I think that the Latin-American nation which proclaimed the principle of international justice to the effect that the sovereignty of those countries is not to be violated by another American country or countries, nor by the countries of another continent, thus extolling the Monroe Doctrine and completing its moral integrity, would greatly promote justice, liberty and democracy, so seriously imperiled in these dark and turbulent times of war and extermination in Europe.

I respectfully beg you to raise the banner of that noble ideal, in order that in the name of our country the delegates of Colombia may submit it to the consideration of the next Pan-American Congress.

There will be those, and you will hear them, Mr. President, who will say to you and to the Republic that the most that can be accomplished is the signing of a treaty by all the North, Central and South American nations; but that this will be of no avail because tomorrow, when the powerful deem it convenient, that treaty will be repudiated as was the treaty between Colombia and the United States; it will be said that to put our faith on the written and signed word of nations at this time when Germany has just trampled under the hoofs of her cavalry the treaties providing for the neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium, signed by all Europe, declared to be "scraps of paper" by the Minister of Foreign Relations Jagow, is an unpardonable puerility. It will be said that force depends on the sword and that the only voice heeded by the world is the roaring of the cannon. To this I answer that that is the eternal lie of Draconians and of demagogues to obstruct the evolution of justice.

We the weak have no other protection than the law; if we ourselves make haste to discredit law, we will incite and point the way to the violators of the law. If law crumbles, our duty is not to bury it in the mire of insult and contempt; our duty is to raise it from the dust, and place it high, very high, as the Saviour raised the Cross, that it may be a guiding light to awaken the conscience; to submit ourselves voluntarily and in advance to deceit and violence, is to merit slavery, and is in addition treason to our country. We are not compelled to be cowards before the battle starts. We have no armaments. Let us uphold the law, having as we have, faith in the final victory of the law.

139. THE QUESTION OF THE PACIFIC

The series of problems growing out of the War of the Pacific is usually dealt with under the title of "The Question of the Pacific." It embraces more especially the problem or problems growing out of the efforts to enforce Article Three of the Treaty of Ancón. A reference to the full text of that treaty will make clear the nature of the arrangement for the ultimate ownership of the provinces of Tacna and Arica, as well as that for the payment of the stipulated sum of money by the nation which proves successful in the plebiscite. The differences between the two nations over the manner of conducting the plebiscite have prevented a settlement. During the peace negotiations which resulted in the Treaty of Ancón, Chile made it clear that she desired the three provinces of Tarapacá, Tacna, and Arica. The first, the most important of the three, was readily ceded to her. But the delegates of Peru declined to agree to the cession of the other two on the ground that the national sentiment of the Peruvian people would not permit it. To bring about an end of the war, a measure was resorted to similar to the device adopted in the cession of Nice and Savoy in 18601 and of the island of St. Barthélemy in 1877. It was the provision that a plebiscite was to determine the ultimate ownership of the lands in question. Controversies, however, arose early between Chile and Peru over the manner of conducting the plebiscite. Chile held that the article was inserted merely to allay Peruvian national resentment so that peace might be concluded; that the plebiscite was to be carried out under conditions that would render inevitable the definite annexation of the two provinces, a fact she had insisted upon from the very first; and that the sole purpose of the provision for the lapse of ten years before the plebiscite could be held was to give the Peruvian people of those two provinces time to accustom themselves to Chilean rule. She also held that the ten million pesos which would be 2 The Treaty of Paris.

1 The Treaty of Turin.

paid by her was meant to be a compensation for the cession of those provinces.

Peru maintained, on the contrary, that the plebiscite did not have the disguised meaning that Chile claimed, but that it actually provided a means of determining the ultimate ownership of the two provinces. Another phase of the controversy has proved equally difficult of solution. Peru has maintained that none but Peruvians born in these provinces should be allowed to vote in the plebiscite. Chile has held that all adult inhabitants, including all the foreign inhabitants living in them, who could read and write, should have that right. She also claimed that she should have the right, as the nation exercising sovereignty over these provinces, to delegate a representative to preside over the plebiscite commission. This right Peru has refused to grant to Chile, claiming that since the ten-year period marked the maximum, Chile's sovereignty over them expired at the end of that period. For this reason she cannot be said to exercise sovereignty de jure over them and cannot claim the right to preside over the commission. Chile maintained, however, that the ten-year period was the minimum and that her rights still held. The controversy dragged on. In 1920 Peru took the matter before the League of Nations. As a member of that body she requested that the League Assembly bring about a revision of the Treaty of Ancón. She was persuaded to withdraw the request and did so with the right to renew the request later. The efforts of the United States of North America to have the whole question settled by arbitration resulted in an agreement to refer the matter at issue between Chile and Peru over Tacna and Arica to the president of the United States as arbitrator. President Harding accepted the invitation to serve in that capacity, and upon his death President Coolidge assumed the position. He rendered his award on March 4, 1925. The following excerpts from the demands of the Peruvian Court of Arbitration, the opinion of Barclay, and the award of President Coolidge will throw more light on the whole question.

