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guerre, mais parce que ce sont des choses appartenantes à l'ennemi, ou au moins parce qu'elles sont destinées à devenir sa propriété et à accroître ses forces. D'où il résulte que le souverain qui permet sur son territoire le commerce libre de toutes sortes d'objets ne passe pas les droits de souveraineté, et les puissances belligérantes ne peuvent s'en plaindre ni l'accuser de donner la main à la vente des marchandises de contrebande, qui, sur son territoire, ne peuvent jamais avoir ce caractère, et ne peuvent en porter le nom que lorsqu'elles sont devenues ou destinées à devenir la propriété de l'ennemi, et sorties du territoire où elles ont été achetées.

In chapter viii, Lampredi fortifies these views by a detailed examination of numerous treaties, and of the practice of the different states of Europe; the result of which is sufficiently stated in the extract given below, from Wheaton's History of the progress of the laws of nations.. Azuni (Système universel de principes du droit maritime de l'Europe, 1799, 1800, Digeon's translation) on all these points agrees with [146] Lampredi. In vol. ii, chap. 1, art. 3, p. 31, he distinguishes *between "commerce actif," consisting of exports to foreign nations, and "commerce passif," consisting of internal trade with foreigners. In chapter ii, articles 1 and 6, page 56, he says:

Une grande partie du commerce de quelques nations européennes, telles que les Suédois, Norvégiens, et les Russes, consiste en marchandises nécessaires pour la guerre maritime, pour la construction et pour l'equipement d'une flotte; elles vendent en tems de paix, à quiconque en a besoin, du fer, du cuivre, des mâts, des bois, du goudron, de la poix, et des canons, enfin des navires de guerre entiers. Quelles raisons pourrait-il y avoir de priver ces nations de leur commerce et de leur manière de subsister, à l'occasion d'une guerre à laquelle ils ne prennent aucune part? Il n'y a, dans le code de la justice et de l'équité, rien en faveur d'une telle protection. Il est donc nécessaire d'établir comme maxime fondamentale de tout droit, que, les peuples neutres devant et pouvant licitement continuer le commerce qu'ils font en tems de paix, on ne doit faire aucune distinction de denrées, de marchandises et de manufactures, quoique propres à la guerre, et que, par cette raison, la vente et le transport aux parties belligérantes en sont permis, si le commerce actif et passif était établi en tems de paix, sans qu'on puisse prendre, en aucune manière, que la neutralité soit violée, pourvu que cela se fasse sans animosité, sans préférence et sans partialité.

In the same chapter, art. 3, sec. 3, p. 83, he says:

Si le droit des gens universel permet aux neutres qui sont en possession de faire un commerce actif avec les nations belligérantes le transport impartial de quelque espèce de marchandise à une d'elles, quoiqu'elle soit du nombre de celles appelées contrebande, par le même principe de raison, la vente des mêmes marchandises sur le propre territoire doit être permise toutes les fois que la nation neutre aura fait avant la guerre un commerce passif avec la nation belligérante. Ainsi, le commerce général passif ou la vente impartiale sur le propre territoire des neutres, de marchandises, denrées, ou manufactures, de toute espèce, sera toujours permis, pourvu que le souverain n'ait pas fait un traité particulier avec un des belligérants dont les sujets viennent faire des achats et des provisions sur le territoire neutre, et qu'il ne se mêle pas des achats, des ventes, et des autres contrats qui transmettent la propriété, qu'il n'ordonne pas qu'on remplisse les magasins de provisions de guerre, et ne fasse pas mettre ses navires à la voile pour les transporter sur le territoire du belligérant. En protégeant également le commerce de son pays, en permettant à ses sujets de continuer leur commerce de la même manière et avec la même liberté qu'avant la guerre, il ne fait qu'user de droits incontestables qui ne peuvent être limités que par des conventions spéciales, expressément ou tacitement faites.

SEC. 5. Malgré la solidité de ce principe fondamental, Galiani a voulu établir une théorie absolument contraire, non-seulement au principe que j'ai précédemment établi, mais encore à tous les autres principes qu'il a adoptés dans son ouvrage.

