AMERICAN MUSEUM, For DECEMBER, 1787. THE FEDERALIST. To the people of the state of New York. LETTER III. T is not a new obfervation, that people like the Americans, intelligent and well informed) feldom adopt, and fteadily perfevere for many years in, an erroneous opinion refpecting their interefts. That confideration naturally tends to create great refpect for the high opinion which the people of America have fo long and uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing firmly united under one federal government, vefted with fufficient powers for all general and national purposes. The more attentively I confider and inveftigate the reafons which appear to have given birth to this opinion, the more I become convinced that they are cogent and conclufive. Among the many objects to which a wife and free people find it neceffary to direct their attention, that of providing for their fafety feems to be the first. The fafety of the people, doubtless, has relation to a great variety of circumstances and confiderations; and confequently affords great latitude to thofe who wish to define it precifely and comprehenfively. At prefent, I mean only to confider it as it refpects fecurity for the prefervation of peace and tranquility, as well against dangers from foreign arms and influence, as from dangers of the like kind, arifing from domeftic caufes. As the former of these comes firft in order, it is it Let us, therefore, proceed to examine, whether the people are not right in their opinion, that a cordial union, under an efficient national government, affords them the best security that can be devised against hoftilities from abroad. The number of wars which have happened or will happen in the world, will always be found to be in proportion to the number and weight of the causes, whether real or pretended, which provoke or invite them. If this remark be juft, it becomes ufeful to enquire, whether fo many just caufes of war are likely to be given by united America, as by difunited America; for if it fhould turn out that united America will probably give the feweft, then it will follow, that, in this refpect, the union tends moft to preferve the people in a state of peace with other na maritime, and therefore able to annoy and injure us. She has alfo extenfive commerce with Portugal, Spain, and Britain, and with refpect to the two latter, has, in addition, the circumftance of neighbourhood to attend to. It is of high importance to the peace of America, that the obferve the laws of nations towards all thefe powers, and to me it appears evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national government, than it could be either by thirteen feparate ftates, or by three or four diftinct confederacies. Because when once an efficient national government is eftablifhed, the beft men in the country will not only confent to ferve, but alfo will generally be appointed to manage it; for although town or country, or other contracted influence may place men in ftate affemblies, or fenates, or courts of justice, or executive departments; yet more general and extenfive reputation for talents and other qualifications, will be neceffary to recommend men to offices under the national government-efpecially as it will have the wideft field for choice, and never experience that want of proper perfons, which is not uncommon in fome of the ftates. Hence it will refult, that the adininistration, the political counfels, and the judicial decifions of the national government will be more wife, fyftematical and judicious, than thofe of individual ftates, and confequently more fatisfactory with respect to other nations, as well as more fafe with refpect to us, Because under the national government, treaties, and articles of treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one fenfe, and executed in the fame mannerwhereas adjudications on the fame. points and questions, in thirteen ftates, or in three or four confederacies, will not always accord or be confiftent; and that as well from the variety of independent courts and judges appointed by different and independent governments, as from the different local laws and interes which may affect and influence them. The wisdom of the convention in committing fuch queftions to the jurifdiction and judgment of courts appointed by, and refponfible caly to one national government, cannot le too much commended. Becaufe the profpect of prefat lofs or advantage, inay often tempt the governing party in one or ta ftates to fwerve from geod faith ad juftice: but thofe temptations Lt reaching the other ftates, and coalsquently having little or no influence on the national government, the temptation will be fruitiefs, and good faith and juftice be preferved. The cafe of the treaty of peace with Britain, adds great weight to this reafoning. Becaufe even if the governing par ty in a ftate fhould be difpofed to refit fuch temptations, yet as fach temptations may, and commonly do refult from circumftances peculiar to the state, and may affect a great number of the inhabitants, the governing party may not always be able, if wil ling, to prevent the injuftice medita ted, or to punish the aggreffors. But the national government, not being affected by thofe local