RELATIONS BETWEEN MEXICO AND

GUATEMALA

125. BOUNDARY DISPUTE BETWEEN MEXICO AND GUATEMALA

[April 1, 1882. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1883, 387-388. Published by the United States Department of State.]

The boundary dispute between Mexico and Guatemala had occupied the attention of the governments of these two countries for several years. Through the good offices of the United States government the question was settled amicably. By the Treaty of Washington1 of September 27, 1882, Guatemala abandoned her claims to the state of Chiapas and the department of Soconusco and her claim for pecuniary indemnity as well. It was further agreed between the two countries that if differences should arise in the effort to determine the exact boundary line, the whole matter was to be laid before a court of arbitration. It was also agreed that if it should be necessary to resort to this method of solving the problem, the president of the United States of North America was to act as arbitrator. These excerpts from the message of President Díaz explain the position of Mexico in the controversy.

Gentlemen of the Chamber of Deputies and Senators:

The good harmony which has for some time past existed between Mexico and the foreign powers with whom she has relations has been preserved, and has been increased, and we receive from them frequent evidences of their friendly feeling towards us.

1 The treaty was ratified by Mexico on October 17, 1882, and by Guatemala on December 25 of the same year. The full text of the document is given in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1883, 649-651.

Our relations with Guatemala continue in the same condition they were in when I gave you an account of them in September last.

When treating of interests of such magnitude it is prudent, without neglecting them, to leave to time that natural influence which it sometimes advantageously exercises in bringing complicated questions to a solution.

I must, therefore, for your information, as well as for that of Mexico and of the Governments of Central America, explain clearly and succinctly what are the aspirations of my administration in our difficulties with Guatemala, and I hope that you will not deny to me the co-operation necessary to bring them to an end.

Perhaps the circumstance that in former times some of the republics which are grouped together in the center of the continent, formed part of the Mexican nation, has given rise to the idea that our republic, stimulated by its actual condition of tranquillity and progress, wishes to possess itself, in whole or in part, of these political entities, which are now sovereign and independent, and annex them to our own territory- a lamentable error which might alienate from us the sympathy of the people thereof, from whom no conflict separates us, and with whom we desire to cultivate and strengthen, if possible, the most disinterested friendship.

When we possess a territory of the greatest richness, washed by two oceans, capable of supporting in prosperity a population of one hundred millions, it would be insensate in us to attempt the conquest of those countries, from which we are separated by great distances, and we would unceasingly repel in them those proper sentiments of liberty and independence which are as firmly rooted in their soil as they are in our own. And I solemnly declare to Congress, and to the nation which it represents, that my administration has no other views with reference to the questions which now exist with the southern republic, than the defence of the territory and dignity of Mexico, and looks only to the establishing of a well-defined boundary which will be adopted by a common accord between Mexico and Guatemala. If the government of that country will renounce the unrealizable idea of reoccupying Chiapas and Soconusco, or of obtaining an indemnity for supposed damages for having been despoiled of the same, the sincerity of the policy which in these few words I have indicated would be soon made apparent.

RELATIONS BETWEEN CHILE, BOLIVIA,

AND PERU

126. THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC

The growing commercial importance of the guano deposits of the Atacama Desert had its effects on the relations between Chile, Peru, and Bolivia. A large part of the desert was included in Bolivia by the uti possidetis of 1810. The interest of certain Chilean capitalists in the exploitation of the guano deposits in Bolivian territory brought about a crisis in the controversy over the boundaries of the three countries. The differences between Chile and Bolivia were temporarily settled by the treaty of August 10, 1866. Peru was naturally concerned in the arrangement made by the other two powers. Her fear of the aggressive policy of Chile led her to seek to alienate Bolivia from Chile. On February 6, 1873, she was able to sign a secret treaty of alliance with Bolivia. The text of the treaty is given in the first document below. The result of this transaction was that the relations between Bolivia and Chile and between Peru and Chile were further embittered. The whole controversy was greatly intensified by the maneuverings of the politicians in the three countries, but more especially in Bolivia. The coup d'etat of May 4, 1876, by which General Hilarión Daza became president of that country, was the immediate cause of a new crisis in the Chilo-Bolivian relations. In February, 1878, Daza sanctioned an act passed by the Bolivian congress whereby a tax of ten centavos per hundred was to be levied on all the nitrate exported from the Bolivian littoral. This was in direct opposition to the treaty of 1866. The Nitrate Company of Antofagasta, a Chilean concern, protested against this law and appealed to the

