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PITT'S DEMAND FOR INSTANT WAR, 1761 107

tion of war to a trembling Council.' On September 18 the Cabinet met to consider Pitt's proposals. But the very men who had supported him in his indignant rejoinders to France and Spain on Bussy's memorial now shrank back from the logical consequence of their action. All except Temple opposed an immediate declaration of war, fortifying themselves with Anson's opinion that the fleet was not in a position to meet the combined navies of France and Spain; 1 and Pitt's proposal to attack the treasure fleet without due warning was objected to as bad policy. In vain Pitt urged in one of his ablest speeches evidence of an alliance between the two Bourbon Powers, to show them that there was no middle course between vigorous action and acquiescence in Spain's menace. Admitting part of their case, he allowed there was danger in a bold policy, but, he added, there was at least as much danger in delay: if they hesitated the golden moment would pass and Spain could strike at her own good time. It was useless, he concluded, to imagine that the House of Bourbon was still divided: 'France is Spain and Spain is France.'

All to no use. Men who in the past never dared to resist Pitt had gained courage from the gradual change of opinion on the war, manifested by the sudden veering round of Bute and the King on Pitt's extreme demands in the French negotiation: and eloquence had not the same power at the Council Board as in the House of Commons. Pitt was left alone with Temple: the rest unanimously rejected his sentence for open war and resolved to temporize. Bristol was to ask for further explanations from the Spanish Court and at the same time repeat Pitt's offer to evacuate the settlements in Honduras: the galleons were not to be attacked, but reinforcements were to be sent to the West Indies and Mediterranean fleets. Pitt fell back on the only resource left to him to draw up a memorial of his advice, which Temple also signed, for submission to the King. In this memorial he demanded the instant recall of Lord Bristol and declaration of war on Spain on the ground of the

1 Anson's view was not that the English fleet was inferior in numbers, but that it had too many ships in need of cleaning and repairing after the prolonged service in the Bay of Biscay.

* So said even the second Lord Hardwicke, who hated him. (Add. MSS. 35870, f. 304.)

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unjust and unexampled proceeding of the Court of Spain by inforcing her demands on England through the channel and by the compulsion of a hostile power and the full declaration and avowal at last made by the Spanish Ministry of a total union of councils and interests between the two monarchies of the House of Bourbon matters of so high and urgent a nature as [to] call indispensably on His Majesty to take forthwith such necessary and timely measures as God has put into his hands, for the defence of the honour of the Crown and of the just and essential interests of His Majesty's people.1

This memorandum and a hint of resignation from Pitt alarmed the other ministers. Bute, Mansfield, Devonshire and Newcastle, who met at Devonshire House next day to discuss the situation, were all in a flutter at their own audacity in opposing Pitt's judgment. Bute reported that he had seen Pitt and urged him to lay aside his 'absurd and offensive paper'; Mansfield had been on the same errand; but Pitt had told them that, even if he did not hand the paper to the King, he should repeat the substance to him and lodge his protest formally with Bute. All four agreed that it would be awkward to have such a paper on record: it might be produced and quoted in Parliament as an argument against themselves: it would be equally awkward if Pitt retired, 'leaving the impracticability of his own war upon us.' For Pitt, they reflected, might after all prove to be right if Spain refused to give a satisfactory answer: 'we should then,' concludes Newcastle sorrowfully, 'have given Mr. Pitt such a handle against us as might have very bad consequences.' They resolved, therefore, if possible, to induce Pitt not to retire.2

On September 21 Pitt saw the King and presented his memorandum, which the King refused to keep and said he would postpone a decision until Stanley's return from Paris. At a

1 The whole memorial is in Grenville Papers, i, 386.
Add. MSS. 32928, ff. 248, 259.

KING AND CABINET AGAINST HIM 109 Cabinet meeting on the same day Pitt made another attempt to persuade his brethren. He spoke very long, very well, and very determined,' says Newcastle, ' but with great politeness and candour.' It is interesting, indeed, to notice that at all these last Cabinets, when he saw that the men who had previously surrendered all initiative into his hands were beginning to take a line of their own, he abandoned his arrogant airs and reasoned with them. All his care was to get sanction for what he knew to be right: it was no longer a case of impetuously brushing aside Newcastle's irrelevant scruples and questionings; he had to persuade the whole Council backed by the King himself, and he employed all his arts of persuasion in this final struggle. He had taken advice, he began, from the most able men and had found no reason to depart from his first opinion; he regretted that he had yielded against his better judgment in the French negotiation, and had no intention of repeating that mistake. Then, availing himself of an interruption from Mansfield, who asked how the operations against Spain would suffer by delay, he once more dwelt on the incalculable advantage of taking the enemy unprepared and insisted that a blow struck immediately could hardly fail against even the united force of the House of Bourbon: but,' he concluded, there is not an hour to be lost.' The effect of Pitt's earnestness was somewhat marred by an abusive speech from Temple on the same side, which Newcastle took up' with spirit and, I think, to the satisfaction of my friends,' and the Council adjourned until Stanley's return, without altering its former decision. Thereupon Bute, Newcastle and Devonshire again resolved themselves into a private conclave to fortify one another by mutual assurances of their desire to do right by the public and . . . form a right minute of our own opinion in opposition to Mr. Pitt's paper.' The two dukes still thought every effort should be made to prevent Pitt's resignation, but when Bute, with clearer vision and with greater knowledge of his master's plans, told them it was impossible, they proceeded to discuss the claimants to his succession. On this subject they came to no satisfactory conclusion. George Grenville, who had quarrelled with Pitt

