As a result of this connivance of the British consul, eight corsair vessels were let loose to plunder American shipping. For all these acts and depredations England was held directly responsible. From this time the question of our foreign relations-especially the British restrictions laid upon our commerce, and the repeated aggression by Great Britain upon our neutral rights— became the most conspicuous features in American politics, the parties being divided by their British and anti-British sympathies. § 4. THE CONGRESSIONAL TREND TOWARD RETALI ATION Whatever doubts may have already existed as to the actual restrictions imposed upon American commerce, were set at rest by the long-expected report (dated Dec. 13, 1793) of Mr. Jefferson, who had been authorized, as we have seen, by Congress to make such a report. While this report dispelled doubts by revealing facts, these facts were decidedly disparaging to the British policy; and the conclusions of Mr. Jefferson pointed unmistakably to the duty of retaliation. The report showed, for example: (1) that a few unimportant articles, such as bar-iron, of which we did not produce enough for our own use, were admitted. into the British ports free of duty; (2) that our tobacco and rice paid heavy duties; (3) that our salted fish, bacon, whale-oils, grains, meals and breadstuffs, were either prohibited or under prohibitive duties; (4) that our ships, even though purchased and used by British merchants, were not permitted to be used in their trade with us; and (5) that the navigation laws of England bore with special hardship upon our com merce. Such being the restrictions imposed upon American commerce, as shown by Jefferson's report, the question now arose in Congress how these restrictions should be met? There were but two answers: either by friendly arrangements by which, in the minds of some, they might possibly be removed; or else, in the minds of others, by the acts of our own legislature to counteract their disastrous effects. The former method was preferable; but it had been found to be futile. The latter, though less desirable, would in the present crisis be found possibly the more effectual. “In the commerce of the world," to use the language of Mr. Jefferson's report, "if particular nations, instead of relying upon the enterprise and activity of their own citizens, grasp at undue shares, especially if they seize on the means of the United States to convert them into aliment for their own strength, and withdraw them entirely from the support of those to whom they belong, defensive and protective measures become necessary on the part of the nation whose marine resources are thus invaded." (Wait's State Papers, Vol. I, pp. 343 seq., for "Jefferson's Report.") But it was for Congress to determine how far the report of the Secretary of State should be accepted as indicating the policy of the government. The mind of Congress became evident when a body of resolutions was introduced in the House of Representatives by Mr. Madison (Jan. 30, 1794). The purpose of these resolutions was to carry into effect the recommendations contained in Jefferson's report. Mr. Madison was heartily in favor of the policy of retali ation. He had already, as far back as 1789, advocated such a principle in the first tariff law; and, although he was not then successful, he was now fully in accord with the policy outlined by Mr. Jefferson. The resolutions submitted by Madison were based upon the general principle to discriminate against all nations not in commercial alliance with the United States, imposing special duties upon all articles manufactured by such nations; and also to retaliate upon those nations whose navigation laws operated unfavorably to the United States. Though no particular nation was named, one enthusiastic member insisted that honesty demanded that the name of "Great Britain" be inserted in the resolutions. Mr. The debate that followed in the House showed the attitude of the two parties. The chief leaders in this debate were Mr. Smith of South Carolina, and Mr. Madison of Virginia. Mr. Smith represented the opinions of Hamilton against the resolutions. Madison represented the opinions of Jefferson in their favor. In Hamilton and Jefferson the extreme British and anti-British sympathies seemed to be personified. Hamilton had been charged with undue sympathy with England and with a desire to introduce her monarchical institutions into this country; while Jefferson had been reproached with undue sympathy with France and with a desire to employ the power of this country against England, the great enemy of France. Both of these charges were, no doubt, greatly exaggerated. But still the followers of Hamilton were, in the main, opposed to the policy of discrimination and of retaliating against England; while the followers of Jefferson were equally strenuous in favor of such a policy. Mr. Smith, who was evidently the spokesman of Hamilton in this debate, claimed that there was nothing in our existing commercial relations to afford any special ground for complaint against Great Britain any more than against France. If the British system was less favorable to our navigation, it was more favorable in other respects. England consumes more of our products than does France, and is hence a better customer with whom to deal. If we discriminate against Great Britain, she will surely retaliate against us; and we will be drawn into a war for which we are poorly prepared. Mr. Madison, on the other hand, denied that our commercial relations with England were as favorable as those with France; and claimed that they tended to discourage our domestic manufactures, and to injure materially our foreign trade. The debates on the Madison resolutions continued in the House for nearly a month with great vigor and ability displayed on either side, and with results decidedly in favor of a retaliatory policy. The first resolution, asserting the general policy of discrimination, was carried (Feb. 3, 1794) by a vote of fifty-one to forty-six. The discussion of the remaining resolutions was postponed until March "to await the progress of events." But these remaining resolutions never came to a vote. In the meantime other unfriendly acts on the part of Great Britain were brought to the attention of the American people which seemed to demand more radical measures of redress than those proposed in the Madison resolutions. During the previous debates the possibilities and dangers of war had been frequently mentioned; but the new encroachments of England seemed to make war inevitable. (For the debates on Madison's resolutions, see "An nals of Congress" 1794, which are condensed by Hildreth, Hist. of U. S., IV, 459-476.) The new complications which now appeared to interrupt the passage of the Madison resolutions, and which rendered our commercial relations with England not only unsatisfactory but well-nigh intolerable, were due to "the vexations and spoliations committed on American commerce." The President had already informed Congress that such depredations were reported; but no proofs had then appeared. Trustworthy information was now received that American vessels in the West Indies had actually been seized and condemned by the British authorities. The policy of England was clearly revealed in the British "Orders in Council" and in the instructions issued to British cruisers. In order to create a famine in France, it was found that the Pitt ministry had in the previous year (June, 1793) instructed English cruisers to detain all neutral vessels bound to France with cargoes of provisions, upon offering due payment for the same. A later instruction (November, 1793) ordered the detention of all vessels laden with the produce of any French colony, or carrying any supplies for the use of such colony. It is not necessary to enumerate the various ways in which these restrictions tended to embarrass and despoil American commerce. They were regarded by Congress as infringements upon the neutral rights that Americans claimed as their peculiar possession. It now remained for Congress to find some means to redress the wrongs that were being inflicted upon us by a foreign power. In view of the neutral attitude. that the United States had observed, from the first, the policy of Great Britain seemed especially irritat |