The work of Dr. M'Cosh is an attempt to ingraft upon the Aristotelian system all that is valuable in the Hamiltonian analysis, at the same time avoiding its errors and defects. Dr. M'Cosh shows that the errors of Mill and the Comteans on the one hand, and of Hamilton and the Kantians on the other, have arisen mainly from defective or altogether erroneous ideas on the nature of notions, or the elements of the judgment, the "concepts" of Hamilton, the "names" of Mill, and the "terms" of Whately and others. Hence Part I, embracing nearly one half of the work, is devoted to the discussion of the notion. He takes issue at the start with the Kantian postulate that the forms of thought are subjectively determined, and that logic is consequently à priori science, showing that this is the error that runs through the whole Hamiltonian system. The author holds, on the contrary, that the science is to be constructed only by a careful inductive investigation of the operations of the mind in thinking. Hence, while the Kantian would start à priori, from the unconsciously operating laws of thought, Dr. M'Cosh proceeds à posteriori, from an inductive examination of conscious mental operations, and gives us the "fundamental laws of thought" as a supplementary conclusion.

Hamilton's great defect in his discussion of the elements of the judgment is that he has no place for abstracts. The notion is with him, as with all the Kantian logicians, simply a concept. Redness cannot be called a concept, with extension and intension, in the sense that the word is applied to red, much less as applied to a concrete, as man. Dr. M'Cosh accordingly divides notions thus:

NOTIONS-1. Percepts; the singular concrete, as Milton, Bucephalus.

2. Abstracts; as swiftness, beauty.

3. Concepts. (1) Generalized abstract; as red, swift.
(2) Generalized concrete; as poet, horse.

This analysis enables the author to use all that is really valuable in the Hamiltonian theory of the quantified predicate. Hamilton's universal affirmative with a universal predicate, (A, f, a,) marks a valuable distinction in the case of substitutive judgments-for example, definitions and mathematical propositions. Following the above analysis of the notion, it will be seen that in all such judgments the terms are abstracts or percepts; for example, 2 (a + b) = 2a + 2b is a judgment wherein both subject and predicate are abstracts. "Washington was the father of his country" predicates an abstract of a percept. Such

judgments may be regarded as mathematical equations, wherein neither term can be said to have extension or intension. All the notions that the mind can form fall into one of these three classes, yet they may also be mixed together; especially may the same word be both abstract and concept, as virtue is an abstract primarily, but afterward comes to denote a class, becoming a concept, as when we speak of the virtues, justice, temperance, etc.

Judgments may then be divided into two classes: 1. That wherein the agreement is that of identity or equality; and 2. Where there is a joint agreement of extension and intension Hamilton's U is there accepted with this limitation, while his Y, y, and w are discarded.

The author admits Hamilton's principle, that whatever is contained implicitly in spontaneous thought should be unfolded explicitly in logical forms, but denies with Trendelenberg that this leads to the "thorough-going quantification of the predicate." Much of our thinking is in intension, (comprehension, depth,) and here the quantity of the predicate is, of course, unthought of. To use Trendelenberg's illustration and application, (Logische Untersuchungen, ii, 204,) when we say, "Man is responsible," we mean that man has the attribute responsibility, without thinking whether there are other responsible beings or not. To say, "All men are all the responsible," is to say that man has this attribute, and that no other being has it—that is, it is combining two judgments in one, a synthesis rather than an analysis. There is, then, no propriety in using the sign of mathematical equality to express the joint agreement of extension and intension.

