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of affairs, in the hope of a better, before they have made themselves sure that a better one will succeed that which they destroy. There is one important truth which ought to be borne in mind, which is, that although this is an age of progress in the arts and sciences, in humanity and morality, in philosophy and the development of the religious life, every change is not progress. It oftentimes is but a movement backwards. Progress has been the favorite watch-cry with some, and when their vandal hands have been laid on what was accounted most sacred and dear to many hearts, they have claimed to belong to the movement party, and are only progressing as they outgrow the errors of the past. It would be well for them to pause a moment and ask themselves whether the change be really indicative of improvement-whether they have really outgrown what they are so ready to resign. A few years ago, some learned men of France, in solemn conclave assembled, thought they had outgrown the use of a Supreme Being, and so voted that there is no God. But with all their boasted advance in wisdom and knowledge, their situation was not made better, nor was any thing changed by the vote. Could the vote have altered any thing, they might have had a striking manifestation of the difference between change and progress. But God still lives, and exercises a watchful care even over those who deny his existence. And, in our own day, there are those who have thought they have outgrown the need of a Saviour, and have voted that Christ had no real existence, or if he had, that he is of no use to us now. Away with such progress, which takes away from us all that is most in accordance with our holiest impulses, and that leaves us a shadow only of what is good.

And

From this consideration of these two classes, we see that neither of them is in the possession of all the truth. yet there is much of what is good and true in the theory of each. While we seek to retain that which is good and true, we ought not, like the conservative, to be so attached to the past and the time-hallowed, as to cleave to it simply because it is old. Nor on the other hand like the radical, ought we to reject it for this reason. When the

past has within its bosom any thing of good, let it be held to with reverence. We should also remember, that the

uses of thought have not been exhausted, and though we have much to be thankful for, in the lessons of the past, the future too has riches in store for us. Life is given for a glorious activity. The treasures of the past are ours; the rich stores of the present are unlocked; and we may also hope that the future shall pour into the lap of the faithful, her garnered wealth. Thankful for the past, we should not be unmindful of the present, and while we bind up the rich sheaves that have come through the toil of those long since passed away, it is our duty to be faithful, that coming times may be led to rejoice in our memory. Trifle not with the teachings of the past. Give not up the sacred influences of the great and the good, long since gone to the world where hope has blossomed and borne the fruits of joy and righteousness and everlasting peace.

And on the other hand, while we seek to appreciate the past, and its lessons upon the heart, let us not forget that the mine of truth contains other jewels, to be had for the earnest seeking. Let us be true to the lessons of the past, and the monitions of the present. Let us wisely improve every thing, preserving pure all that now exists of goodness, and adding to it each day and each hour, so that we may go forth to meet the shadowy future with a firm and a manly heart. Thus shall the world grow wiser as it grows older; progress shall keep pace with years and each step shall be improvement.

A. A.

ART. XIII.

A Response to O. A. Brownson.

The article entitled "Brownson on the Church and the Republic," which appeared in this periodical for last October, and which reviewed certain positions put forth by Mr. Brownson in his Quarterly Review for the preceding July, has called forth a reply, which appears in

1 Mountford's Thorpe.

the January issue of his Review. Mr. Brownson gives us credit for writing "with a certain degree of courtesy and candor, and apparently with an earnest love of truth and justice," which commendable qualities, he avers, make our article an exception to the general character of Protestant criticism on Catholic argument. We are most happy in securing the good opinion of our author; for in these days of sectarian strife and artifice, the good opinion of an opponent, is worth something. In what he says of our argumentation, Mr. Brownson, we are bound to say, is too complimentary. We concede the exceptions, that we are not perfectly master of the subject which we attempted to argue, and that we have not risen to an appreciation of the full claims of the Catholic Church; but the very general tone of compliment which pervades his article we must attribute to his wish to repay our alleged candor with kindness. It would indeed be flattering to be spoken of as "able," "philosophical," and "learned," did we not know how such predicates in such a connection, must strike the minds of those who are best acquainted with us and our attainments.

