tingencies might also arise in case the Acreans were victorious and we accepted their proposal of annexation.

The resort to arbitration would involve the inconvenience of delaying four or five years, if not longer, the desired solution; and even if the judge were favorable to us it would not afford a radical or definitive conclusion, since it would not suppress or resolve the difficulties with which the two countries have been struggling since 1899. In appealing to arbitration we should abandon and sacrifice thousands of Brazilians who had in good faith settled to the south of parallel 10° 20′. The arbitrator could grant us only the territory which we had declared to be in dispute to the north of that parallel, while to the south of it lie the greater part of Acre and the most of the Brazilian settlements. During the process of arbitration, these compatriots of ours would continue their conspiracies and revolts against the Bolivian authorities. Political agitation would persist among us in regard to the Acre question, and in Bolivia perhaps the temptation of some new lease, with a view to subdue, by means of foreign resources, a population which had shown itself steadfastly hostile to her. And owing to the instability of opinion in some of our political centres, and to the influence which they occasionally might exert on that of the real or apparent majority of the nation, it was impossible to foresee to what decisions we might be led, in moments of patriotic exaltation, by the spectacle of the persistent revolt of these Brazilians or of their final subjugation by sheer extermination. It is furthermore very likely that the mind of the arbitrator would be influenced less by arguments which we could adduce than by the constant tradition of thirty-five years, during which the Government of Brazil not only considered as unquestionably Bolivian the territory situated between the oblique Jacary-Bení line and the above-mentioned parallel, but also performed, before the demarcation was concluded, positive acts which acknowledged Bolivian sovereignty, agreeing to the establishment of a custom house in Porto Alonso, afterwards Port Acre, and establishing there a Brazilian consulate. I must for myself declare, that, with such high interests of the present and future of this nation at stake, I would not deem arbitration advisable, unless a direct agreement was entirely impossible and the arbitration was conducted outside of the restrictions of the treaty of 1867 and with special guarantees which it would be difficult for the other party to accept.

A direct agreement was, indeed, the preferable expedient, the most

expeditious and the only one that could efficaciously assure an immediate advantage as well to Brazil as to Bolivia. We had recourse to it, and after patient labor we secured its realization in a manner satisfactory and honorable to both countries, solving radically not only all present questions, but also comprising in a general conception everything pertaining to our permanent intercourse with Bolivia.

Happily it was not necessary, in order to attain this result, to introduce any innovation into existing rights as between the two countries. The present agreement, as has heretofore been pointed out, is in its essence a simple development and application of that of 1867. There is not, properly speaking, a cession, but a reciprocal exchange of territories of each country inhabited by citizens of the other, precisely as is provided in Article V of the compact of 1867, above mentioned. But, even if we were to describe as a "cession of territories" an exchange by which we give 3,200 square kilometers and receive 191,000, it could not be said that such an act is in itself indecorous, and much less that it is not, authorized by the traditions of free peoples having the highest sense of honor in the world, such as the United States of America and Switzerland, and by the juridical and customary precedents of our fatherland. The constitution of the Empire authorized, in Article CII, Paragraph 8, the cession of territory, on condition that it be sanctioned by the General Legislative Assembly. And the principle was not only admitted, but it was carried into effect on several occasions.

By the present treaty, however, we do not lose but acquire territory. Moreover, we make our first territorial acquisition since we became an independent nation.

The decision of the two disputes, in which I have had the honor to defend the interests of Brazil, did not increase but barely maintained the national patrimony within the limits sanctioned by long-continued affirmation of our rights. Only now have we accomplished true territorial expansion, with the fortunate circumstance that in securing it we do not despoil any neighboring and friendly nation; on the contrary, we liberate her from a burden, offering her material and political compensations the equivalency of which has been shown, and which the future will transform into as many bonds of international fellowship.

134. THE ROOSEVELT COROLLARY TO THE MONROE DOCTRINE [December 6, 1904. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1904, XLI. Published by the United States Government.]

The financial affairs of Santo Domingo had been in a state of chaos for several years. In 1904 the European creditors of the republic became more insistent in their demands for an acceptable settlement of the debts that were due them. There was a fear that an attempt would be made to collect the debts by force. The only way in which Santo Domingo could be made to pay was through a seizure and administration of its customhouses. President Roosevelt feared that such an occupation might be extended for an indefinite period of time owing to the large amount of the foreign debts of the republic and to the chronic mismanagement of its finances. He could see only one solution: the United States must act as the receiver and take over the administration of the financial affairs of the republic. The following excerpts explain the policy which President Roosevelt was about to inaugurate.

It is not true that the United States feels any land hunger or entertains any projects as regards the other nations of the Western Hemisphere save such as are for their welfare. All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power. If every country washed by the Caribbean Sea would show the progress in stable and just civilization which with the aid of the Platt Amendment Cuba has

shown since our troops left the island, and which so many of the republics in both Americas are constantly and brilliantly showing, all questions of interference by this nation with their affairs would be at an end. Our interests and those of our southern neighbors are in reality identical. They have great natural riches, and if within their borders the reign of law and justice obtains, prosperity is sure to come to them. While they thus obey the primary laws of civilized society they must rest assured that they will be treated by us in a spirit of cordial and helpful sympathy. We would interfere with them only in the last resort, and then only because it became evident that their inability or unwillingness to do justice at home and abroad had violated the rights of the United States or had invited foreign aggression to the detriment of the entire body of American nations. It is a mere truism to say that every nation, whether in America or elsewhere, which desires to maintain its freedom, its independence, must ultimately realize that the right of such independence cannot be separated from the responsibility of making good use of it.

In asserting the Monroe Doctrine, in taking such steps as we have taken in regard to Cuba, Venezuela, and Panama, and in endeavoring to circumscribe the theater of war in the Far East, and to secure the open door in China, we have acted in our own interest as well as in the interest of humanity at large. . . . But in extreme cases, action may be justifiable and proper. What form the action shall take must depend upon the circumstances of the case; that is, upon the degree of the atrocity and upon our power to remedy it. The cases in which we could interfere by force of arms as we interfered to put a stop to intolerable conditions in Cuba are necessarily few. . . .

FORCEFUL COLLECTION OF CONTRACT

DEBTS

135. THE ATTITUDE OF THE HISPANIC AMERICAN DELEGATIONS TOWARD THE PORTER RESOLUTION IN THE SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCE

[1907. James Brown Scott, The Reports to the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. Being the Official Explanatory and Interpretative Commentary accompanying the Draft Conventions and Declarations submitted to the Conferences by the Several Commissions charged with Preparing Them (1917), 489-496. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Division of International Law. Printed in England at the Oxford Press, London.]

The Calvo-Drago Doctrine had attracted wide attention from the first. The gravity of the Venezuelan controversy and the high position held by Luis M. Drago gave it general interest throughout Hispanic America. At the Third Panamerican Conference, held in Rio de Janeiro in 1906, Drago made his proposal a statement of policy and desired that the states of the Americas should adopt it as such. The Conference decided to recommend that the whole subject of the forceful collection of public debts be referred to the Second Peace Conference of the Hague. The delegation of the United States accordingly presented to that conference a resolution providing that force should not be used in the collection of contractual debts until the justice of the claim and the amount of the debt should have been determined by arbitration. It was a happy solution of a problem of grave import to Hispanic America. The attitude of the various Hispanic American delegations toward this resolution is set forth in the following excerpts. The resolutions of the Conference dealing with the whole subject are also given.