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THE

METHODIST QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1851.

ART. I.-DIVINE AGENCY IN MATERIAL PHENOMENA.

1. Of the Divine Agency in the Production of Material Phenomena. Art. VII. Bibliotheca Sacra, May, 1848.

2. Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation.

3. Works on Natural Science.

Or the real nature of matter we know as little as of spirit. A volume might be filled with the various and curious speculations of philosophers, which have added little to our knowledge, and are valuable only as a part of the history of mind. One class, spiritualizing all things, consider matter as merely phenomenal, having no real existence; while others, taking the opposite view, deny the independent existence of mind, and maintain that sensation and thought are the result of material combinations. Christian philosophers of the present day admit the real and independent existence of matter and spirit, and have chiefly occupied themselves in investigating their laws, and tracing the immediate causes of their phenomena. The first principles of our knowledge of the external world are derived through the senses. All admit their evidence to be unquestionable; but in making it the basis of theories, we ought to be careful not to mistake this testimony by confounding original and acquired perceptions. Professor Chace, the author of the article referred to in the Bibliotheca Sacra, thus speaks of the dependence to be placed on this evidence:

"All men are so constituted that they cannot help believing in the reality of what they see or feel, or gain a knowledge of through any of the senses. "This feeling of assurance, this conviction of absolute certainty, is naturally and inseparably connected with the exercise of all our perceptive faculties.

"It is a part of our nature, and we cannot escape it without ceasing to be ourselves."

FOURTH SERIES, VOL. III.-1

"The information derived through the senses, therefore, rests upon the same ground as the truths of revelation, namely, the Divine veracity.

"The testimony of the senses, therefore, in relation to the existence and attributes of matter, must be admitted. Coming from the same source, it has equal authority with the dictates of reason or the voice of inspiration. We cannot question it without questioning the truthfulness of our constitution, nay, the veracity of God himself,-without questioning everything, through whatever channel derived."-Pp. 346, 347.

Did we not know that our senses are now imperfect, this strong confidence in their proper testimony, which we think no one, from his individual experience, now feels, might exist. But as a result of this imperfection, the same sensations are not always experienced in like circumstances, as in the case where two individuals gazing on the same object suppose it to be of different colours. There are many instances in which individuals fail to distinguish even all the primary colours, and are made sensible of their defect only through the teaching of others. The concurring testimony of many is requisite to produce that strong confidence which results from the voice of inspiration. Here reason comes to the aid of the senses.

The assertion of Professor Chace, that the senses directly give us a knowledge of the existence of matter and its properties, cannot be sustained. The knowledge thus imparted is very limited. Each sense gives us one class of simple ideas only: thus, by sight, we learn of colours; by hearing, sounds, and so of the other senses. So far from giving us a knowledge of the existence of matter generally, no one of the senses reveals to us directly the existence of its own organ. This knowledge, like most, the origin of which is ascribed to the senses, must be referred to reason and experience. Neither is it true that the senses reveal to us the attributes or properties of matter. The terms applied to sensations have a double meaning, including both the cause and the effect. All sensation is, properly speaking, in the mind. When standing before a landscape in summer, if we open our eyes we are immediately conscious of a sensation which we may call green, and we apply the same term to the vegetation which we believe to exist around us. But in this case the sense of sight is only the medium through which an effect has been produced on us,--of the external cause it tells us nothing. A sensation may be experienced when no external cause is present. If we place a red wafer on a sheet of white paper exposed to the sun's rays, and gaze steadfastly on it a few moments, we shall see, when the wafer is removed, another in its place of the same size, but of a different colour. In this, and many other instances that might be named, a simple sensation gives us no correct knowledge of the external cause. Moreover, the consideration that, previous

to investigation, men confound sensations and their causes, and also original and acquired perceptions, must detract from any practical results of the infallibility ascribed to the testimony of the senses. All at first confound sensation with its cause, and suppose that something like it exists in the external world. Till convinced by reason, when looking on a portrait, or a painted landscape, men suppose there is more before them than mere canvass covered with pigments possessing different properties of reflecting light, which at midnight present only an even, colourless surface. It is now well established, that the eye gives us no knowledge of the place, distance, or form of bodies. These are all matters of experience. We cannot tell, by the sense of sight simply, whether an object is on our right hand or our left; whether it is a sphere or a cube; a few feet distant, or many rods. As we gaze on nature, the eye does not reveal to us whether a great mountain or a deep valley is before us. It gives us no knowledge of the position of the heavenly bodies; we never see the stars in their true places; and we suppose we see the sun after it has been several minutes below the horizon.