SEC. 6. Après avoir enseigné avec raison que la neutralité n'est pas un état de chose nouvelle, mais la continuation d'un ancien état; après avoir ajouté que l'état de neutralité n'est et ne peut être un nouvel état dans lequel passe une souveraineté, mais une permanence et une continuation du précédent, qui est tel, parce qu'il n'est pas survenu de nouvelles causes qui l'obligent à changer, il en conclut (au grand étonnement de quiconque est dans son bon sens) que les neutres ne peuvent vendre sur leur propre territoire, comme ils le faisaient auparavant, aux sujets des nations belligérantes, des. armes, des instruments, et d'autres munitions de guerre. Mais si la guerre, comme il le dit, n'apporte aucun changement au premier état d'un peuple neutre, si la guerre n'anéantit pas les droits qu'il avait en tems de paix, par quelle raison, dis-je, doit-il abstenir de faire les commerce qu'il faisait avant la guerre Par quelle raison sera-t-il

obligé de changer son état, qui, selon les propres principes de Galiani, ne doit, au moyen de la neutralité qu'il a adoptée, être altéré en rien? Par quelle raison, enfin, ne pourrat-il pas vendre dans un port neutre un vaisseau propre à la navigation, avec les attirails de guerre? On n'en trouve pas d'autre dans Galiani que celle de la confusion qu'il a jetée dans ses théories, en se laissant transporter par l'esprit de parti, lorsqu'il a voulu réfuter l'opinion de Lampredi, qui soutient le contraire. C'est précisément alors que la vérité se cache dans les ténèbres de ses subtiles raisonnements et de ses ingénieux paralogismes. Il est donc nécessaire que je répète ici le principe incontestable que j'ai précédemment rapporté, qu'en suivant le droit conventionnel de l'Europe, les neutres ne peuvent porter les choses qui sont spécialement propres à la guerre, et qui y sont directement employées, mais qu'ils peuvent sans inconvénient, selon le droit universel des gens, les vendre comme marchandise sur leur propre territoire à quiconque se présente pour les acheter, puisqu'ils le font sans partialité, et sans montrer de faveur plutôt pour une partie belligérante que pour l'autre.

No European writer, before 1858, had advanced any doctrine at variance with the passages above cited from Lampredi and Azuni, except so far as Galiani had done so; and the doctrine of Galiani, as is shown in these extracts, (and in other passages of the same writers,) was not only novel, but inconsistent with itself.

In England there is no trace of a different doctrine having been held or advocated by any jurist; although the interest of England in this class of questions had been generally that of a belligerent. In 1721, on the occasion of a complaint being made by the minister of Sweden that certain ships of war had been built in England and sold to the Czar, the judges were ordered to attend the House of Lords and deliver their opinions on the question, whether the King of England had power to prohibit the building of ships of war, or of great force, for foreigners, and they answered that the King had no power to prohibit the same.(Fortescue's Reports, p. 388.)

Mr. Reddie, of Edinburgh, whose useful "Researches, historical and critical, in maritime international law," were published in 1844, cites with approbation the views of Lampredi and Azuni on the point in controversy between these writers and Galiani, and bestows especial praise upon the former of these jurists.

In the case of the United States, a passage is, it is true, cited from the well-known work of M. Hautefeuille, entitled "Les droits et les devoirs des nations neutres en temps de guerre maritime," published in 1858, in which the author affirms that the building or arming in a neutral port of a vessel of war for a belligerent is a violation of the neutral territory and of the sovereignty of the neutral, and that cap

tures made by such a vessel are unlawful. M. Hautefeuille is a [147] writer of great ingenuity and research, but the foundation of

his work is the assumption that the settled and ascertained usage, or, as it has sometimes been called, the positive law, of nations, is to be rejected as erroneous when it appears to conflict with such conclusions as he is able to draw from à priori reasoning. His statements of principle are, therefore, to be received with caution, but his statements of fact are generally careful and valuable. It is apparent, however, that in the above-mentioned passage, M. Hautefeuille cannot have intended to condemn the mere construction, to the order of a belligerent, of a vessel of war which is not armed or equipped for war when she leaves the neutral port, since in a subsequent part of the same work he contends that she is not even contraband of war, when sent to sea, unless armed:

