The bearing of these statements upon the character of a nation's policy may no doubt be readily seen. If the binding force of international law is to be judged by the extent that it receives the approval of civilized nations, then the justice of a nation's policy may be judged in the same way—that is, by the extent that it receives the approval of civilized nations. It must be admitted that the policy of a particular state may not always conform to the requirement demanded by international justice. A nation's policy may be the mere expression of the will or judgment of a single state, looking to its own advancement or its own interests. The spirit of nationality is no doubt one of the strongest motives that inspire the human race. It manifests itself in the emotion of patriotism, in the "love of the Flag" and often leads a people to ignore the welfare of other peoples. The policy of a government which takes account of its own interests without regard to the interests of others—which is stamped with the mark of selfishness and deceit― which uses the arts of diplomacy to infringe upon the rights of its neighbors-which seeks to live and not to let live-does not arouse the plaudits of the world.

But it is a matter of congratulation that the love of country is not always inconsistent with the love of humanity. There may be interests belonging to the world at large which may be espoused by a single people. When such a people takes upon itself the burden of advancing the cause of civilization, it assumes a responsibility that civilized nations are willing to acknowledge.

There are few world-interests of greater concern to the human race than the promotion of the world's

commerce, and the giving to all peoples freedom of access to the natural lines of commercial communication. Such was the aim of the United States in the case of Panama. The policy of the American government had for its ultimate end the commercial interests of mankind; and no personal considerations, or political intrigue, or legal devices could obscure this as its primary purpose. Having this purpose in view, it received the approval of civilized nations. Thus, to the policy of a single government was given in this case the same kind of sanction for its justification as that upon which the "Law of Nations" itself depends for its authority.

How this approval came to be given is a matter of history. The specific and primary end of the government's policy was, of course, the opening of a water-route across the American continent. It reached its crucial stage in the recognition of the new republic of Panama. It therefore remained for foreign powers to determine how far this new water-route and the recognition of this new republic involved the interests of other nations. The concrete problem thus presented to these powers was the question whether the recognition of the new republic should or should not be approved. As the facts with reference to this approval and the promptness with which it was accorded may not be clearly in mind, the following statement is made as a reminder of these facts: The United States recognized the Republic of Panama on November 14, 1903. There followed in rapid succession, in the same month of November-the recognition by France, China, Austria-Hungary and Germany. There succeeded in the following month of December, in the order here given-the recognition by

Denmark, Russia, Norway and Sweden, Belgium, Nicaragua, Peru, Cuba, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Costa Rica and Switzerland.

This list comprises seventeen nations of the world, including the six great powers of Europe. It is a question whether such an unanimous confirmation of a nation's policy was ever given in the same space of time. The remarkable concurrence of action on the part of the civilized nations of the world, whose combined sanction was the source of international law, was the authentic seal of approval upon the policy of the United States and vindicated, as nothing else could do, the international right of way across the Isthmus of Panama.

CHAPTER VII

THE SALE OF MUNITIONS OF WAR IN ITS RELATION TO THE LAW OF NEUTRALITY

THE subject of neutrality holds a large place in modern treatises on international law. The term "neutrality" always assumes the existence of a state of war; and refers to the status of those nations that are not engaged in the war. The law of neutrality in general includes the rights and duties of such nations. in their relation to the belligerent powers. It grants to the neutral nations the right of territorial inviolability against the hostile acts of either belligerent; it also imposes upon each neutral nation the duty of preventing its territory from being used for hostile purposes, and moreover imposes the duty of strict impartiality toward the belligerents. The law especially lays down the rules that must be observed by neutrals in naval warfare-rules that relate to the carrying of contraband goods; to the observance of a blockade; to the refraining from unneutral service; and to submitting to the right of visit and search by belligerents.

The special relation of the law of neutrality to the sale of munitions of war, which we are now considering, may perhaps be conveniently discussed by referring to: (1) the early theory of neutrality in the eighteenth century; (2) the American doctrine as followed during the first administration; (3) the devel

opment of a definite and permanent policy by the United States; (4) the distinction between the liability of neutral states and of neutral subjects; and (5) the questions arising as to the sale of munitions during the late war.

§ I. THE LAW OF NEUTRALITY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The law of neutrality, it may be well to say at the outset, is of comparatively modern origin. It seems that at the time of Grotius no attempt was made to lay down any general rules regarding the duty of neutrals toward belligerents. In his great work published in 1625 this eminent writer does not use the terms "neutrals" and "neutrality." He was also far from recognizing the modern rule of strict impartiality; and distinguished between the obligations of a neutral toward a belligerent waging a just war and one waging an unjust war. But a far more important distinction drawn by Grotius was that relating to the kind of goods belonging to a neutral which were liable to capture by a belligerent. In this he may be said to have laid the basis for the modern law of "contraband”—though he does not use this term. It must be observed that in the first class, which we call "absolute contraband," he includes munitions of war. It must also be observed that the restriction which he places upon the furnishing to a belligerent of articles in this class, is their liability to capture by the belligerent. He thus recognizes the fact that the prevention of the furnishing of munitions of war is a belligerent right and not a neutral duty.

It is to Vattel that we are indebted for the clearest