the sentence, as being the emphatic point in a declaration which ushers in an express statement of the eternity of the Logos; it evidently corresponds to the of Gen. i, 1, and refers to the same period. That it is a translation of that adverbial phrase, may be one reason for the omission of the article; but a better one is, that the article would make the time too definite, the meaning being, not ai the origin of the present mundane order of

things merely, but aboriginally, in the widest sense that the mind can take in. The imperfect v can hardly be relied upon as proof of Christ's pre-existence, for no other tense could have been used; the verb denotes simple existence as predicated of him at that period; it is the ev rather which implies that he did not then begin to be had ní been used, the idea would have been at least ambiguous; with ȧró the notion of priority must have ceased, even had v continued in use.

Καὶ ὁ Λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν,] Καί is used universally by John as a simple continuative, the of the Hebrew; whether the meaning be adversative or otherwise, must generally be gathered from the context. Those are rather hasty, who make ρóç here equivalent to napá; it may justly be doubted whether such an interchange of prepositions, especially with a different case, ever takes place in Greek, even in the New Testament; and an intentional selection of πρóç in this instance is shown by its repetition in verse 2, as well as by eiç in the parallel expression of verse 18. The predominant idea undoubtedly is Tapá; but as this would be obvious, and included in the collateral notion of eiç (in the sense of erga), Tρóç is used to combine them. Glorified saints are maçà To Oe, angels may be said to be παρὰ τὸν Θεόν, but the Logos only is πρὸς τὸν Θεόν; within this interior circle of proximity and interpenetration no finite being can enter. The meaning then, as we think, is the personal and intimate association or intercourse enjoyed by the Logos with the Father, previous to the incarnation. Ilapú denotes mere juxtaposition; even with the accusative it could only have intimated an approach to the Deity, with the dative it would have made the proximity too remote and quiescent, and with the genitive (as Prof. Stuart suggests) it might have been perverted to countenance the emanation system. On the contrary, pós at once signifies closeness of connection, and at the same time shows that it is an actively assumed relation, a permanent flowing in of one essence upon the other in the harmonious consociation of the distinctive persons of the Godhead, yet not an infusion or commingling of the two beings, as eiç might have been mistaken to denote.*

The interpretation of Lücke (in loc.) comes nearest to this. After quoting analogous expressions from Proverbs, the Apocrypha, and Philo, leading to "the presumption that John, by the phrase pòc ròv Ocov, would express the inmost consociation (gemeinschaft) of the Aóyoç with God, his very existence near (bei) God," he proceeds to refer to Fritsche and Winer as noting the same idiom in classic Greek, and then adduces Matt. xxvi, 55; Mark vi, 3; ix, 19; 1 Cor. xvi, 6, 7; Gal. i, 18; iv, 18, as sustaining "the usual exposition of the expression Tрòç Tov Ocov, that it denotes the being of the Logos with (bei) God, in his im

Kai Oɛòç po Aóyoç.] The Evangelist has just shown the exterior relations of the Logos,-namely, in respect to time, his duration as compared with that of this world, and his place, a residence with the Deity; he now brings to view his inmost nature, which is expressed by a comparison with that of the Deity himself. For this reason Ocóc is placed first as the important unknown element. Many think the article requisite to make this word expressive of strict Divinity; but to have said ó Aóyoç ǹv ó Ɖɛós, would have been to assert the absolute identity of the two beings, rather than to distinguish one by a comparison with the other. The word deóc with the Greeks was not synonymous with the English word God,-their ideas on this subject were different from ours; its usage was precisely analogous to that of our word deity,-for that was what the ancients meant. Thus when we speak of an idolatrous or mythological personage, we say a deity, in distinction from the true God, whom alone we style the Deity; but when we wish to speak of Divinity independently of any such distinction, we express our meaning very pertinently and forcibly by omitting either article,— as in the phrase "Moslems believe that Allah, not Mohammed, is Deity." Who does not see that the symmetry of such a sentence would be marred, and its meaning impaired, were it expressed thus: "Moslems believe that Allah, not Mohammed, is the Deity;" the idea in this form is too specific, or not sufficiently abstract to suit the predication of a Divine character in the general sense intended. Yet no one would understand the sentence containing no article before "deity," as equivalent to the following: "Moslems believe that Allah, not Mohammed, is a deity;" here the indefinite article really becomes definite, by limiting the idea to a single particular Divine personage. The omission of any article whatever is thus seen to generalize an idea more fully than any other form of phraseology. This sentence of John, therefore, is constructed in the best manner to express the idea intended; and is in accordance

mediate society (gemeinschaft)." It seems to us, however, that the exalted character of the present case intensifies the connexion intimated by the πрóç in those passages; so that we should translate this gemeinschaft bei into a communion of sentiment and agency in active intercourse, whereas Lücke doubtless rather designed it passively to express a community of residence, or at most of sphere, as a privilege. The idea of equality, although not directly intended by this clause, results necessarily from the statement of this intimacy, especially if it be one actively exercised toward God on the part of the Logos by inherent right, and not merely received or enjoyed as with a superior. It is precisely this distinction that pós with the accusative is here fitted to intimate.-It is not a little remarkable that the same construction (πрòç ròv Ilarépa) recurs in the parallel declaration of 1 John i, 2.