most is the renowned Columbus, who, though not a professed metaphysician, was yet one of the most profound of thinkers, and amongst the most astute and sagacious of the observers of nature.1 Montesquieu2 also believed in the innateness of this sentiment, as did Warburton,3 Hume, Tucker, the author of Clio, 6 Gregory, Kant, and Davy.9 8 4 5 The innateness of PHILOPROGENITIVENESS is not without its advocates:-I may name Warburton,10 Hume," Tucker,12 Reid,13 the author of A Theory of Agreeable Sensations,14 and lastly, Dr. Thomas Browne;15 nor MARVELLOUSNESS, which is supported by Lord Shaftesbury,16 in discoursing on the opinion of Lucretius upon this subject, Tucker,17 Reid,18 Fred 1 Washington Irving's Life of Columbus, I. 291. 2 Warburton's Divine Legation, III. 356. 3 Id. I. 314. III. 309, 311. 4 Hume's Essays, II. 466. 5 Tucker, VII. 276, 522. 6 Clio, 110, 113, 117. 7 Gregory's Comparative View, 197. 8 Aikin's Biography, Life of Kant. 9 Davy's Last Days of a Philosopher, 10. 10 Warburton, I. 259. 11 Hume's Essays, II. 198, 354. 12 Tucker, IV. 194. 13 Reid, I. 56. III. 151. 14 Theory of Agreeable Sensations, 109. 15 Browne, 401, 442. 16 Shaftesbury's Characteristics, I. 49. 17 Tucker, V. 498. 18 Reid, III. 115, 315. erick Schlegel,1 and Browne.2 BENEVOLENCE is advocated by Hume,3 Reid, and Browne.5 CAUTIOUSNESS, or prudence, by Tucker and Browne.7 9 8 SELF-ESTEEM is maintained by Reid, Madame de Staël, and Browne.10 LOVE OF APPROBATION by Hume, de Staël,12 Browne,13 and the author of the theory above adverted to.14 HOPE byt he author of Clio.15 IDEALITY by Dugald Stewart16 and Browne.17 -IMITATION by Reid 18 and Browne.19 SPACE, 20 9 Madame de Staël on the Influence of the Passions, 1813, 191, 252. 10 Browne, 398, 412, 416. 11 Hume's Essays, II. 327, 361. 12 De Staël, 191. 13 Browne, 412, 455, 507. 14 Theory of Agreeable Sensations, 90, 92, 183. 15 Clio, 128, 130. 16 Stewart's Elements, I. 530. 17 Browne, 350, 377, 403. 18 Reid, II. 68. III. 111. 19 Browne, 350. 20 Reid, I. 354. 1 2 TIME, and TUNE, INDIVIDUALITY,3 and CAUSALITY, by Reid; and COMPARISON by Locke.5 4 ADHESIVENESS is supported by Warburton and Browne; AMATIVENESS by Browne;8 COMBATIVENESS by Hume and Browne;10 DESTRUCTIVENESS by the author of Theory of Agreeable Sensations,'11 by de Staël,12 and Browne ;13 FIRMNESS by Tucker,14 and ACQUISITIVENESS by Reid.15 6 16 Browne absolutely admits a faculty of equilibrium,' which is identical with the phrenological faculty of weight; and if his principle of relative suggestion be not a component part of the mind, then to account for other phenomena which he discusses, the innate existence must be inferred of individuality,17 eventuality, 18 1 Reid, I. 354. 2 Id. II. 392. 3 Id. I. 331. II. 256, 396. 4 Id. [I. 295. III. 17, 41, 273, 277. 5 Locke, II. 178, 244. 6 Warburton, I. 320. 7 Browne, 402, 450. 8 Id. 403. 9 Hume's Essays, II. 309. 10 Browne, 400, 419, 420. 11 Theory, &c. 49, 88. 12 De Staël, 193. 13 Browne, 399, 400, 480, 481. 14 Tucker, Il. 304. 15 Reid, III. 431, 439. 16 Browne, 433. 17 Id. 289. 18 Id. id. 7 2 comparison,1 causality, number,3 size, form,5 color," and space, in addition to those faculties which he admits without reserve. It is not, however, to be forgotten, that Dr. Browne was well acquainted, even in the early part of his professorship, with the doctrines of Gall and Spurzheim; and that the first critique in the Edinburgh Review (vol. ii. p. 147) upon those doctrines, in 1803, is known to be from his pen. It may therefore be presumed, that he derived from phrenology some little assistance in forming his own system of mental philosophy, consisting, as it does, of at least four and twenty of the faculties of the very system he rejected.* If the rejection was ungrateful, he at least made an amende honorable by so liberal an adoption. So much, then, for the coincidences of phrenology with the other systems of the philosophy of mind.— Let us now compare their respective merits and defects, and ascertain whether the deficiencies of the old school have been supplied by the new. 1 Browne, 290, 292. 2 Id. 289, 329. 3 Id. 334, 4 Id. 178. 5 Id. id. 6 Id. id. 7 Id. 290. *The author might have added, that Lord Kames alone describes twenty of these faculties.-PH. JOUR. Strange questions have arisen among many metaphysicians with respect to the difference between the mind of man and other animals-the origin of society, language, and property-the nature of the moral sense -and the cause of genius and idiocy, insanity, dreaming, and sleep. Curious questions, and elaborately discussed; but never decided until PHRENOLOGY, supported by NATURE and TRUTH, came forth and gave judgment. 'Man,' say metaphysicians, 'is guided by his reason, and brutes by their instincts. From phrenology we may learn that brutes also reason; and that man is not without his instincts. Even the impulse to analyze and abstract, or to trace the clue between cause and effect, as far as it is an impulse, is but an INSTINCt. The process by which these mental operations are performed, is more than instinct—it is REASONING; nor is the imagination that assists in the process, by forming new combinations, nor the judgment that selects the means, and awards the result, nor the memory that registers all, to be called an instinct; but the propensity to this exercise of the mind, though the highest enjoyed by man, is but an INSTINCT. The propensity to construct his hut is an INSTINCT in the beaver; but who will say that his mental exertions in choosing his materials, in shaping them, in placing them, in obviating accidents, and completing his edifice, are not REASONING? The true difference between man and the inferior |