tion is an artificial, not a natural process; but if a ship is not so constructed that it will float and cut the waters, and so managed as to take advantage of the winds and other physical powers which can be used for impelling it, the navigator will effect nothing. In like manner, political laws and institutions, though they do not exist by nature, though they are contrived and established by man, must, if they are to attain the ends for which they are designed, be in accordance with the natural laws of society-those leges legum, which consist in the constitution of man, physical, moral, and intellectual. Government is an art, exercised in conformity with human nature: it must, in order even that a political society should exist, observe the conditions of human nature; and in proportion as those conditions are skilfully observed, and the end of the art (viz. the well-being of the community) is kept steadily in view, it will be more perfect in its structure.(25)

.

(25) With respect to the natural laws of society, which determine the construction of civil laws, as the physical laws determine works of art, see Cic. de Leg. i. 11-3; Stewart, Elements of the Phil. of the Human Mind, vol. i. c. 4; Say, Cours d'Economie Politique, tom. i. p. 2-6; Storch, Cours d'Economie Politique, tom. i. p. 13-4. Il n'y a point d'arbitraire dans la nature; tout est soumis à des lois invariables, les phénomènes de l'ordre moral comme ceux du monde physique. Il y a, donc, nécessairement un ordre naturel pour l'arrangement et l'étude des faits qui sont du domaine de la législation, comme pour les faits qui appartiennent à l'histoire naturelle.'-Comte, Traité de Législation, tom. i. p. 26; also, Aug. Comte, Cours de Phil. Pos.

Mr. Stewart, in the following passages of his Memoir of Adam Smith, clearly illustrates this acceptation of the word nature: The advantages which modern policy possesses over the ancient arise principally from its conformity, in some of the most important articles of political economy, to an order of things recommended by nature.'-p. 86; ed. 4to, 1811. I shall content myself with remarking, in general terms, that the great and leading object of his (Adam Smith's) speculations is to illustrate the provision made by nature in the principles of the human mind, and in the circumstances of man's external situation, for a gradual and progressive augmentation in the means of national wealth; and to demonstrate that the most effectual plan for advancing a people to greatness, is to maintain that order of things which nature has pointed out.' -P. 88.

Similar expressions occur in his Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind. Thus, in vol. i. p. 250, he says: In order to lay a solid foundation for the science of politics, the first step ought to be, to ascertain that form of society which is perfectly agreeable to nature and to justice. Again, the first supposition of the economical, as distinguished from the Utopian system, is, that 'the social order is, in the most essential

Nature, therefore, considered as the general expression for the laws of the world in which we live, is not inconsistent with political institution. Indeed, every political institution must, in order to perform its functions adequately, comply with the laws of human nature. In this sense, we must understand the saying of Socrates, who denounced the separation of nature from utility.(2) Every creation of man must, in order to be useful, conform with the conditions of humanity. But, as we have already shown, the principles which determine the goodness or badness of institutions, and which serve as the standard by which they are tried, are not universal and immutable. (2) In this

respects, the result of the wisdom of nature, and not of human contrivance.' -vol. i. P 250.

The following passage of M. Guizot contains a similar use of the word in question: Non seulement le gouvernement est nécessaire, mais il se forme tout naturellement. Je ne puis m'arrêter longtemps à expliquer comment le gouvernement naît et s'établit dans la société en général. Je me bornerai à dire que, lorsque les choses suivent leurs lois naturelles, quand la force ne s'en mêle pas, le pouvoir va aux plus capables, aux meilleurs, à ceux qui mèneront la société à son but. S'agit-il d'une expédition de guerre ? ce sont les plus braves qui prennent le pouvoir. L'association a-t-elle pour objet une recherche, une entreprise savante? le plus habile sera le maître. En tout, dans le monde, livré à son cours naturel, l'inégalité naturelle des hommes se déploie librement, et chacun prend la place qu'il est capable d'occuper.'-Histoire de la Civilisation en Europe, leçon 5.

