treatise "De Corpore," to the Earl of Devonshire, 1655. There it is said that the doctrine of the earth's diurnal revolution was the invention of the ancients, but that both it and astronomy, that is, celestial phy sics, springing up together were, by succeeding philosophers, strangled with the snares of words. And, therefore, the beginning of astronomy, except observations, is not to be derived from farther time than from Nicolas Copernicus, who, in the age next preceding the present, had revived the opinion of Pythagoras, Aristarchus, and Philolaos. After this Galileo had opened the gate of natural philosophy (physics) and, lastly, the science of man's body had been founded by Harvey, through his doctrines of the circulation of the blood and the generation of animals. To the whole domain of ecclesiastical theology, Hobbes does not conceal his aversion. With peculiar consistency, he denies any absoluteness of difference between good and evil, virtue and vice. Man cannot live without hurting the interests of others, since his own interest compels him to struggle for the advantage of his own. So long as he keeps clear of the law, he is at liberty to prey upon the weaker individual. The denial of the freedom of the will, is, as a matter of course, in Hobbes's system. In politics, fear and compulsion alone can make his egoistical rabble of human beings maintain any form of constitution, or observe any laws. The ruler, therefore, must be an egoistic despot, to restrain the very much more harmful egoism of all his subjects. Every revolution that is strong enough to establish itself is justified. Might is Right, in the most vulgar sense. The name of Hobbes's chief work, "Leviathan," is only too significant of this monster of a State, which like a God upon earth, ordains law and judgment, right and possession, at its own will, and even arbitrarily determines the ideas of good and evil, and, in return, assures to all those who bow the knee before it and do it sacrifice, protection for their lives and property. His real view of religion is trenchantly expressed in the following definition: "Fear of power invisible, feigned by the mind or imagined from tales publicly allowed, RELIGION: not allowed, SUPERSTITION." As to his theory of external nature, Hobbes absolutely identifies the idea of body with that of substance. Everything is body that, independently of our thought, occupies a portion of space, and coincides with it. The permanent element which persists through all change is "body," which only changes its accidents, that is, is now conceived by us one way and now in another. The images or sense-qualities, by means

of which we perceive the thing, are not the thing itself, but a motion originating within us. Human sensation is nothing but the motion of corporeal particles, occasioned by the external motion of things.

The Materialism of Hobbes met with a formidable opposition from Ralph Cudworth, who, in 1678, brought out his Magnum Opus, the "True Intellectual System of the Universe, wherein all the Reason and Philosophy of Atheism is refuted, and its Impossibility Demonstrated." Cudworth, in the preface of his work, sets forth to show: "That all things in the world do not float without a head or governor; but that there is a God, an omnipotent understanding Being, presiding over all. Secondly, that this God, being essentially good and just, there is something in its own nature immutably and eternally just and unjust; and not by arbitrary will, law, and command only. And, lastly, that we are so far forth principles or masters of our own actions, as to be accountable to justice for them, or to make us guilty and blameworthy for that we do amiss, and to deserve punishment accordingly."* The history of the Atomic philosophy is narrated at great length by Cudworth, and with vast erudition. He has the merit of seeing very clearly that the Atomic theory itself, or what he calls the Atomic physiology, had no natural or even necessary connection with the Atomic atheism. He would make it out that the Atomic theory of the constitution of the universe, in so far as it is a purely physical speculation, reaches back historically to the time of Moses, and that its traditional teaching, as handed down by Pythagoras and Empedocles, was first perverted to atheism by Leucippus and Democritus. He was also quick enough to foresee that what he called the Hylozoic atheism, or the evolution of consciousness from an inherent cosmo-plastic force in matter, started by Strato in opposition to the fortuitous concourse of the atoms of Democritus, was the principle of matter that would be adopted by later Materialists. Cudworth's own hypothesis, which he held in common with his friend Henry More, the Platonist, of a Plastic Nature-a power which evolves certain ends without consciousness or intelligence-but derived, permitted, and, so to speak, left to itself by a Divine Providence, obviously presents its own difficulties. There is great elevation and breadth of thought in his survey of the heathen religions. He finds in these

* Birch's edition, 1820, p. 45.

evidences of God having never left himself without a witness in human hearts. He points out that theists and atheists, spiritualists and materialists, agree that something certainly existed of itself from all eternity. What then is this something, God or Matter? It is inconceivable that this necessary eternal existence should be other than an absolutely perfect and reasonable Being. Knowledge is possible only through Ideas that have their source in the eternal Reason. Sense is not only not the whole of knowledge, but is in itself not at all knowledge; it is wholly relative and individual, and not knowledge until the mind adds to it what is absolute and universal. And these Universals or Ideas come direct to us from the Eternal mind. They form "that light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world." It is the scholar of Plato who thus speaks.

