benefit of the world. By abolishing her protectorate in Egypt she had effectively cancelled the reservation that had existed during her occupation; and hence her present position is precisely what it would have been had no reservation ever been made. No longer hampered by qualifying restrictions, it may be said, in conclusion, that the international status of the Suez canal is now indicated by the provisions contained in the Convention of Paris of 1885, and ratified by the Convention of Constantinople of 1888.

CHAPTER VI

INTERNATIONAL RIGHT OF WAY WITH REFERENCE TO THE OPENING OF THE PANAMA CANAL

THE policy of the United States, as shown in the speedy recognition of the Republic of Panama and the apparent pressure brought to bear to ensure the opening of a water-route between the Atlantic and the Pacific, was the occasion, at the time, of some doubt as to whether such a policy was entirely consistent with the principles of international law and international morality. That the end which this policy had in view was of transcendent importance to the commercial interests of the world, no one could for a moment deny. The question perhaps lingers in some minds today whether the greatness of the end could justify the use of immoral and illegal means for its attainment. But whether, as a matter of fact, immoral and illegal means were really used by the United States in promoting the interests of international commerce must be decided by an appeal, not simply to the judgment of individuals, but to the moral judgment of mankind, as that judgment is expressed in the accepted principles of international law and morality.

§ I. THE POLICY ADOPTED BY THE UNITED STATES

It must be evident to the most casual observer that the policy of the United States was not prompted solely by disinterested motives. Every advantage was apparently taken to further the commercial interests of this country and the world. The United States was under no obligation, even though the right existed, to recognize the revolutionary government of Panama so speedily as to make it appear premature, if not precipitant. If the commercial interests of the world had been opposed to such recognition, it would no doubt have been withheld. But as it seemed necessary to further the general interests of commerce, it was granted. The time had evidently come when greater facilities of transit across the Isthmus of Panama seemed necessary. The obstacle which Colombia interposed to the development of these general interests seemed to require a summary mode of procedure for the promotion of the common good. In the absence of any general international authority, the government of the United States, as the representative of the commercial interests of the world, took upon itself the right to carry into execution this summary process. To those who regarded the recognition of the new Republic as unjustifiable, this summary mode of procedure seems to have been an encroachment upon the territorial jurisdiction possessed by Colombia within her own lawful dominions. The question therefore arises: Did the necessity of a commercial canal across the Isthmus of Panama justify the use of such summary proceedings for the purpose of ensuring a canal? In other words, is the right of jurisdiction possessed by one country over its own territory quali

fied by the commercial rights or interests of other nations? Or, conversely, is there an international right of way which nations may justly claim under certain circumstances, over the territory of their neighbors.

For the solution of this question, we may appeal to (1) the analogies afforded by the positive law of different countries; (2) the opinions of the great text-writers on international law; (3) the authority of precedents embodied in international treaties and conventions; (4) the great expansion of the world's commerce which required a new line of transit; and (5) the concurrent judgment of civilized nations.

§ 2. THE ANALOGIES AFFORDED BY THE MUNICIPAL LAW

The appeal to the common or statute law of any particular country, or to any number of countries, cannot of course furnish any conclusive evidence of what constitutes a positive rule of international law. It can at most only indicate what has been the general sense of justice in determining similar relations between the individual members of society.

So far as these individual relations are analogous to those existing between states, the mode in which they are regulated may, perhaps, suggest to us what justice seems to require in the control of international relations. This consideration receives additional force. from the fact that international law, like the municipal law, is based upon the idea that nations, like individuals, are moral persons, who are amenable to each. other and to the community to which they belong. This consideration is still further strengthened by the

fact that in its historical development international law has derived a large part of its conceptions regarding the essential and conventional rights of nations from the civil rights of property and contract. The international law regarding national dominion is not only analogous to but, to a certain extent, derived from the civil law regarding individual property.

When we consider the civil right of property, and the extent to which this right may be restricted and qualified by the rights and interests of others, including the interests of the whole community, we may at least form some inferences as to how the right of dominion possessed by one nation should, according to the principles of justice, be restricted and qualified by the rights and interests of other nations, and of that community of nations of which each country forms a part. It is unnecessary to emphasize the various modes in which the rights of individual property are restricted and qualified by the fact that the individual is a member of a community having related rights and interests. The liability of individual property to taxation, to police restrictions, to the exercise of the right of eminent domain, is not due to the disposition on the part of the state or community to encroach unjustly upon the right of property, but rather to maintain the existing rights of the community, which are quite as essential and sacred as the rights of the individual.

It is, of course, easy to draw unwarrantable conclusions from the analogy between the right of individual property and the right of national dominion. The individuals of a community are under a common state authority, while the nations of the world are under no such coercive power. There is no sovereign