of this government in its earlier history regarding the sale of munitions of war by its citizens to belligerents, has continued to be the uniform policy of the United States. That this has, as a matter of fact, been the case will be evident from a reference to the following documentary proofs:

During the French invasion of Mexico the Mexican minister at Washington complained that the exportation, on French account, of military stores was permitted at New York. To this imputation Mr. Seward, then Secretary of State, replied: (December 15, 1862), "If Mexico shall prescribe to us what merchandise we shall not sell to French subjects, because it may be employed in military operations against Mexico, France must equally be allowed to dictate to us what merchandise we shall allow to be shipped to Mexico because it might be belligerently used against France. Every other nation which is at war would have a similar right, and every other commercial nation would be bound to respect it as much as the United States. Commerce in that case, instead of being free or independent, would exist only as the caprice of war." (Ibid., Vol. VII, p. 958.)

President Grant, in his neutrality proclamation of August 22, 1870, during the Franco-German War, expressly declared that: "All persons might law fully and without restriction, by reason of the aforesaid state of war, manufacture and sell within the United States arms and munitions of war and other articles ordinarily known ‘as contraband of war,' subject only to the risk of hostile capture on the high seas."

Secretary Bayard, in reply to a request made by the Haytian Minister at Washington, that the United States, on the strength of certain treaty stipulations,

specifying what articles should be regarded as contraband, should take steps to prevent the exportation of such articles of war to Hayti, said: "It is not unusual to find in the treaties of the United States specifications of what things should be regarded as contraband of war between the contracting parties. Such provisions, however, have never been held to bind either government to prevent its citizens from exporting such things to the other country under any circumstances whatever. The United States have uniformly maintained the position taken by Mr. Jefferson, as Secretary of State, that 'our citizens have always been free to make, vend and export arms.' (Ibid., Vol. VII, p. 964.)

In 1891 Secretary Blaine was informed by the Chilean Minister that an agent of certain insurgents in Chile had arrived in the city of New York for the purchase of arms and munitions of war; and the request was made to him that the shipment of such articles be prevented by the United States Government. To this request Mr. Blaine replied: "The laws of the United States on the subject of neutrality while forbidding certain acts to be done in this country which may affect the relation of hostile forces in foreign countries, do not forbid the manufacture and sale of arms or munitions of war. I am, therefore, at a loss to find any authority for attempting to forbid the sale and shipment of arms and munitions of war in this country, since such sale and shipment are permitted by our law. . . . In this relation it is proper to say that our statutes on that subject are understood to be in conformity with the law of nations, by which traffic in arms and munitions of war is permitted, subject to the belligerent right of

capture and condemnation." (Ibid., Vol. V, pp. 964, 965.)

A somewhat similar case occurred the next year in connection with Venezuela, while Secretary Foster was at the head of the Department of State. Mr. Foster had occasion to use almost the same language to the Venezuelan Minister that Mr. Blaine had used to the Chilean Minister. He said: "The sale of arms and munitions of war, even to a recognized belligerent, during the course of active hostilities, is not in itself a hostile act, although the seller runs the risk of capture and condemnation of his wares as contraband of war." (Ibid., Vol. VII, p. 965.)

Many other citations might be made from official documents similar in import to those given above. But special attention is called to the reply of Secretary John Hay to a complaint made by the Envoy Extraordinary of the Orange Free State to the effect that the English Government was drawing large supplies of material, contraband of war, from the United States. The reply of Mr. Hay is especially significant, not only because it agrees with the uniform. opinion of his predecessors, but because it refers to the authorities upon which he based his judgment as to the traditional policy of the United States, and its conformity to the principles of international law. Mr. Hay said: "I have the honor to quote from Kent's Commentaries (I, 142) concerning the well established doctrine as to the law of nations on this subject. Chancellor Kent said: 'It was contended. on the part of the French nation in 1796, that neutral governments were bound to restrain their subjects from selling or exporting articles contraband of war to the belligerent Powers. It was successfully shown

on the part of the United States that neutrals may lawfully sell at home to a belligerent purchaser, or carry themselves to the belligerent Powers contraband articles subject to the right of seizure in transit. . . . The right has since been explicitly declared by the judicial authorities of this country.' Mr. Justice Story in the case of The Santissima Trinidad (7 Wheaton 340), used the following language: 'There is nothing in our laws or in the law of nations that forbids our citizens from sending armed vessels as well as munitions of war to foreign ports for sale. It is a commercial adventure which no nation is bound to prohibit, and which only exposes the persons engaged in it to the penalty of confiscation.' In the case of The Bermuda, Chief Justice Chase said: 'Neutrals in their own country may sell to belligerents whatever belligerents may choose to buy. The principal exception to this rule is that neutrals must not sell to one belligerent what they refuse to sell to another.' . . . An examination of Wharton's Digest of International Law (section 391), will make it clear that the executive departments of this government from the earliest period have maintained the correctness of the doctrine stated by Chancellor Kent and that, in this position, they have been supported by the decisions of the courts of the United States, and by the opinions of eminent authorities on international law.'" (Ibid., Vol. VII, pp. 969, 970.)

From these excerpts from official documents, it appears that the Government of the United States from the beginning of its history has uniformly held to the doctrine, as consistent with international law, that no neutral nation is under obligation to prohibit the sale of munitions of war to a belligerent Power, but

that the penalty for such an act, so far as a penalty is sought, rests entirely in the hands of the offended belligerent. The prevention of the sale and transportation of munitions is, therefore, recognized in international law as a belligerent right, and not as a neutral duty.

§ 4. LIABILITY OF NEUTRAL STATES AND OF NEUTRAL SUBJECTS

The foregoing statements are sufficient to show that the law of neutrality, as understood by the United States, draws a clear distinction between the liability of a neutral state and the liability of the private citizens of that state. This does not mean that a neutral state, in its corporate capacity, is under no obligations to a belligerent Power. On the contrary, a large part of the law of neutrality, in fact, deals with such obligations. A neutral state, as a state, is obliged by international law not to permit other states to use its territory as a field for military operations, or a basis for the fitting out of military expeditions, or a place for the enlistment of troops. A neutral government, as a government, is also under obligations not to exercise its corporate authority for the benefit of either belligerent in the way of furnishing supplies or the loaning of money. It is evident that the relief of neutral subjects from liability to their own government for the carrying of contraband does not relieve the neutral state itself from its own obligation to other states.

It should also be kept in mind, what seems entirely obvious, that international law lays down the duties which states owe to other states, and not the