Still further, Dr. M'Cosh shows that Hamilton is guilty of an ambiguity in the use of "all." "It is clear, that when we say simply, 'All men are rational,' we mean (when the judgment is explicated in extension) that every one man, every one in the class man, is in the class rational. But, if we have further found that every rational being is in the class man, we are entitled to say, 'All men are all rational.' But what do we mean when we say so? The terms, it appears to us, are no longer general, standing for each and every one of a class; we do not mean, Every one man = all rational,' nor 'Every one man every rational.' The word 'all' does not now mean 'every one,' but the whole collectively. The meaning, in fact, now is, 'The whole class men the whole class rational.' If so, the terms are not general, applicable to each and every one of an indefinite number, but singular, with a process of abstraction involved." Pp. 101, 112. FOURTH SERIES, VOL. XXII.-30

=

Upon these points we think that Dr. M'Cosh's criticism of Hamilton must be accepted as thorough and decisive.

Yet we cannot clearly make out what is our author's idea of the logical judgment. Here he seems to agree wholly with Mill, yet we are unwilling to believe that such is the fact. He says nothing whatever of the valuable Kantian distinction between judgments logical and psychological, but, having defined the notion as the object apprehended by the mind, he defines the judgment as the comparison of two objects of mental apprehension, being careful to say that he does not mean thereby two mental states, but objects apprehended. But certainly the external objects are not in the mind to be compared. When we assert, Alexander was ambitious,' we have not the man Alexander in our minds, for he died some years ago; we have a notion 'Alexander,' and a notion ambitious,' two mental states, which we compare and assert to agree. But we do more than this: we also assert the existence of objective realities corresponding to the percept Alexander' and the abstract ambitious.' Here, then, are two judgments, the first logical, and the second psychological, united in one proposition. The first simply asserts agreement between the mental states, the second asserts the existence of objective realities corresponding to the notions. In discursive thought we use nothing but notions or mental states; but in speech, when judgments are put into language, we refer to the objects of possible intuition which the notions represent. We do not understand why the author, by thus making no reference to a distinction that must be familiar to him, seems to coincide entirely with Mill in the analysis of the judgment.

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The book is highly readable, not needlessly technical, the recondite discussions being dropped into finely-printed paragraphs so that they can be omitted if desirable. The author uses abundant illustrations, discarding diagrams, occasionally affording us glimpses through long vistas of practical thought, or leading us up to the edge of speculative deeps, which suggest that our guide has a comprehensive view of adjacent regions, to which he might conduct us if he would.

N.

Annual of Scientific Discovery; or, Year-Book of Facts in Science and Art, for 1870. Exhibiting the most important Discoveries and Improvements in Mechanics, Useful Arts, Natural Philosophy, Chemistry, Astronomy, Geology, Biology, Botany, Mineralogy, Meteorology, Geography, Antiquities, etc. Together with Notes on the Progress of Science during the year 1869; a list of recent Scientific Publications; Obituaries of eminent Scientific Men, etc. Edited by JOHN TROW

BRIDGE, S. B., Assistant Professor of Physics in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; aided by SAMUEL KNEELAND, M.D., Professor of Zoology and Physiology in the Institute, and W. R. NICHOLS, Graduate of the Institute. 12mo., pp. 354. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. London:

Trübner & Co. 1870.

Three great events are specified in the introductory notes by the Editor of the Scientific Annual, as distinguishing the year 1869, in the great department of international intercourse-the Suez Canal, the Pacific Railroad, and the French Cable. Railroad construction is improving, both in new forms of cars, and the introduction of steel as the material for rails. This last improvement is a great securer of safety, and from the durability of material, in the long run the cheapest. When the telegraph, now being rapidly laid from St. Petersburgh to the mouth of the Amoor, is completed, but a narrow marine link is needed to complete the circuit of the globe. Steam and electricity will rapidly revolutionize Asia.

The celebrated chemist, Dumas, in his lecture on Faraday, makes some statements justifying our refusal to accept the assertions of many physicists, that chemistry can account for all the phenomena of life:

The existing chemistry is all powerful in the circle of mineral nature, even when its processes are carried on in the heart of the tissues of plants or of animals, and at their expense; but she has advanced no further than the chemistry of the ancients in the knowledge of life and in the exact study of living matter; like them, she is ignorant of the mode of generation.