Phrases of this sort ought properly to be restricted to the sense of nature, which expresses the aggregate conditions of human existence. There is, however, a tendency (as may be observed in some of the instances quoted) to go a step further, and to set up an arbitrary set of conditions, selected by the writer himself, to which he affixes the imposing title of 'nature.' Thus, Aristotle defines three forms of government, which he considers right' (opai), and three others which he regards as depravations of these. The latter, he lays it down, are contrary to nature' (Tapà púow): Pol. iii. 17, cf. 7. A bad form of government is, however, just as much in accordance with the laws of human nature as a good form of government, in the same manner that a hurricane, which devastates a country, is as much in accordance with the laws of physical nature as fine weather, which brings plenty.

(26) Jus igitur datum est omnibus; recteque Socrates exsecrari eum solebat, qui primus utilitatem a naturâ sejunxisset. Id enim querebatur caput esse exitiorum omnium.-Cic. de Leg. i. 12; compare De Off. iii. 3.

(27) See Aristot. Eth. Nic. v. 10. The following passages respecting the non-existence of universal principles of natural justice occur in the speech of Philus, in the third book of Cic. de Republică: Jus enim de quo quærimus, civile est aliquod, naturale nullum: nam si esset, ut calida et frigida, et amara et dulcia, sic essent justa et injusta eadem omnibus.' -iii. 8. 'At nec inconstantiam virtus recipit, nec varietatem natura

respect they differ from physical laws. Yet they admit of a scientific treatment, and an art may be founded on the science thus constructed.

$7 We have already adverted to the dictum, that 'human nature is always and everywhere the same,' and have shown in what sense this dictum is to be understood. (2) So far as the identity of human nature imposes identical conditions upon the practical problem of the legislator, we may expect to find that the solutions will be substantially identical. Hence are to be explained the close resemblances in the political institutions of remote countries, formed without mutual concert, 'and not derived from any common model.(29) In like manner we may explain the resemblance of wearing apparel, tools, arms, the products of the spindle and the loom, and other mechanical contrivances, in numerous and unconnected nations. Having similar wants, and being subjected to similar laws of nature, they have devised similar expedients.(30) If we were to take any work of human ingenuity, for example, a ship, we might parody the famous passage of Cicero, on the universality of law, () and say that there is one universal and invariable form of ship-that it floats on all waters

patitur; legesque pœnâ, non justitiâ nostrâ, comprobantur. Nihil habet igitur naturale ejus; ex quo illud efficitur, ne justos quidem esse naturâ.'lb. c. 11. It is to be observed, that these are the opinions, not of Cicero himself, but of Carneades, and are introduced only to be controverted.

(28) Above, ch. xv. § 4.

(29) Aristotle, in his Rhetoric, divides law into dios and Kowós, the former of which is the jus civile, the law peculiar to each state. The latter he defines thus: κοινὸν δὲ τὸν κατὰ φύσιν· ἔστι γάρ. ὃ μαντεύονται τι πάντες, φύσει κοινὸν δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον, κἂν μηδεμία κοινωνία πρὸς ἀλλήλους ᾖ μηδὲ συνθήκη.—i. 13, § 2.

(30) It is observable (says Dr. Johnson) that most nations, amongst whom the use of clothes is unknown, paint their bodies. Such was the practice of the first inhabitants of our own country. From this custom did our earliest enemies, the Picts, owe their denomination. As it is not probable that caprice or fancy should be uniform, there must be, doubtless, some reason for a practice so general and prevailing in distant parts of the world, which have no communication with each other.'-Life of Sir Francis Drake; Works, vol. vi. p. 347.