government of Chile for protection of its rights. Bolivia, however, persisted in enforcing the law, with the result that Chile declared war against her in February, 1879. Peru refused to pursue a neutral policy in this conflict, and Chile declared war on her also, a few days later. The War of the Pacific, as the struggle is generally called, did not end until October 20, 1883, with the signing of the Treaty of Ancón. This treaty was not ratified, however, until March 28, 1884.

A. THE TREATY OF LIMA

[February 6, 1873. Arbitration between Peru and Chile. Appendix to the Case of Peru in the Matter of the Controversy arising out of the Question of the Pacific before the President of the United States of America Arbitrator (1923), II, 35-37. Washington.]

The Republics of Bolivia and Peru, desirous to cement in a solemn manner the bonds that unite them, to increase thus their strength and mutually guarantee one another certain rights, have drawn up the present treaty of defensive alliance; to which end, the President of Bolivia has invested with ample powers to conduct the said negotiation, Juan de la Cruz Benavente, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary in Peru, and the President of Peru has conferred the same upon José de la Riva-Agüero, minister of foreign affairs, who have agreed upon the following stipulations :

ARTICLE I. The contracting parties will unite and join to mutually guarantee their independence, sovereignty, and the integrity of their respective territory, binding themselves by the terms of the present treaty to defend themselves against all foreign aggressions, whether proceeding from another or other independent state, or from a force without a flag, owing obedience to no recognized power.

ART. II. The alliance will become effective to protect the rights expressed in the preceding article and particularly in cases of offense consisting:

1st. In acts tending to deprive either of the contracting parties of a portion of their territory, in order to assume dominion over it; or to yield it to another power.

2d. In acts tending to oblige either of the contracting parties to

submit to a protectorate, sale or cession of territory, or to establish over it any superiority, right, or pre-eminence whatsoever, which may injure or offend the full and ample exercise of its sovereignty and independence.

3d. In acts tending to do away with or change the form of government, the political constitution or the laws that the contracting parties have made, or may in future make, in the exercise of the sovereignty.

ART. III. As both the contracting parties admit that every legitimate act of alliance is based upon justice, for each of them respectively, the right is established of deciding whether the offense inferred to the other is comprised amongst those mentioned in the preceding article.

ART. IV. The casus fœderis once declared, the contracting parties bind themselves to cease immediately their relations with the offending state; to hand their passports to its diplomatic ministers; to cancel the appointments of the consular agents; to forbid the importation of its natural and industrial products, and to close their ports against its ships.

ART. V. The same parties shall also appoint plenipotentiaries to adjust by protocol the arrangements necessary to determine upon the subsidies, the contingents of either sea or land forces, or the aid of whatever kind that must be lent to the republic which has received the offense; the manner in which the forces are to act and the assistance to be lent, and whatever else may be convenient for the defense. The meeting of the plenipotentiaries will take place in the place assigned by the offended party for that purpose.

ART. VI. The contracting parties bind themselves to provide the one offended with the means of defense of which each may consider it can dispose, though the arrangements pointed out in the preceding article may not have taken place, provided that they consider the case urgent.

ART. VII. The casus fœderis once declared, the offended party will not be able to make arrangements for peace, truce, or armistice without the concurrence of the ally who may have taken part in the war.

ART. VIII. The contracting parties bind themselves in addition: 1st. To employ with preference, whenever it is possible, every conciliatory measure in order to avoid a rupture or to put an end to the war, holding as the most effective the arbitration of a third power.