The chemist has never manufactured any thing which, near or distant, was susceptible even of the appearance of life. Every thing he has made in his laboratories belongs to "brute" matter; as soon as he approaches life and organization he is disarmed.

These statements very conclusively check the sanguine words of a note to Professor Barker's lecture, elsewhere noticed: "The chemist is capable of producing from carbonic acid and water a whole host of organic bodies, and we see no reason to question his ultimate ability to reproduce all animal and vegetable principle whatsoever." Perhaps he may yet put up a sign on his laboratory door reading, "Horses and men made to order."

Dr. Carriere, of Jean du Gard, gives the following very simple method of ascertaining actual death:

Place the hand, with the fingers closely pressed one against the other, close to a lighted lamp or candle; if alive, the tissues will be observed to be of a transparent, rosy hue, and the capillary circulation in full play; if, on the contrary, the hand of a dead person be placed in the same relation to light, none of these phenomena are observed-we see a hand as of marble, without circulation, without life.

Professor Owen substitutes, in place of Darwin's Natural Selection, a new doctrine of Derivation of one species from another by primordial law:

Professor Owen, like Lamark and Darwin, rejects the principle of direct or miraculous creation, and recognizes a "natural law, or secondary cause," as operative in the production of species "in orderly succession and progression." To Cuvier's objection, that, if the existing species are modifications, by slow degrees, of extinct ones, the intermediate forms ought to be found, he replies, that many missing links in the paleontological series have been found since 1830. He gives several examples of these modifications, and dwells specially on hipparion, and the other forms between the fossil palæotherium and the present genus equus.

The difference between Natural Selection and Derivated is thus stated:

Species owe as little to the accidental concurrence of environing circumstances, as Cosmos depends on a fortuitous concourse of atoms. A purposive route of development and change, of correlation and interdependence, manifesting intelligent will, is as determinable in the succession of races, as in the development and organization of the individual. Generations do not vary accidentally, in any and every direction, but in pre-ordained, definite, and correlated courses.

"Derivation" holds that every species changes, in time, by virtue of inherent tendencies thereto. "Natural Selection" holds that no such change can take place without the influence of altered circumstances educing or selecting such change.

"Derivation" sees among the effects of the innate tendency to change, irrespective of altered surrounding circumstances, a manifestation of creative power in the variety and beauty of the results; and, in the ultimate forth-coming of a being susceptible of appreciating such beauty, evidence of the preordaining of such relation of power to the appreciation. "Natural Selection" acknowledges that if ornament or beauty, in itself, should be a purpose in creation, it would be absolutely fatal to it as an hypothesis.

"Natural Selection" sees grandeur in the view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms, or into one. "Derivation" sees therein a narrow invocation of a special miracle, and an unworthy limitation of creative power, the grandeur of which is manifested daily, hourly, in calling into life many forms, by conversion of physical and chemical into vital modes of force, under as many diversified conditions of the requisite elements to be so combined.

"Natural Selection" leaves the subsequent origin and succession of species to the fortuitous concurrence of outward conditions. "Derivation recognizes a purpose in the defined and preordained course, due to innate capacity or power of change, by which homogeneously created protozoa have risen to the higher forms of plants and animals.

Mental Philosophy: Embracing the three Departments of the Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will. By THOMAS C. UPHAM, D. D., Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy in Bowdoin College, Member of the Academy of Metaphysical and Ethical Sciences, Author of "Esthetic and Moral Letters," "The Interior Life," "Divine Union," etc. In two volumes. Volume I, The Intellect, with an Appendix on Language. Volume II., The Sensibilities and Will. 12mo., pp. 561, 705. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1869. This is a new edition, revised, but not largely altered, of a work published more than thirty years ago, well known to metaphysical scholars, and extensively used in our higher seminaries and colleges. Though written in the modest style, and perhaps a little too fluid and diffuse, it has hardly been surpassed by any manual of complete psychology. There was no little originality in the work, for which the able author seems hardly to have received due credit, from the fact that its advanced views infused