A l'égard des vaisseaux construits, la question n'a jamais été tranchée par les traités; peu d'auteurs s'en sont occupés, et ceux qui l'ont fait se sont bornés, comme Azuni, à énoncer une opinion sans entrer dans la discussion. Hubner a suivi cette marche; il déclare contrebande les vaisseaux de guerre construits dans les ports neutres, pour le compte de l'un des belligérauts, et faisant route pour ses états.

Je ne puis comprende qu'un bâtiment, quelles que soient sa grandeur, sa forme, sa destination, soit un objet de contrebande de guerre. Le navire n'est pas propre à la guerre, préparé pour servir exclusivement aux opérations militaires, apte à être employé à ces opérations, immédiatement et sans aucun changement, sans aucune addition. Lorsqu'il est dépourvu des canons, des munitions, des armes, et des hommes qui doivent les employer, ce n'est pas une machine de guerre; c'est un véhicule plus ou moins grand, plus ou moins solide, mais ce n'est qu'un véhicule. Pour lui donner les qualités spéciales et exclusives qui déterminent le caractère de contrebande de guerre, il est nécessaire de transporter à bord des canons, des armes, des munitions, en un mot tout l'attirail du combat. C'est alors seulement que le bâtiment devient, non une machine de guerre, mais une machine portant des instruments de guerre, et susceptibles de nuire, par cette circonstance seulement, au belligérant. Mais la machine elle-même, mais le véhicule dénué de son armement, ne peut être réputé nuisible. Au reste, il faut convenir que ce commerce est peu fréquent, et la meilleure preuve que je puisse donner de l'innocuité de ce négoce est le silence du droit secondaire à son égard.

After stating that materials for ship-building and for the equipment of ships can under no circumstances be contraband of war, he concludes:

Les bâtiments non armés, construits dans les ports neutres et vendus aux nations engagées dans les hostilités, quelles que soient leur force, la nature de leur construction, sont également objets d'un commerce licite. Ils doivent être régis par la règle générale, qui est la liberté entière du commerce entre les nations neutres et les deux belligérants.-(Hautefeuille, vol. ii, pp. 144-146.)

M. Hautefeuille, therefore, who has been cited by the United States, here goes beyond all preceding writers, and asserts with the utmost clearness that a vessel not actually armed for war is, under all circumstances, an innocent object of lawful commerce, whatever may be her size or force, or the character of her construction, and he adds that the best proof of this is that the law of nations, so far as it rests on international usage and practice, has been wholly silent on the subject.

It

The Government of the United States has further cited a passage from Ortolan's "Diplomatie de la mer." This passage is not found in any edition of M. Ortolan's excellent work anterior to the civil war. expresses, therefore, an opinion recently formed by the writer on a question which he evidently regards as a new one, but it is not, nor indeed does it purport to be, evidence that such an opinion had been held before, much less that it had been sanctioned by the usage and general consent of nations.

Among the jurists of the United States there are no more famous names than those of Story and Wheaton. The opinion of the former was clearly expressed in the case of the Santissima Trinidad, (7 Wheaton, p. 283,) where he said, "There is nothing in our laws, or in the law of nations, that forbids our citizens from sending armed vessels, as well as munitions of war, to foreign ports for sale. It is a commercial adventure which no nation is bound to prohibit, and which only exposes the persons engaged in it to the penalty of confiscation." Wheaton, in his excellent History of the progress of the law of nations, (French edition, Leipsic, 1853, vol. i, p. 376,) referring to the controversy between Lampredi and Galiani, writes as follows:

Lampredi passe maintenant à l'examen d'une question oiseuse suscitée par Galiani, savoir: "Si le droit des gens conventionnel, qui interdit le commerce avec l'ennemi de marchandises de contrebande, prohibe la vente de ces marchandises dans le territoire neutre." Galiani répond à cette question par l'affirmative, et il prétend qu'un vaisseau, par exemple, construit et armé pour la guerre dans un port neutre ne peut y étre légalement vendu à une des parties belligérantes. Lampredi se donne beaucoup de peines superflues pour appuyer, par la raison et l'autorité des publicistes précédents, son opinion que le transport seul des marchandises de contrebande à l'ennemi est prohibé, mais que la vente de ces marchandises dans le territoire de l'état neutre est parfaitement légale. Il admet qu'il peut y avoir des exemples de nations neutres qui, désirant par prudence éviter des collisions avec les puissances belligérantes, auraient prohibé le commerce des objets de contrebande dans les limites de leur propre territoire; mais il affirme que, pendant la guerre de l'indépendance de l'Amérique du Nord, Venise donnait seule l'exemple d'une

telle prohibition de la part d'un état neutre..,Naples prohiba seulement la construction des vaisseaux de guerre destinés à être vendus, et l'exportation des autres objets de contrebande, tandis que la Toscane permit à ses sujets de continuer leur commerce accoutumé de ces objets, dans les limites de son territoire, et par l'exportation, sauf le droit des puissances belligérantes de saisir en mer et de confisquer les objets destinés à l'usage des ennemis.

The following extract from the American Law Review of January, 1871, a periodical which deservedly possesses the highest reputation, shows in what manner this question was last year regarded by accomplished jurists in the United States, and upon what distinctions those jurists considered it necessary to rely, in order to maintain the present claims against Great Britain:

A ship, theoretically considered, may or may not be contraband. If on its way to a belligerent port for the purpose of being sold to the belligerent, it will be contraband if it is adapted or readily adaptable for warlike use; equally so, doubtless, if it be adapted for the transportation of troops, or even perhaps of military material. [148] Inasmuch, therefore, as very few vessels are not capable of being fitted * and

used for one or the other of these purposes, it may be laid down generally that ships will pretty surely be condemned as contraband of war. Nor will it help the matter that a contingency may prevent the sale. Thus, where the captain had orders to sell if he could find a good purchaser, but otherwise to seek freight, the ship was condemned, (the Brutus, 5 Rob. Adm., 331, note and app.) The case of the Meteor, heard before Judge Nelson, in the United States circuit court, may be regarded as furnishing authority for the same doctrine.

The neutrality acts of the United States and Great Britain may possibly have the effect of clouding the popular apprehension of this subject. But the thread of an unquestioned and unquestionable principle is quite capable of being traced through all the legal argument and diplomatic controversy. With regard to ships, as with regard to all other descriptions of contraband merchandise, no restriction is placed by international law upon trade. The naked right to sell a ship of war to a belligerent is not interfered with. But a neutral port cannot be made the base of hostile operations by either belligerent against the other. It is because the right to sell a ship of war in a neutral port, or to send it from a neutral port for sale abroad, are so apt to be wrongfully magnified into the actual equipment and dispatch of a military expedition from that port, that neutrality acts have been passed. Their intent has not been to prohibit sales, but they have been obliged to hamper the right of sale with a multitude of safeguards against the activity and deceit of men who would add to the legitimate business transaction an improper and unjustifiable adjunct. The history of the neutrality legislation shows this. The first neutrality act ever known was passed by the United States. The immediate provocation was the equipment by France of privateers, which departed, manned and armed, from our ports to cruise against Great Britain. Congress, therefore, passed the neutrality act of 1794. In 1817 and 1818 this was improved, at the suggestion of the Portuguese minister, to meet the necessities arising out of the war then waging by Spain and Portugal with their cis-Atlantic colonies. In each of these years Congress carefully and by obvious intent reserved to American citizens the power to sell. A proposed bill took away this power, and was amended before becoming an act by the striking out of all such prohibitive language. Congress simply furnished legal machinery to the executive, whereby the stretching of the transaction of sale into the dispatch of a military expedition might be prevented. The British foreign-enlistment act, modeled upon our own legislation, aimed, by less effective language, to accomplish precisely the same end.1

