LUDE.] it is essential Atheism. 103 mena of matter and extension, it habituates us only to the contemplation of an order of things in which everything is determined by the laws of a blind or mechanical necessity, and leads us to think that the mechanism of nature can explain every thing." If we hold such views as those last expressed, we have duly arrived at the materialistic goal.1 And this is the goal to which these men would lead the world of thought. They may shrink from the ultimate legitimate conclusions of their teaching, but their disciples will not, and the great uncritical multitude will not, and will carry out into practical life what these teach as science. At times they one and all use strong words against materialism, for they know what a revulsion of feeling that would create in English lands, as I am glad to say Haeckel's utterances did in Germany; and yet when you search their systems you fail to find anything but matter and mechanical force, and an emasculated ghost of an unknowable, inconceivable something, on which they rely to save their system from the charge of being what Carlyle called a "gospel of dirt." And in unguarded moments their true tendency is made exceedingly manifest. Mr. Huxley tells the Medical College that "the simplest particle of that which men in their blindness are pleased to call 'brute matter,' is a vast aggregate of molecular mechanisms performing complicated movements of immense rapidity and sensitivity, adjusting themselves to every change in the surrounding world. Living matter differs from other matter in degree and not in kind; the microcosm repeats the macrocosm, and one chain of causation connects the nebulous origin of suns and planetary systems with the protoplasmic foundation of life and organization." Here are particles of matter sensitively adjusting themselves—and then again vital actions are "nothing but changes of place of particles of matter." Mr. Huxley says man is "like a machine of the nature 1See also Modern Materialism" in New Englander, July, 1882. 66 104 and essential Materialism. [INTER of an army, each cell a soldier;" and "vital phenomena like all other phenomena of the physical world, are resolvable into matter and motion and effected without external agency," i.e. without a God or mind. Now passing by the fact that in that chain of causation from nebulous matter to suns, and vital phenomena, no two consecutive links have yet been discovered, and that these comparisons and metaphors serve only in place of proof for otherwise bare assertions, its seems that matter and motion suffice for all things physical, living and conscious.1 Mr. Tyndall's famous Belfast address is perhaps nearly forgotten, but his matter with the "promise and potency" of all possible things has passed into history. He says:-"Strip it naked, and you stand face to face with the notion (please notice that it is "a notion," and yet Mr. Tyndall asks you to put faith in that "notion") that not only the more ignoble forms of animalcular or animal life, not alone the nobler forms of the horse and the lion, not alone the exquisite and wonderful mechanism of the human body, but that the human mind itself-emotion, intellect, will and all their phenomena-were once latent in a fiery cloud." And not so very long ago, building on this fundamental notion of his, he told an audience in Birmingham that the robber and the seducer and the murderer were no more responsible for their crimes than tigers were for their feasts of blood. It surely needs no words of mine to point out the essential materialism and the practical tendency of such teaching as this. And now comes Mr. Herbert Spencer, who with almost superhuman intellectual efforts, carrying out the same notion, attempts to reduce the world of thought and matter to a unit. Denying a personal God, calling creation a "carpenter theory," the talk about design "fetichism," he undertakes to reconcile Science and Religion. But in all the tomes of thousands of 1 See also Dr. Lionel S. Beale's "Dictatorial Scientific Utterances and the Decline of Thought."-Victoria Institute. LUDE.] Apparent strength, concealed weakness. 105 pages published by Mr. Spencer, although he writes the Power working in the universe with a capital P, I fail to find the recognition of anything that can be called a God, or of anything in the universe that has any relation to man which is not assumed to be evolved by a necessary law out of matter and inherent mechanical force. If there is no place for God in his teachings, surely they are atheistic; if matter and force grind on and produce all things without an Intelligence to guide them, surely we have materialism. But what if it is true? Well, if atheism, and materialism are true, or the new philosophy of Mr. Spencer be true, why we must believe it, of course, believe it though the heavens fall and the human heart be left desolate, though human society be blighted and all hope vanish in despair. To one unaccustomed to rigid logical discipline, and with a very slight anti-theological bias, these "First Principles," upon which is erected a vast philosophical system, must appear a veritable fortress of polished granite without a break in its solid masonry. But when examined by the hammering of logical criticism, and in the light of consistent thought, what seemed to be impregnable rock proves to be, in an appalling number of places, a superficial plastering over great gaps extending from foundation to summit; and when through these gaps the light of the outside world is let in, the whole structure proves to be a strange medley of old and often-used, and as often-exploded, fallacies, covered over with the glamour of modern scientific productions-facts and fancies-a veritable maze of " Wahrheit und Dichtung." So much so indeed is this the case, that if it had not been the custom of philosophies to do so from time immemorial, one would scarcely believe that a man of large powers could be in earnest in propounding such vagaries in the name of science and philosophy. But Mr. Spencer is terribly in earnest, and I believe perfectly honest, giving in his immense work a further evidence of the blinding influence of an initial fallacy, and the colossal blunders which a 106 Four radical fallacies. INTER gigantic intellect may commit. It is of course impossible to criticize in minutiæ the whole of his system, nor is it needful so to do; for if only one or two essential fallacies can be exposed in the foundations, the whole system must collapse, and a multiplication of arguments and criticisms would add nothing to the overthrow. There are four points which I will attempt to make clear, any one of which, if substantiated—and I believe they can all be substantiated beyond a doubt-would be sufficient to condemn any system of teaching. These points are as follows: 1. Mr. Spencer, from the start, raises an absolutely false issue, and proposes a suicidal solution. 2. The premises which he assumes require too great a strain on human faith to be accepted as a true basis for philosophy. 3. The definitions which he sometimes makes can never be accepted by his opponents, rendering of course resultant argument either harmless or suicidal. 4. He plays fast and loose with the syllogism to such an extent as to vitiate the cogency of his reasoning where really legitimate. 1. The supposed issue is nothing else than the falsely socalled Conflict of Science and Religion, which Professor Ewing showed (Lect. II) to be an essential fallacy, and unworthy of educated men. Mr. Spencer seems to know of no religion but the vagaries of men that have ever been in conflict with science. All religious superstitions are bundled together into one heap along with Christianity, and all are equally unworthy of belief. Mr. Spencer's ideas of the rise and progress of religious beliefs are such that Goldwin Smith, a real authority in historical studies, thus describes them: "Scientific the theory may be, and on questions of science the utmost deference must be paid to the inventor's authority; that it is historical must be denied." Mr. Spencer goes on to say: "Of all antagonisms of belief, the oldest, the widest, the most 1 Contemporary Review, Feb. 1882. LUDE.] Anti-religious bias. 107 profound and the most important, is that between Religion and Science."1 "An unceasing battle of opinion like this which has been carried on throughout all the ages under the banners of Religion and Science, has of course generated an animosity fatal to a just estimate of either party by the other." And then assuming the role of a mediator, he continues: "Preserving as far as may be this impartial attitude, let us then contemplate the two sides of this great controversy." If Mr. Spencer, instead of writing Religion, had said "ignorance and superstitions, ofttimes assuming the garb of Religion," he would have spoken the truth; but making Religion to include Christianity as taught in the Bible, he states what is the antipodes of truth, as was well demonstrated in the last lecture. The way in which Mr. Spencer views the contest' may be seen in his statement of the position of the parties in this imaginary battle. "Thus, however untenable may be any or all existing religious creeds, however gross the absurdities associated with them, however irrational the arguments set forth in their defence, we must not ignore the verity which in all likelihood is hidden within them. In that nescience which must ever remain the antithesis to science, there is a sphere for the exercise of this (religious) sentiment. . . . We may we sure therefore that religions, though even none of them be actually true, are yet all adumbrations of a truth."4 Now contrast the tone with regard to science: "To ask the question which more immediately concerns our argument-whether science is substantially true ?—is much like asking whether the sun gives light."5 "Be there or be there not any other revelation, we have a veritable revelation in science-a continuous disclosure, 1" First Principles," p. 11. 2" First Principles," p. 12. 4" First Principles," p. 17. 5" First Principles," p. 19. |