pay the interest due to foreign bond-holders, and the finances of the Egyptian government were placed under the "dual control" of France and England. Although Ismail surrendered all his private estates valued at 100,000,000 francs, he was still unable to satisfy the demands of his creditors; and the Sultan was induced by foreign influence to depose him from his position and to put in his place his eldest son, Tufik Pasha. This occurred in 1879.

The new Khedive ruled only in name, the real administration being in the hands of the two foreign governments, France and England. The severe methods now adopted to restore the financial credit of Egypt, accompanied as they were by extensive retrenchments and burdensome taxes, were followed by a general uprising on the part of the army and the people, in an attempt to overthrow the existing régime. This revolt of 1881 was led by Arabi Pasha, the Egyptian minister of war and leader of the so-called "national party." The movement was primarily a military movement, and was an effort to put an end to the foreign influence in Egypt. France at this time saw fit to withdraw from the "dual control," and upon England alone was thrown the responsibility of suppressing the rebellion. The reduction of Alexandria by the fleet of Admiral Seymour and the defeat of Arabi's army by General Wolseley left England in 1882 the sole protector of European interests in Egypt. For the maintenance of public order and pending the settlement of the Egyptian question, the country was occupied by British forces and placed under the energetic supervision of Lord Cromer.

The question as to the justice or injustice of the British occupation is not relevant to our present dis

cussion. The fact exists that, by a sequence of events which seemed almost inevitable, the European interests in Egypt had been brought under the exclusive guardianship of Great Britain. And it is a question whether there was any other Power better fitted for the execution of this trust. England was as little responsible as any other country for the deplorable condition into which Egypt had been thrown. She was as interested as any other in restoring the financial credit of Egypt; and she was more concerned than any other country in maintaining public order and in protecting the water-route to the East. Although originally opposed to the construction of the Suez canal, it had become one of the conditions of her prosperity, and she had become one of the strongest advocates of its security and freedom. Her own interests in Egypt thus seemed in harmony with the commercial interests of the world. Gladstone said at this time (1882) "that Egypt having become the great gate between the East and the West it is essential for the industry and enterprise of mankind that the gate should be kept open." This opinion of Gladstone was the opinion of England, and indicates the purpose toward which English diplomacy was for six years directed.

That the British occupation of Egypt was intended originally to be merely temporary seems to be quite clear, from the immediate efforts of the British ministry to secure some efficient guarantee for the freedom of the canal after the occupation should cease. The first general diplomatic note on the subject after the suppression of Arabi's revolt in September, 1882, was written by Lord Granville in January, 1883. This note was addressed to the courts of France, Germany,

Austro-Hungary, Italy and Russia. It presented the English view of the situation, and brought the whole subject for the first time fairly within the field of diplomatic discussion.

It will, of course, be impossible for us to follow the special negotiations regarding this matter which, with many interruptions, extended from 1883 to 1888. But in looking at these discussions one cannot help being impressed with the difference in the method pursued by the diplomatists from that previously employed by the academicians. The members of the Institut having no power to create law, had sought to bring the facts of the case into harmony with the existing law. To them the only feasible method to protect the canal from hostile attack was to bring the territory under the existing law of "neutralization,"-which would mean that the canal should not be used in time of war for the passage of belligerent vessels. But this was precisely the position with which Great Britain could. not agree; in other words, the conservation of her own interests would not justify England in permitting the facts to be brought under the existing rules of law. The rules regarding neutralization which had previously been established for Belgium and Luxembourg could not be accepted as applying to the condition of things now existing in Egypt. Hence the present case was not one which could be settled by the simple method of juristic interpretation employed by the publicists.

The method of the diplomatists, on the other hand, was more akin to that of legislation—to establish a new rule of law to apply to the new condition of things, to modify the existing law of neutralization, so as not to infringe upon the interests and equitable

rights of Great Britain, in other words, to bring the law into harmony with existing facts. Considerations of this kind led Lord Granville to avoid the use of the word "neutralization" in his dispatch of January, 1883, and to suggest rules to fit the case in hand, whether already existing or not.

The rules suggested by Lord Granville involved: (1) the freedom of passage of all vessels under any circumstances; (2) the limitation of the time for which belligerent vessels might remain in the canal; (3) the prohibition of hostilities in the canal or its approaches; (4) the repairing of damages done by the vessels of war of any Power; (5) the forbidding of fortification on the canal, or in its vicinity; (6) the maintenance of the territorial rights of Egypt, as far as consistent with the above conditions; and (7) the authorization of Egypt to enforce the conditions imposed upon the transit of belligerent vessels.

It will be seen from this summary that the rules suggested by Lord Granville departed from the ordinary rules of neutralization (1) in permitting the transit of belligerent vessels in time of war and (2) in placing the guarantee of protection in the hands of the territorial power.

After these rules had been submitted to the Powers in 1883, the next important diplomatic step was the reference of the rules to an International Commission which convened at Paris in March, 1885. The States which were represented at this conference were Great Britain, France, Germany, Austro-Hungary, Russia and Italy, that is, the six great Powers-together with Holland, Turkey and Egypt. It is worthy of note that there was at this conference no difference of opinion as to the justice of the claim insisted upon by

Great Britain, namely the freedom of passage for all vessels in time of peace or war, whether neutral or belligerent. The chief point of divergence related to the mode in which this new form of so-called "neutralization" should be guaranteed-England insisting upon the territorial, and France upon an international guarantee. Neither of these methods, however, recognized the sovereignty of the Sultan, and hence exposed the treaty to the opposition of the Porte.

Another convention was accordingly signed in May, 1887, which provided that the canal should be watched over by the foreign diplomatic agents in Egypt, who in case of a threatened danger should report to the Khedive; that the Khedive should to the extent of his power enforce the canal regulations; and, that in case of his inability, he should appeal to the Sultan, who in turn should advise the Six Great European Powers. This complicated method might be regarded as primarily a territorial, but ultimately an international guarantee. After these negotiations the final convention, embodying the general principles just described, was ratified at Constantinople in October, 1888, by the Great Powers and by Turkey, Spain, and the Netherlands.

Such were some of the most important steps by which the Suez canal was brought within the field of European diplomacy, and apparently brought under a new international law relating to an artificial and navigable channel between two seas.

§ 6. BRITISH "Reservations" during the English OCCUPATION

From the facts which have just been narrated the conclusion would naturally be drawn that the Suez