Familiar examples of innocent and guilty transactions will occur at once to every American. Of the former, the case of the Meteor is recent and prominent. The libel averred that she was to be sold to Chili, then at war with Spain, with both of which nations we were at peace. Judge Nelson maintained the right of the owners to sell the ship, as she lay at the wharf, unprepared for military service, neither manned nor armed, and having no covert arrangements made for the procuring of either men or arms. Even the Government counsel acknowledged that, in order to condemn the vessel, it would be necessary directly to overrule the whole course of American jurisprudence on the subject. The right of sale, bona fide, to a belligerent, unaccompanied by extraneous illicit circumstances, has been upheld by our courts as clearly and consistently as by our legislature. (The Mermaid, Bee, Adm., 69; Moodie v. The Alfred, 3 Dall., 307, which is probably the same case under a different name. The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat., 283, a famous and leading case. Also the United States v. Quincy, 6 Pet., 445.) The instance of the guilty transactions which will at once occur to all is

It will be seen from the examination in Annex B that the provisions of the British foreign-enlistment act were, on the contrary, more effective than those of the American.

that of the Anglo-rebel cruisers. It was not because the Messrs. Laird sold a war-ship to the confederates that we have a claim against England for a breach of international law. But it was because collateral arrangements for completing the equipment and armament of the ship so sold, by placing on board officers and crew, guns and provisions, rendered the entire procedure, in fact, the inception of a hostile undertaking from the confines of a neutral country. It is needless to elaborate further a matter which is in a measure digressive. It may be declared as indubitable that the pure unalloyed bargain and sale of a ship, even a ship of war, to a belligerent is legal by the rules of international law; that such a ship is, however, contraband of war, and if captured after sale on her way toward delivery, or before sale on her way toward a market where she is intended to be sold to a belligerent, she will be properly condemned. Neutrality acts have not been intended to change this state of the law, but only to furnish sufficient means for preventing its abuse. Our original proposition that the doctrine of Contraband of war does not operate as a restriction upon trade, upon dealings which are purely commercial, remains correct, even in this matter of war-vessels. The neutral is not called upon actively to interfere with commerce, but he is called upon actively to prevent the use of his territory as the base of hostile operations.—American Law Review, vol. v, p. 371.

It was not sufficient, according to this view of the law, that the Alaama was a vessel adapted for war, nor that there was reason to believe that she was intended for the Confederate States. These facts alone would not make it the duty of the British government to prevent her departure. That duty would not arise until there was reasonable ground to believe that the arrangements for dispatching her included also arrangements for completing her armament by placing on board her guns and crew; in short, that what was taking place was not merely the dispatch of a ship of war constructed for belligerent use from a neutral port, but the dispatch from a neutral territory of a military expedition. And to support a charge of negligence against the government, it would be necessary to prove that the government either knew all this, or, had reasonable care been exercised, would have known it. This, however, is exactly what has not been, and cannot be, proved. The knowl edge of these facts was not in the possession nor within the reach of the government.

It must be here observed that the decisions of municipal tribunals,. on the construction of the municipal law of the United States or of England, are not to be cited as authorities for the construction of the law of nations.

The general conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing authorities is, as the British government believes, fairly stated above, pp. 11, 12.

[149]

*ANNEX (B.)

THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN FOREIGN-ENLISTMENT ACTS.

Annex (B.)

It is assumed throughout the United States case that the American act of Congress of 1818 is more efficient than the British act of Parliament of 1819, and a contrast is attempted to be drawn, to the disadvantage of the British law, between the provisions of the former, as epitomized in the President's proclamation of neutrality of October 8, 1870, and the provisions of the latter, as explained in a summary given at page 111 of the case.

A very cursory examination will be sufficient to show that this assumption is erroneous.

H. Ex. 324- 14

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