circumftances, will neither be induced to commit the wrong themselves, not want power or inclination to prevent, of punish its commiffion by others. So far therefore as either defigned or accidental violation of treaties and of the laws of nations afford juft catfes of war, they are lefs to be appre hended under one general gover ment, than under feveral leffer ones, and in that refpect, the former mod favour the fafety of the people. As to thofe juft caufes of war, which proceed from direct and unlawful violence, it appears equally clear to me, that one good national wvernment affords vaftly more fecuty againit dangers of that fort, than in be derived from any other quarter. Becaufe fuch violences are more equently caufed by the paflions and terefts of a part than of the whole, f one or two ftates than of the unin. Not a fingle Indian war has et been occafioned by aggreffions i the prefent federal government, eble as it is; but there are feveral tances of Indian hoftilities having een provoked by the improper conuct of individual states, who, either nable or unwilling to refrain or unith offences, have given occafion the flaughter of many innocent babitants. The neighbourhood of Spanish and ritish territories, bordering on fome ates and not on others, naturally onfines the causes of quarrel more ninediately to the borderers. The ordering ftates, if any, will be thofe ho, under the impulfe of fudden rritation, and a quick fenfe of appaent intereft or injury, will be moft ikely by direct violence, to excite var with those nations; and nothing an fo effectually obviate that danger, as a national government, whofe vifdom and prudence will not be moderation and candour to confider and decide on the means most proper to extricate them from the difficulties which threaten them. Befides, it is well known, that acknowledgments, explanations, and compenfations, are often accepted, as fatisfactory, from a ftrong united nation, which would be rejected, as unfatisfactory, if offered by a state or confederacy of little confideration or power. In the year 1685, the state of Genoa having offended Louis XIV. endeavoured to appease him. He demanded, that they should fend their doge, or chief magiitrate, accompanied by four of their fenators, to France, to afk his pardon, and receive his terms. They were obliged to fubmit to it, for the fake of peace. Would he, on any occafion, either have demanded, or have received the like humiliation from Spain, Britain, or any other powerful nation? PUBLIU S. LETTER IV. of the iminished by the paffions which MY laft paper affigned several ctuate the parties immediately inerested. But not only fewer juft caufes of war will be given by the national government, but it will alfo be more In their power to fettle them amicably. They will be more temperate and cool; and in that refpect, as vell as in others, will be more in capacity to act advisedly than the of ending ftate. The pride of states, as well as of men, naturally difpofes hem to justify all their actions, and oppofes their acknowledging, corecting, or repairing their errors and Offences. The national government, En fuch cafes, will not be affected by this pride; but will proceed with people would be beft fecured by union, againft the dangers it may be expofed to, by juft caufes of war given to other nations and those reafons fhew, that such caufes would not only be more rarely given, but would also be more eafily accommodated by a national government, than either by the ftate governments, or the propofed little confederacies. But the fafety of the people of America, against dangers from foreign force, depends not only on their forbearing to give juft caufes of war to other nations, but alfo on their placing and continuing themfelves in fuch a fituation, as not to invite hoftility or infult: for it need not be obferved, that there are pretended as well as just causes of war, It is too true, however difgraceful it may be to human nature, that nations in general will make war, whenever they have a profpect of getting any thing by it: nay, that abfolute monarchs will often make war, when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for purposes and objects merely perfonal, fuch as, a thirst for military glory, revenge for perfonal affronts, ambition, or pri vate compacts to aggrandize or fupport their particular families, or partizans. Thefe, and a variety of motives, which affect only the mind of the fovereign, often lead him to engage in wars not fanctified by juftice, or the voice and interefts of his people. But, independent of these inducements to war, which are more prevalent in abfolute monarchies, but which well deserve our attention, there are others, which affect nations as often as kings and fome of them will, on examination, be found to grow out of our relative fituation and circumstances. With France, and with Britain, we are rivals in the fisheries; and can fupply their markets cheaper than they can themselves, notwithstanding any efforts to prevent it, by bounties on their own, or duties on foreign fish. : With them, and moft other European nations, we are rivals in navigation and the carrying trade and we fhall deceive ourselves, if we fuppofe that any of them will rejoice to fee it flourish [with us]: for as our carrying trade cannot increafe, without in fome degree diminishing theirs, it is more their intereft, and will be more their policy, to reftrain, than to promote it. In the trade to China and India, we interfere with more than one na tion, in as much as it enables us to partake in advantages which they had in a manner monopolized, and as we thereby fapply ourselves with commodities which we used to par chafe from them. The extenfion of our own conmerce, in our own veffels, cannot give pleasure to any nations which poffefs territories on or near this continent: because the cheapes and excellence of our productions, added to the circumftance of vicinity, and the enterprize and address of our merchants and navigators, will give us a greater share in the advantages which thofe territories afford, than confifts with the wishes or policy of their respective fovereigns. Spain thinks it convenient to faut the Miffiffippi against us, on the one fide; and Britain excludes us from the St. Laurence, on the other: nor will either of them permit the other waters, which are between them and us, to become the means of mutual intercourse and traffic. From these, and fuch like confiderations, which might, if confiftent with prudence, be more amplifed and detailed, it is easy to fee that jealoufies and uneafineffes may g dually flide into the minds and cabi nets of other nations; and that w are not to expect they should regard our advancement in union, in power and confequence by land, and by fea, with an eye of indifference and compofure. The people of America are aware fe that inducements to war, may, out of thefe circumftances, as well as from others not fo obvious at prefent; and that whenever fuch in ducements may find fit time and op portunity for operation, pretenc to colour and juftify them, will not he wanting. Wifely therefore do they confider union and a good national government as neceffary to put an keep them in fuch a fituation as in ftead of inviting war, will tend to reprefs and difcourage it. That fir ation confifts in the beft poffible flate of defence, and neceffarily depends on the government, the arms, and the refources of the country. We have heard much of the fleets of Britain; and the time may come, if we are wife, when the fleets of America may engage attention. But if one national government had not fo regulated the navigation of Britain as to make it a nursery for feamen As the fafety of the whole is the intereft of the whole, and cannot be provided for without government, either one, or more, or many, let us nquire whether one good govern--if one national government had ment is not, relative to the object in queftion, more competent than any other given number whatever. One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and experience of the ableft men, in whatever part of the union they may be found. It can move on uniform principies of policy-It can harmonize, affimilate and protect the feveral parts and members, and extend the benefit of its forefight and precautions to each. In the formation of treaties, it will regard the intereft of the whole, and the particular interefts of the parts, as connected with that of the whole. It can apply the refources and power of the whole to the defence of any particular part, and that more eafily and expeditiously than ftate governments, or feparate confederacies can poffibly do, for want of concert and unity of fyftem-It can place the militia under one plan of difcipline, and by putting their officers in a proper line of fubordination to the chief magiftrate, will as it were confolidate them into one corps, and thereby render them more efficient than if divided into thirteen or into three or four diftinct independent bodies. What would the militia of Britain be, if the English militia obeyed the government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the government of Scotland, and if the Welsh militia obeyed the government of Wales! Suppofe an invafion-would those three governments (if they agreed at all) be able, with all their refpective forces, to operate against the enemy fo effectually as the fingle government of Great Britain? not called forth all the national Let England have its navigation and Apply thefe facts to our own cafe Leave America divided into thirteen, or if you please, into three or four independent governmentswhat armies could they raise and pay, what fleets could they ever hope to have? If one was attacked, would the others fly to its fuccour, and fpend their blood and money in its defence? would there be no danger of their being flattered into neutrality, by fpecious promifes, or feduced by a too great fondness for peace, to decline hazarding their tranquility and prefent fafety for the fake of neighbours, of whom, perhaps, they have been jealous, and whofe importance they are content to fee diminished? Although fuch conduct would not be wife, it would nevertheless be natural. The history of the ftates of Greece, and of other countries, abound with fuch inftances: and it is not improbable that what has fo often happened, would under fimilar circumftances, happen again. But admit that they might be willing to help the invaded state or confederacy-How and when, and |