by the blindness of furious passion it could not possibly be overlooked. In its effect, however, such a rule is less favourable to sudden resentment than to deliberate malice. The angry stab is avenged by the death of the delinquent, while the more subtle and calculating assassin escapes with a petty fine. The chances of impunity to the criminal are in exact proportion to the diabolical coolness and contrivance with which the crime is perpetrated. Such, however, were the doctrines adopted in the native justiciary of Bengal; and such, also, were the consequences which they produced. Mr. Hastings records a striking instance of a wretch who cruelly held the head of a female child under water till she was suffocated, in order that he might make prize of her clothes and ornaments, and who, being convicted of the offence before one of the native courts, was pu nished only by a fine.*

As the facts from which murder may be inferred, are, under this code, very few, so the proofs by which those facts must be substantiated are of a very peculiar kind. Circumstantial evidence is in no case admitted. The crime must be made out, either by the free and unsolicited confession of the offender, or by the testimony of at least two eye-witnesses, not being women, nor slaves, and, if the accused be a Mussulman, both of that faith. The last regulation was always enforced in Bengal; and the propriety of it, as *Letter, 10th July, 1773.

applied to that country, will rightly be estimated only by those who remember that the Mussulmans compose about one tenth of the subsisting population.

No farther comments, surely, need be added on this subject; but, after all that has been said, it cannot surprise the reader to learn, that under the native government of Bengal the frequency of murders was lamentably great.

Of the inequality with which the protection of the law was dispensed to the Hindoo classes of the community, an incidental hint has already been given. In civil matters, indeed, individuals of this persuasion were allowed the option of referring disputes among themselves to their own Bramins. But, if one of the parties was a Mahomedan, or if, both being Hindoos, one or both chose to abide by the decision of the established courts, the matter was determined according to the Mahomedan law. This rule, however, was relaxed in cases concerning caste, or otherwise of an immediate religious nature. In the adjudication of such questions, a Bramin was called in to assist and to direct the temporal judge. Still when we reflect on the greatly superior numbers of the Hindoos, on their known partiality for their national usages and institutions, and on the singularity of those usages and institutions, even where they are of a purely civil nature, our minds must revolt at a system which prescribed to this order

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of men a violation of their most rooted feelings, as the only price of that justice which every people has a right to demand at the hands of its rulers.

it

The judicial proceedings of the Mahomedan courts in Bengal were not of a steady or methodical kind. The causes were brought to a hearing at the discretion of the judge; nor, in this respect, did the early institution of a suit confer on any claim of precedency. Although the decisions were sufficiently summary, the business in all the courts accumulated to an astonishing degree. The matter, when once fairly in a state of trial, was disposed of with little delay; but it had perhaps previously remained in waiting for years. Suitors pleaded their own causes; and the records of the court were so imperfectly kept, that when the English, on their assumption of the justiciary, required a return of the convicts under sentence of imprisonment, the names of many persons were found to be recorded, of whose trials there was no report, and, in many cases, nothing could be collected, respecting the equity of the sentence, or even the nature of the crime.

But there were evils far worse than these, inasmuch as the gross and wilful perversion of justice is far worse than the mere obstruction or neglect of it. Of the malpractices alluded to, the following lively and authentic sketch by Mr. Orme will perhaps both shock and interest the reader. The description primarily respects the Nazim's

own court, the principal seat of justice in the land; but it may readily be believed that the subordinate and dependent tribunals were not more pure.

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"The wealth, the consequence, the interest, "or the address of the party, become now the only considerations. He visits the judge in "private, and gives the jar of oil: his adversary "bestows the hog, which breaks it. The friends "who can influence, intercede; and, excepting "where the case is so manifestly proved as to "brand the failure of redress with glaring infamy (a restraint which human nature is born to reverence) the value of the bribe ascertains the justice of the cause.

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"This is so avowed a practice, that if a stranger "should enquire, how much it would cost him "to recover a just debt from a creditor who " evaded payment, he would every where receive "the same answer-the government will keep "one-fourth, and give you the rest.

"Still the forms of justice subsist: witnesses "are heard; but browbeaten and removed: proofs of writing produced; but deemed for

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geries and rejected; until the way is cleared "for a decision, which becomes totally or par "tially favourable, in proportion to the methods "which have been used to render it such; but "still with some attention to the consequences of a judgment, which would be of too flagrant

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iniquity not to produce universal detestation ❝and resentment."*

At the period of our acquisition of the Dewannee, the custom mentioned by Mr. Orme, of ap. propriating a chout or proportion of all the sums judicially recovered, was professedly adopted by all the civil judges of the country, and seems to have taken the appearance rather of an established rule of law, than of a tolerated irregularity. At first sight it may be thought that the greater publicity of the practice made it comparatively innocent. It certainly could scarcely be itself called corruption, but there seems room to conjecture, that as it occasioned in the first instance, if not a corrupt, yet an unfair influence on the mind of the judge, so it ultimately tended to produce a greater degree of corruption than that from which it originally sprung. Under such a rule of court, every defendant in a pecuniary action, would be tempted at least to neutralize his judge by privately complimenting him with a somewhat larger percentage on the amount of the sum for which he was sued, than the customary chout. The plaintiff, knowing or suspecting this, might be expected to restore the balance, if possible, in his own favour, by a similar offering. Thus would be laid a foundation for continued bribery on both sides, with this only difference, that the accused would

* General Idea of the Government and People of Indostan, Book III. Chap. v.