Before attempting to comply with Mr. Brownson's invitation to respond to his last article, we must ask him not to make too much of the concession we have made relative to the logical advantage which the Catholic has over the Calvinist. We write from the stand-point of a Universalist interpretation of Christianity; and we say, what we presume most of our Universalist brethren are also ready to say, that Calvinism concedes the premises out of which the necessity of an infallible interpreter is educed. But such a statement, coming from a Universalist, is no concession. We have not said, nor do we think, that Universalism gives the Catholic any such ground of deduction. We have only said, that Calvinism does this; but as the Calvinist will not permit us to speak for him, our statement cannot be viewed in the light of a concession.

We hasten, however, to meet what we deem the main point in our present controversy with Mr. Brownson. The occasion of his reply appears to have been the charge preferred by us, that the article on the Church and the Republic assumes the vital point in the argument. We conceded the proposition, that there must be a power

to mediate between the rival claims of the individual and the State, and that this power must be something independent of the parties on whose conflicting claims it pronounces authoritative judgment. We further conceded, that this third element, or authoritative power, is the Christian religion. That we may bring the subject distinctly before the minds of our readers, we again quote from our author's first article, on the Church and the Republic.

"Here, then, we are, exposed to two powerful and dangerous tendencies, [that of the individual and that of the State,] rushing, on the one hand, into social despotism, and on the other, into anarchy. What, in this state of things, do we need in order to escape them? We need, it is evident, a power alike independent of the State and of the individual, to step, as it were, in between them and harmonize them,-a power strong enough to restrain the State when it would become despotic, and the individual when he would become disloyal and rebellious. Without such a power we can not save our republic, and have that security for individual and social liberty, it was instituted to protect and vindicate. With only the State and the individual we have, and can have, only antagonism. The two elements are, and will be, pitted one against the other, each struggling for the mastery. They cannot be made to move without collision one with the other, unless there is between them a mediating term, the third element I mentioned as essential to the constitution of society. That term, power, or constituent element, is religion, and I need not add, the Christian religion.” ―pp. 286, 287.

Readily conceding every thing so forcibly stated in this extract, what was the vital point which we complained of as being assumed? It was this. Conceding the third and authoritative element in society to be religion, we charged Mr. Brownson, with assuming, that this religion must be organized, must be integral in a Church. His words were:

"Then you must concede that religion, to answer our purpose, must be the Christian Church, or religion organized. Religion without the Church, without an organization, is not a power, is only an idea, a simple opinion, and therefore nothing but individualism. Unorganized, existing not as a Church, or as an organism, with no organs through which it can speak, it is nothing but the private conviction of the individual, and

adds to the individual nothing beyond the strength of his conviction."-p. 287.

This we called assumption. We did not see in it proof, or even an attempt at proof; and we characterized it accordingly. Now, how does our author meet our charge? These are his words:

"With the author's leave we must tell him that he is mistaken in saying that we leave this point without proof, or without offering any reason why it must be conceded. The point is given as a logical conclusion from what we had previously established, and which the author of the criticism himself concedes. It is proved in proving the premises, and the author should object, if he objects at all, not that it is a naked assertion left without a show of proof, but that it does not necessarily follow from these premises. In what immediately precedes, as he himself cites us, we say, 'It-religion-must rest on a basis independent of both-the state and the individual,—and higher than that of either, and be a power which neither the national authority nor the individual authority can control, but strong enough to restrain them both. This you will willingly concede me. [The author does concede it.] Then you must concede that religion to answer our purpose must be the Christian Church, or religion as an organization.' an organization.' Why so? Because, religion without the Church, without an organization, is not a power, is only an idea, a simple opinion, and therefore nothing but individualism. Unorganized, existing not as a Church, or as an organism, with no organs through which it can speak, it is nothing but the private conviction of the individual, and can add to the individual nothing but the strength of his conviction.' Surely this is not adroitly to slip over the point, and to leave it without even a show of proof. This is not simple naked assertion, as alleged, but argument, at least an attempt at argument, whether successful or unsuccessful."—pp. 8, 9.

6

It is possible that our author, in the words here quoted from him, shows that he did not assume, that he really attempted to prove what we have termed the vital point in his argument. Possibly there is something in his words that we do not see. Candor, however, compels us to say, that we see in the extract nothing but an assumption of that "vital point!" What does he give as argument, that religion to be authoritative in society, must be organized, must be an organism? Why must religion be an organization, a church? The answer is, "because reli

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