(1) The executive branch consists of a Governorgeneral who represents the Crown, assisted by an executive council, appointed by the governor-general, as an advisory body; and a ministry of not more than ten persons having charge of the various departments of state, appointed by the governor-general, and holding that office theoretically during his pleasure, but practically as long as they receive the support of the legislature.

(2) The legislative branch, called the Parliament, consists of a Senate and a House of Assembly. The Senate is composed of eight senators nominated by the governor-general and eight chosen by each of the four colonies-all senators being nominated or chosen for a term of ten years. The House of Assembly is composed of 121 representatives, apportioned according to the population, and elected for a term of five years. In case of a deadlock between the two houses, provision is made for the calling of a joint session of both houses.

(3) The judicial branch consists of a Supreme court, divided into two branches, namely, the Appellate division of the Supreme court having jurisdiction throughout the South African Union; and what are called provincial divisions of the Supreme court, which are the continuations of the previous colonial Supreme courts, having jurisdiction within their respective provinces.

(4) In respect to the local government, we find the greatest departure from the federal systems of Canada and Australia. In South Africa the previous colonial governors and legislatures are superseded by an entirely new local system. In place of the colonial governor is an executive officer called the "administrator

of the province," who is appointed by the governorgeneral in council for a term of five years, and who acts as the administrative agent of the central government. In place of the previous colonial assemblies with their two houses, is now established in each province a single provincial council, the members of which are elected by the qualified voters of the province, but the powers of which are restricted to the passing of ordinances upon certain specified matters, subject to the approval of the governor-general in council. By these provisions the local governments become subordinate parts of the centralized government of the union. (For the text of the British North America Act, 1867; of the Australia Constitution Act, 1900; and of the South Africa Act, 1909; see Supplement to the American Journal of International Law, January, 1910.)

The main difficulty which presented itself in the adoption of the new constitution was due not to its non-federal features; but rather with the provisions of the law relating to the color question and the electoral franchise. In one province, Cape Colony, there was no color line. The white man and the black man enjoyed the same political rights. In all the other provinces, namely, the Orange River Colony, the Transvaal and Natal, the color line was strictly drawn. In the constitution of the Union, it was provided that no person could be a member of parliament who was not a British subject of European descent. By acceding to this provision Cape Colony yielded her claims to those of the other colonies.

When, however, it came to making a uniform law relating to the qualifications of those who might vote for members of Parliament, the case presented greater

difficulties. If Cape Colony should now yield to the prejudices of the other colonies, she would be obliged to disfranchise a part of her own population-which she refused to do. If, on the other hand, the other colonies should yield to the Cape, they would be compelled to abandon the color line-which they also refused to do.

This political difficulty could only be settled by a compromise. It was hence provided that the qualifications for the parliamentary franchise should be prescribed by the Parliament itself, on the condition that no person then possessing the colonial franchise in Cape Colony should be disqualified, except by a two-thirds majority of the total number of the members of both houses sitting in joint session. This example illustrates the patience and skill exercised by the makers of the new constitution in overcoming what seemed to be insuperable obstacles.

The union of British South Africa under a single government was looked upon by English statesmen as an achievement of the greatest importance, and as the solution of what was long regarded as a "political riddle." Lord Crewe said that it is "a measure which closes one chapter in the history of South Africa and begins a new one." Mr. Balfour enthusiastically called it "the most wonderful issue out of all those divisions, controversies, battles and outbreaks-the horrors of war, the devastations of peace. I do not believe," he exclaims, "the world shows anything like it in its whole history." This may be extravagant praise, but it shows the British appreciation of this work of political art. When the proposed constitution, with its nice adjustment of compromises, was laid before the British parliament, a few liberals were bold

enough to suggest some criticisms upon its color scheme, but no one ventured to touch it with his ruthless hand, lest it might fall into fragments and the magic creation disappear.

The great significance of the South African Union consists in the fact that it is a new evidence of the growing diplomatic wisdom which the British government has shown in respect to the political rights and claims of its subjects; moreover, that it is a constitution made practically by the people themselves, who have thus proved their capacity to exercise political powers; and, finally, that it affords a new bond of union between the different part of the British empire, and constitutes a new guarantee of British loyalty.

CHAPTER IX

THE GROWTH OF THE CONCERT OF EUROPE: THE INTERNATIONAL POLICY OF INTERVENTION

THERE is no lover of the human race who does not deplore the fact of war. While the patriotic instinct inspires us to support our country in defense of its rights and in upholding its honor, no humane person can repress the feeling of pain and distress when he realizes that the world has advanced so little in civilization as not to be able to find some way to settle international disputes without the shedding of blood.

But in spite of this dissatisfaction, we must confess that, as things now are, rights when they are assailed can be maintained, as a last resort, only by some form of force. It also seems evident that as long as states are isolated and independent of one another, the exercise of force on the part of one against the resistance presented by another, is apt to be uncertain in its results and wasteful of human life. Isolation is weakness. It then becomes a pertinent question whether by a combination of states there may not be developed a united force sufficiently formidable to destroy the hope of resistance, and thus to promote the enforcement of international justice. This question has been made the subject of discussion by philosophical thinkers, by practical statesmen and eminent

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