Professor Chace, denying the direct Divine agency in the production of material phenomena, maintains that they must be ascribed to properties which God gave matter at its creation. He seemingly settles the whole question at the outset, by asserting, in the strongest terms, that our senses in the clearest manner support his views. They declare that material bodies are

"actual substances, possessing properties, and acting by virtue of those properties. This testimony bears on it the impress of certainty. We cannot doubt it if we would. It brings with it the Divine sanction, and God himself is responsible for its truth. God has so made us, and placed us in such relations to these bodies, that we are naturally and instinctively led to take this view of their constitution. Nay, further, such is the structure of our minds, that this view is forced upon us, so that we cannot avoid it without doing the greatest violence to our understandings.”—Pp. 346–348.

Denying, as we do distinctly, the main position of the author, that our senses reveal to us directly the existence of matter in its various forms, possessing properties, and acting by virtue of those properties, it seems we become liable to serious charges, no less than blasphemy, and a want of common sense. As, however, we have not been "led instinctively and naturally" to his conclusions, we hope that under the plea of natural inability we may escape the imputation of guilt.

We have but indicated a course of argument we should pursue against the assumptions of Professor Chace which he has not attempted to prove.

We suppose there are few, if any, at the present day who really doubt, however the conviction may have been acquired, the existence of matter, or that, in our connexion with it, we experience sensations which become the sure foundation of much of our knowledge. All our researches, as well as our experience, show us the perfection and harmony of the works of God. We are astonished when we learn how few are the elements that compose the infinitely varied forms in which matter appears, and how few, simple, and general are the laws by which these forms are governed. Design is everywhere manifest, and man cannot comprehend the wisdom displayed. All parts of inanimate nature are fitted to each other, when the least mistake would ruin all; and the whole is perfectly adapted to the wants and conditions of the various orders of animate beings earth sustains. Says Aristotle "Whoever admires not the skill and contrivance of nature, must either be deficient in intellect, or must have some private motive which withholds him from expressing his admiration."-Lib. x, cap. 10.

In nature's vast expanse, wherever we turn, what new wonders rise! If we look upward, we are led to exclaim,—

"O what a confluence of ethereal fires,

From urns unnumber'd down the steep of heaven,
Streams to a point, and centres in my sight!
What involution! what extent! what swarms
Of worlds that laugh at earth! immensely great!
Immensely distant from each other's spheres!
Nor think thou seest a wild disorder here:
Through this illustrious chaos to the sight,
Arrangement neat, and chastest order reign."

The question of controversy is not,

"What hand behind the scene,

What arm Almighty put these globes

In motion, and wound up the vast machine?

Who rounded in his palm those spacious orbs?

Who bowl'd them flaming through the dark profound,

Numerous as glitt'ring gems of morning dew,

Or sparks from populous cities in a blaze,

And set the bosom of old Night on fire,

Peopled her desert, and made Horror smile?"

"This prospect vast is nature's system of divinity." It is "elder Scripture writ by God's own hand." It tells us of his existence, and the origin of worlds his hand has formed.

But the question we are considering is scarcely less important. We ask, who guides these orbs in all their varied motions?

"On yon cerulean plain,

In exultation to their God and thine,

They dance, they sing eternal jubilee.
Mark how the labyrinthian turns they take,
The circles intricate, and mystic maze,

Weave the grand cipher of Omnipotence."

We ask, who gives origin to the various combinations of matter that are continually formed or dissolved on the surface of these worlds? Who causes the infinitely varied phenomena there displayed? The great majority of philosophers ascribe all these manifestations of power and wisdom to the laws, properties, and attributes of matter. They remove the agency of God far from the works of his hands. We consider this the first step towards Atheism. If we may suppose matter to sustain itself independent of God, and cause all the varied changes to which it is subject, it is but a step farther on the same road to suppose it equally independent in its origin. As a specimen of the kind of instruction given the young on this subject, we may select Comstock's Natural Philosophy, a work probably more generally circulated than any other of the same kind. The author defines matter, or a body, to be any substance of which we can gain a knowledge by our senses. The essential properties common to all forms of matter are said to be, Impenetrability, Extension, Figure, Divisibility, Inertia, and Attraction. There are several errors in this statement we shall not now notice, as the particular point is, that to these essential, and to certain peculiar properties of a similar character, must all the phenomena of the material universe be ascribed. Attraction and repulsion, indeed, are the great agents producing change. We should better understand Mr. Comstock's views if he had clearly defined his terms. We are at a loss what meaning to ascribe to the very important term property. Extension and impenetrability can only refer to the fact, that matter exists in certain states; but attraction and repulsion imply necessarily power as well as a state; no common definition can be applied to these properties. Moreover, a contradiction seems to be implied in calling both attraction and inertia essential properties of matter. Inertia he defines to be, "passiveness, or want of power. Thus matter is of itself equally incapable of putting itself in motion, or of bringing itself to rest when in motion." But attraction is defined to be, "that property or quality in the particles of bodies which makes them tend toward each other. . . . . This power pervades all material things; it not only makes the particles of bodies adhere to each other, but it is the cause which keeps the planets in their orbits as they pass through the heavens." It is made the chief cause of motion.

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