the Seven Years' War, which was closed by the Peace of Paris in 1763-against the maritime pretensions of England which resulted in the "Armed Neutrality” of 1780—and still later, against the ambitious policy and conquests of the First Napoleon, culminating in the reconstruction of Europe at the Congress of Vienna in 1815.

The question may arise as to the justice involved in this theory of the balance of power. The leading publicists of Europe-assuming as the governing principle of international law, the absolute independence and sovereignty of nations-have hesitated to admit this theory as a part of the positive law of nations, but are inclined to accept it as a principle of morality and justice. Grotius, while denying that it is proper to restrain the legitimate growth and expansion of another power, treats the right of self-defense as a just cause of war, and hence would justify the combination of weaker states against the unjust aggression of a more powerful neighbor, as a means of selfprotection. Pufendorf thinks that mere fear caused by the expansion of a neighboring state is not a legitimate reason for war, unless there is a moral certainty of evil designs against other powers. Vattel condemns the idea of international equilibrium as a means of equalizing the power of different states, which he regards as practically impossible; but he regards the principle as furnishing a proper remedy against unjust and actual aggression. The distinguished American publicist, Henry Wheaton, sees no limit to the right of a state to aggrandize itself by all innocent and legitimate means; but when the aggrandizement must cause direct injury to other states it ceases to be justifiable. Thus, while there may be

a doubt whether or not the theory has been incorporated into positive law, there is no doubt that it is recognized as a just principle of international policy.

The benefits which may be accredited to this principle may be seen by a review of some of its results. Although it did not prevent war, it has evidently justified only wars of defense, and not wars of aggression and conquest. Moreover, the combinations and alliances which it has inspired and the treaty stipulations made under its influence, have tended to preserve the custom of concerted action and the spirit of co-operation which was first formally recognized by the Peace of Westphalia. It is true that the various diplomatic assemblies which met during this period were not made up of a single and permanent body of representatives; but they were yet influenced, to a great extent, by a common consensus of opinion which guided their deliberations and affected their discussions; and this general consensus of opinion may be looked upon as forming the basis of the "old concert of Europe."

The chief defect of the theory of international equilibrium was besides its possible perversion in the futile attempt to equalize the power of different nations,—the fact that it sought to accomplish the equally futile purpose, namely, to stabilize the territorial limits of the different states of Europe. The rise of new states and the colonial expansion of the existing states, rendered it practically impossible to fix a status quo which could be permanent. The growth as well as the decline of nations is inevitable. It is impossible for the wisest of men to forecast the future. Of international life it may be said, as of all life, that while "it is true in transition, it becomes false if fixed."

§ 2. THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA AND THE CONCERT OF EUROPE

Since the Peace of Westphalia there has probably been no diplomatic assemblage of greater importance than that which met in 1814 and finished its labors in 1815, and is known as the Congress of Vienna. This congress had for its primary purpose the recovery of Europe following the destructive wars of Napoleon. It also sought, like its predecessors, to frame the basis of a permanent peace. Its distinctive character, however, is seen in the new method adopted to secure this peace. While the previous assemblies had recognized the right of the weaker powers to combine in order to resist the aggression of the greater powers, the new Congress recognized the right of the greater powers to combine in order to control the affairs of the weaker powers.

How the great monarchical powers came to assume the combined authority in European affairs will appear when one considers the international situation between the years 1789 and 1815. The two great outstanding events and most disturbing factors of this period had their origin in France,—namely, the spread of democratic ideas due to the French Revolution, and the threatened dismemberment of the international system due to the extension of the French Empire under Napoleon.

In their intense hatred of the "ancient regime," with its aristrocratic and monarchical system, the French people sought for deliverance in the principles of democracy. They found their slogan in the words, "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity." They found their justification in the French philosophy of the eighteenth

century. They directed their attacks, not only against their own monarchy, but against all the monarchies of Europe. By the execution of their own king, Louis XVI, in 1793 they aroused the active hostility of the neighboring states. This hostility was not diminished, but rather intensified by the ambitious policy of the First Napoleon. The positive encroachments upon the existing European system led to the alliance of the leading powers-England, Russia, Austria and Prussia -not only for the overthrow of the aggressor, but for the reconstruction of the territorial map of Europe,

The Congress of Vienna was therefore called by these Allied powers, which assumed control over all its deliberations. The Congress was, it is true, made up of the representatives of nearly all of the continental states. It exceeded in magnificence and display all previous assemblies. In its social functions it excited the admiration of all its participants, but in its political and diplomatic functions it was confined to the leading powers. Indeed, judging from its proceedings, it can hardly be called a "congress" in the ordinary sense. There was no formal exchange of credentials, nor any formal opening of the body. There were no general sessions of all the representatives. There were, it is true, many treaties formed. between various states in the so-called "committees," but all these arrangements were subject to the approval of the Great Powers. The general principle adopted by the Congress, so far as any such principle is evident, was professedly that of "legitimacy"—that is, the restoration to the various states of the possessions they had held before the Revolution of 1789. But this principle was by no means strictly adhered to, especially on the part of the chief powers, who often

despoiled the weaker states for their own benefit. And even among the chief powers themselves there seemed to be no common motive, except that of self-interest. To one who reads the proceedings of this body of diplomats, it appears like a general scramble for territorial possessions, animated by the spirit of intrigue and resulting in bickering compromises. In the words of a distinguished observer, the chief aim of the Congress "was to divide among the conquerors the spoils taken from the vanquished." (See Gentz, “On the Vienna Congress," in the Memoirs of Metternich, Vol. I, pp. 253-286.)

The long peace which followed this Congress was due more to the general exhaustion resulting from the Napoleonic wars than to any provisions of the Congress itself. Without attempting to trace the resulting boundary lines between the different European states, it is more revelant to our present purpose to indicate how the chief powers of the Congress of Vienna became the Great Powers of the new "Concert of Europe." The Congress of Vienna concluded its labors in what is known as the "Final Act of June 9, 1815." Subsequent to this "Final Act" there were formed between the chief allied powers two supplementary agreements, which were of great significance in the future history of Europe. The more famous. and less important of these agreements was the socalled "Holy Alliance." It was formed (September 26, 1815) at the pious suggestion of the Tsar Alexander I, between Russia, Austria and Prussia, to which other powers were invited to join. This so-called Alliance was scarcely more than a passive concurrence, on the part of its members, with the idealistic scheme of the Tsar, in the statement of his personal opinion