In Cudworth's "Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality," the author exhibits that as there is an absolute criterion of knowledge in the mind itself, so also there is an absolute one in morals. Sense is unable, it is true, to understand how this can be, but "sense is a confused perception obtruded on the soul from without," whereas knowledge (ideas) "is an inward active energy of the mind." Among the ideas not drawn from sense, Cudworth places the conceptions of good and evil. Reason does not find them from without, but brings them with it. So the criterion of truth is to be found within the mind itself.

Several of Cudworth's MSS. are preserved in the British Museum. It is not to the national credit, that, with the exception of "a Treatise of Free Will," edited in 1838, they have not only not been published, but no adequate account or summary has been given of them. In the tractate on free will the author endeavours to establish that man possesses a contingent liberty of self-determination for good or for evil. He argues with great subtlety that this freedom of choice is the very mark or note of a rational imperfect being, such as man is. A perfect being, essentially good and wise, cannot, from the nature of its constitution require, or, humanly speaking, possess such a power.

Immense erudition was combined in Cudworth with remarkable speculative power. The extent of his learning, and his discursiveness in argument have contributed to the neglect of his writings in the current literature. The student, however, will recur to him with profit and mental pleasure.

At the time of the appearance of Cudworth's work, John Locke (1632-1704) had planned his "Essay concerning Human Understanding." He was an enthusiastic student of natural science. Addressing a vigorous mind, unencumbered with the speculations of others, to the question of the origin and limits of human knowledge, he published in the year 1690 his famous work. He found that Ideas are not innate. Knowledge of particulars is prior to knowledge of generals. Experience, sensible experience, is the first source of our knowledge. The senses give us simple ideas, which reflection compounds, and in this way abstract ideas are formed. We know at bottom nothing of substances except their attributes, which are taken from simple sense-impressions. The further man gets from the sensible, the more liable is he to error; and it is nowhere so common as in language. Locke's criticism of the understanding turns into a criticism of language. He deals with the confusion that ensues from the inexact use of words. He would therefore make words merely conventional, because only when thus limited have they a fixed sense. Truth in mere words can be nothing but a chimera. "Revelation" can give us no simple idea, and therefore cannot really extend our knowledge. Yet there are certain things which Locke finally admits transcend the reason, and are therefore objects of belief. Strength of conviction, however, is no sign of truth. Even of revelation the reason must judge, and enthusiasm is no evidence of the divine origin of a doctrine. He wrote later an "Essay on the Reasonableness of Christianity." Neither an Idealist like Berkeley, nor a sceptic like Hume, Locke stands on that neutral ground whence he surveys the position on both sides.

Among the English thinkers who took up and carried further the ideas of Locke, none stands nearer to Materialism than John Toland. He refers to the practice of the ancient philosophers to set forth an exoteric and an esoteric teaching, of which the former was intended for the general public, but the latter only for the circle of initiated disciples. Referring to this, he hints in one of his treatises "that the external and internal doctrine are as much now in use as ever," and this puts him in mind of what he was told by a near relation to the old Lord Shaftesbury. "The latter, conferring one day with Major Wildman about the many sets of Religion in the world, they came to this conclusion at last: That, notwithstanding those infinite divisions caused by the interest of the priests and the ignorance of the people, All Wise Men are of

the same Religion; whereupon a lady in the room, who seemed to be minding her needle more than their discourse, demanded with some concern, What that Religion was? To whom Lord Shaftesbury straight replied: Madam, Wise Men never tell." Toland himself has frankly expressed his esoteric doctrine in the anonymous Pantheistikon," published at Cosmopolis, 1720. He demands, in this treatise, the entire laying aside of revelations and of popular beliefs, and the construction of a new religion which agrees with philosophy. His God is the universe; from which everything is born, into which everything returns. His cultus is that of truth, liberty, and health. His saints and fathers are the master-spirits and most excellent authors of all times, especially of classical antiquity; but even they form no authority to chain the free spirit of mankind. He regards thought as a phenomenon which is an inherent accompaniment of the material movements of the nervous system, but does not, like the ancient Materialists, consider this present world merely as a casual result preceded by innumerable imperfect experiments, but assumes a magnificent purposefulness inherent in the universe.

While the English band of thinkers of the time of Locke were pursuing their inquiries, there arose across the sea one of those exceptional figures which exalt our conceptions of humanity. Baruch Despinosa, or Benedictus de Spinoza, was born in 1632, at Amsterdam. His parents were descendants of Portuguese Jews who had sought refuge in Holland from the Inquisition. His father was an honourable but not wealthy merchant. Educated for a theological career, at the age of fifteen he was a match for a rabbi in the extent of biblical learning, and puzzled the Synagogue with questions to which satisfactory answers were not forthcoming. His teacher Morteira, the great Talmudist, alarmed, endeavoured to check this inquiring spirit. The attempt was futile. Proof against entreaties, against threats, against the proposition of a pension of one thousand florins annually, if he would only appear from time to time in the synagogue and keep his doubts to himself, he withdrew from the worship of his race. His assassination was attempted by a Jewish fanatic. Shortly after he was excommunicated with rites of great solemnity.

It was not simply a fervid, emotional, enthusiastic spirit that prompted Spinoza to separate himself from all that man