(31) Est quidem vera lex recta ratio, naturæ congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna. Huic legi nec abrogari fas est, neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet, neque tota abrogari potest. Nec vero aut per senatum aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus, neque est quærendus

7

L

-that it is impelled by every wind-that it is guided by the same steerage that its boats are urged by the same oars-that there is not one ship in the Mediterranean, and another in the Atlantic-that there was not one ship in the sixteenth, another in the nineteenth century; but that there is one invariable and allpervading ship, whose form has been predetermined by the laws of the universe. Descriptions of this sort, however, exaggerate the uniformity of the works of man, as well in government as in arts. The laws of human nature are immutable; but the operations of man vary according to circumstances. The conditions by which each problem is narrowed may serve to furnish a general type; but this type is reproduced under different forms: in its various manifestations, it is another and the same.' In order to represent political institutions as identical, it is necessary to confound the conditions of the problem with its solution; it is necessary to assume, that the laws of nature are identical with the products of human contrivance which are formed in subjection to those laws. (2) Politics, when properly understood, may, like other subjects whose matter is variable, receive a scientific treatment; but no benefit will arise from claiming for its theorems a universality which they do not possess, by means of a confusion which can only lead to error.

explanator aut interpres ejus alius, nec erit alia lex Romæ, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et omnes gentes et omni tempore una lex, et sempiterna et immutabilis, continebit, unusque erit communis quasi magister et imperator omnium Deus.'-De Rep. iii. 22; compare De Leg. ii. 4.

(32) Erat enim ratio profecta a rerum naturâ, et ad recte faciendum impellens, et a delicto avocans; quæ non tum denique incipit lex esse, cum scripta est, sed tum cum orta est. Orta autem est simul cum mente divinâ.' -Cic. de Leg. ii. 4. In this passage, the confusion between a political law, the creation of man-and the natural or divine laws, which are the conditions subject to which he acts, is very manifest. This confusion is still more apparent in the following passage of Montesquieu: Les êtres particuliers intelligents peuvent avoir des lois qu'ils ont faites; mais ils en ont aussi qu'ils n'ont pas faites. Avant qu'il y eût des êtres intelligents, ils étoient possibles; ils avoient, donc, des rapports possibles, et par consequent des lois possibles. Avant qu'il y eût des lois faites, il y avoit des rapports de justice possibles. Dire qu'il n'y a rien de juste ni d'injuste que ce qu'ordonnent ou défendent les lois positives, c'est dire qu'avant qu'on eût tracé le cercle, tous les rayons n'étoient pas égaux. Il faut, donc, avouer des rapports d'équité antérieurs à la loi positive qui les établit.'-Esprit des Lois, i. c. 1.

141

CHAPTER XIX.

ON THE ART OF POLITICS, AND THE FORMATION

WE

OF POLITICAL PRECEPTS.

E have, in two preceding chapters, considered the nature of political theory, and have inquired how far politics can be reduced into the form of a science. (1) We shall next approach one step nearer to practice, and treat of politics regarded as an art. For this purpose we must premise some general remarks, on the relation of art to science on the one hand, and to action on the other.

In the original acceptation of the word, the arts were merely the useful arts-those mechanical contrivances by which man operates upon external nature, and converts her powers and objects to his use. In this sense, the ancient poets say that all arts were given to mankind by Prometheus, who was considered as the universal civilizer, as the inventor of clothing, houses, ships, metallurgy, and other like appliances. (2) In the arts of this class, there is something made or manufactured; there is a certain physical or material product, which may be the subject of exchange, of sale and purchase. The artizan, in fact, creates nothing new, but he gives a new form, colour, size, or consistency to existing objects, and fashions them according to his will, by a proper employment of their natural properties; or, as in the case of agriculture or horticulture, he converts the powers of nature to his use. These are the operations of labour to which political economists have usually appropriated the name of productive, apparently upon the

(1) Ch. xv. and xviii.

(2) See Esch. Prom. 469, 477, 506. The word réx is applied to the trade of a shipwright, Iliad iii. 61; of a worker in metal, in Odyss. iii. 433; to the steering of a vessel, ib. v. 270. The word réxvn is connected with Teuxw, to make, to form-and with TíкTW, to beget, to bring forth.