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and was therefore eligible, was objected to by Bute, Fox by Newcastle on the ground that it would be unwise to change from the most popular man to the most unpopular man in England.'1

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A hopeful letter from Stanley, which had crossed Pitt's letter of recall, gave fresh confidence to the majority in the Cabinet. Pitt treated Choiseul's reported attempts to renew the negotiation as mere 'amusements,' and, according to Newcastle, was not disposed to trouble the King with it: but George III was now anxious to shake off Pitt whatever the result of this long discussion might be. On September 23 Bute, Devonshire, Mansfield and Newcastle, reinforced by Henley-no longer an unwilling Keeper,' but Lord Chancellor and a peer—met again to discuss the best way of ridding the King of his turbulent Secretary. Bute was against carrying on a 'paper war' with Pitt, in which he was no doubt conscious they would get the worst of it, and suggested that each of them should go in privately to the King and declare his objections to Pitt's paper and so it was decided, in spite of Mansfield's fear that such a course might seem offensive to Mr. Pitt.2 All the members of this conciliabulum, followed by Anson and Halifax, went in separately to the Closet with their objections to Pitt's bold policy. George III, who was every day becoming more 'offended' with Pitt, listened to them with pleasure. Arguments had then ceased to count with any of them. In vain Pitt produced Grimaldi's last letter, in which he wrote that Spain's whole object was to gain time till the fleet had arrived at Cadiz, and that, under the terms of the secret convention, France cannot finish the war without our affairs being settled.' In vain Stanley, on his return, instead of confirming his hopeful letter of the 15th, spoke of war as inevitable, much to the disgust of Newcastle, who reported his conversation as ' very long, dry and fruitless.' 'I am only waiting,' wrote Sackville, no friend of Pitt's, 'to see the

1 Add. MSS. 32928, f. 303. An incomplete version of this letter is given in Rockingham Memoirs, i, 37, which contains a curious misreading of the phrase their unwise relaxations' in 'their whistle relaxation.' See also Add, MSS, 32928, f. 362. 2 Ibid. f. 325.

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ministerial herd kicking their driver and laying him on his back.'1

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On October 2, a fortnight after his proposal for immediate hostilities with Spain, Pitt met his Cabinet for the last time. The meeting was at St. James's, and there was a full attendance, as befitted a solemn leave-taking: for Pitt knew that he was beaten, and all present expected that he would resign. Granville (Lord President), Temple (Privy Seal), Devonshire, Newcastle, Hardwicke, Ligonier (Commander-in-Chief), Anson and Mansfield-all these had fought with Pitt through the dark days that ended in the triumphs of 1759 and 1760; of the old ministers of Cabinet rank Bedford, still sulking in his tent after the 'thumpings,' Halifax and Lord Chancellor Henley alone were absent; the only new face was Bute's. Mr. Secretary Pitt briefly stated the reason for their meeting-to consider what answer should be sent to Lord Bristol, adding that he still adhered to the opinion expressed in his memorial to the King. The Lord President opened the discussion: 'I would be behindhand in nothing,' he said, 'but in the actual striking of the blow. I admit the war would be popular in the City because of the prizes to be got. But consider your strength. My opinion is to give no hostile answer to Spain; for what hostilities can you begin with advantage?' So spake the cautious Granville, changed indeed from the fiery Carteret whom Pitt used to flout for his rash adventures. Newcastle followed, arguing that we were founded neither in justice nor in prudence and expediency to begin hostilities. Then one after another the lords of the Council took up the same tale. Devonshire and Bute agreed with Newcastle. Hardwicke doubted much whether Spain would declare war against us: Choiseul's view, he thought, was to lay a trap for us by encouraging Spain to take such steps as, knowing our vivacity, might animate us to begin hostilities. Anson repeated what he had already told the King-that, Keppel's ships being foul, it would be two months before he had a squadron ready for any material operation. Mansfield was afraid of the effect on neutral

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1 Historical MSS. Commission, ix, App. iii, p. 16 b.

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