A. THE CONCLUSION OF THE PERUVIAN ARBITRATION

COMMISSION

[1923. Arbitration between Peru and Chile. The Counter Case of Peru in the Matter of the Controversy arising out of the Question of the Pacific before the President of the United States of America as Arbitrator (1923), II, 213–216. National Capital Press, Inc., Washington.]

THE AWARD WHICH LAW AND EQUITY REQUIRE

The Governments of Peru and Chile having made a contract in 1884 called the Treaty of Ancon, by the terms of which Chile was to occupy Tacna and Arica for the fixed period of ten years, with no right to remain beyond said period unless a plebiscite of the inhabitants of the Provinces should grant her a new estate of dominion and sovereignty, and the parties to this contract having failed to perform the stipulations in this respect, the question is submitted to the Honorable Arbitrator as to what settlement of their difficulties will satisfy principles of law and equity.

The case is as simple as if it were one between private parties presented to a chancellor in a suit for specific performance of a contract. The exact question to be decided, as both parties agree, is how shall the unfulfilled stipulations of Article III of the Treaty of Ancon be now fulfilled?

Chile contends that specific performance requires a plebiscite now, but on well-established principles of equity she would not be entitled to this:

First, because a plebiscite now was not the agreement between the parties. The contract does not contain any provision for a plebiscite in future years, but only for a plebiscite in 1894, or at the end of the temporary occupancy. The decree for a plebiscite thirty years later, therefore, would not be a compliance with the terms of the contract, but a violation of them.

Second, because requiring a decision by a vote of the inhabitants after thirty years' control by one of the parties, would impose a hardship on the other party not voluntarily assumed when the contract was made. A fortiori, would this be the rule if the conditions which make it a hardship were brought about by the party to the contract who was in control. Third, because control of the territory and the inhabitants, after right to possession had ceased, constitutes in justice and equity a

waiver of advantages thus secured. A fortiori, is this the rule, if the contract was deliberately used to fix the vote in advance.

Peru contends that specific performance requires a decree of sovereignty and possession in Peru, with the incidental relief which follows such decree.

That this is the correct view, is demonstrated:

First, because if the stipulation as to a plebiscite had been carried out as intended, the decision, admitted by both parties, would have continued the sovereignty in Peru and given her possession of Tacna and Arica. Therefore, such decree now is the only way in which "that can be done which should have been done."

Second, because at the expiration of the term by the express words of the contract, right to possession by Chile ceased, and Peru was then entitled to the territory.

Now, both parties agree that this contract of 1884 must still be fulfilled, admitting, as is obvious, that the time and circumstances under which it could be fulfilled according to its terms, cannot now be recalled; and, therefore, admitting that the manner of its enforcement must be decided by the ordinary principles of equity, and the ordinary rules of interpretation in force in courts of equity.

Applying such rules, Peru submits that the Honorable Arbitrator should find and decree:

First, that changed conditions through the lapse of thirty years have made unfair, unjust and contrary to the intent of the parties, a plebiscite now, whether with or without the fault of either party.

Second, that a plebiscite now would be especially unfair and unjust since the character of the population of Tacna and Arica has been changed by the acts of Chile for the very purpose of controlling the vote.

Third, that the only method now of carrying out, in justice and equity, the general object and aim of Article III of the Treaty of Ancon is to decree title and sovereignty and right of possession in Peru, with such further relief, in view of the unlawful occupancy by Chile for thirty years, as equity and good conscience require.

Fourth, that such further relief in equity must include an accounting by Chile to Peru for the damages sustained by the unlawful occupancy of Tacna and Arica, during the last thirty years.

Fifth, that since, as the undisputed facts show, Chile, by the admissions and representations of the responsible officials of her Government