phase of the Eastern problem. After much negotiation a treaty was finally framed at London in 1840, between these powers and Russia (in which France took no part) which resulted in quelling the ambition of Mehemet Ali, and the temporary pacification of the East.

It has been said that "the conclusion of the struggle of 1840 marked with great definiteness the real position which the Ottoman empire was henceforth to occupy in relation to the Western world. Rescued by Europe at large from the alternative of destruction at the hands of Mehemet Ali or complete vassalage to Russia, the Porte entered upon the condition nominally of an independent state, but really of a state existing under the protection of Europe."

The policy which Russia had adopted from 1832 to 1840 had met with signal failure, on account of the opposition of the Western powers, but especially through the diplomacy of England. The Tsar became convinced that the policy of befriending the Sultan was a policy without recompense, and that the Greek cross would never shine from the dome of Saint Sophia as the long as the powers of Europe were united against him. It was evidently better to conciliate the Powers than to conciliate the Porte; and of the Powers the sympathy of England was the most desirable.

Accordingly, in 1844 the Tsar Nicholas paid a friendly visit to London. He believed that he would find in Lord Aberdeen, the English foreign secretary, a trusty co-adjutor, on account of the latter's devotion to Russia in the Napoleonic wars. It was to Lord Aberdeen that Nicholas first characterized Turkey as the "sick man" whose estate should properly fall into the hands of England and Russia. Nicholas was evi

dently impressed with the notion that England could be purchased by a division of spoils. Nine years afterward he dangled before the eyes of Sir Hamilton Seymour, the English ambassador to St. Petersburg, the same image of the "sick man," suggesting that the time had come for a clear understanding in regard to a partition of the inheritance. But England declined to enter into any schemes based upon the division of the Ottoman empire; for this empire was, so far as had yet been discovered, the only bulwark against the encroachments of Russia, and of securing to England her route to the East.

But if England could not be reached by motives of robbery, perhaps she could be appealed to as a Christian. England and France had been the allies of Russia in rescuing the Christian Greek from the cruel Turk. They ought certainly not to object to Russia's acting the part of a protector to the Christian communities throughout the Turkish domain. In assuming the attitude of guardian of her fellow Christians, it is perhaps difficult to disentangle those motives of Russia which were based upon humanity and those based upon policy. But it is quite certain that by becoming the protector of the Christian communities she would obtain the right of interfering with the internal government of Turkey, which was a necessary step toward the disintegration of the Ottoman empire and the possession of Constantinople. At least this was the view of England and France. (Cambridge Modern History, Vol. XII, ch. 14, “The Ottoman Empire and the Balkan Peninsula," by Wm. Miller.)

Taking advantage of a controversy respecting the guardianship of certain "holy places" in Palestine (which had been raised by France), Russia demanded

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of Turkey not only her ancient rights over the sacred spots in Jerusalem, but also the right to guarantee the protection of all the Christian subjects throughout the Turkish dominions. Upon the refusal of Turkey to grant the latter demand the Russian armies were dispatched to the Danube. In reply to this display of force England and France (with the accession of Sardinia) sent their allied armies to the East in defense of Turkey-which resulted in the Crimean War.

If the question be asked, what constituted the European Concert at this time, it may be answered by referring to the principal act of intervention adopted by the European powers. This act was undoubtedly that which resulted from the Conference of London in 1840 of which the parties were England, Austria, Prussia and Russia-or the same powers that constituted the earlier concert formed by the "Quadruple Alliance" after the Congress of Vienna. The diverse theories as to the purpose of intervention, which then distracted the attention of the Great Powers-whether it should be politic or humane, whether for the suppression of liberty or for the securing of liberty—no longer disturbed the mind of Europe. The maintenance of the Turkish empire against the encroachment or interference of Russia was evidently prompted solely by considerations of policy-and the conscience of Europe seemed entirely satisfied with the previous enfranchisement of the Greeks, without regard to the present condition of the other subjects of the Turkish government.

§ 6. THE TREATY OF PARIS AND THE RECOGNITION OF TURKEY

The Treaty of Paris of 1856, which closed the Crimean war, formed an important epoch in the history of European diplomacy. It was signed by the representatives of six powers, namely, England and France, Austria and Prussia, and Russia and Sardinia -which now constituted the European Concert. It was intended to put an end to the eternal Eastern Question, to establish a 'status quo for southeastern Europe, and especially to prevent any further interference of Russia in the internal affairs of Turkey. To accomplish this seemingly desirable result, the Ottoman Empire was, accordingly, admitted to all the rights and privileges of a European state, and her full independence and territorial integrity were recognized and guaranteed.

While the Treaty of Paris may have possessed certain beneficial features, the full import and future results of this act of recognition may not have been appreciated by the Allied Powers. But the direful effects of this act might have been deduced from the terms of the Treaty itself. If Russia had now no right to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey, neither had England nor France, nor, in fact, all the other powers of Europe combined, a right to interfere. To take away any apparent occasion for such interference the Sultan recorded "his generous intentions toward the Christian population of his empire," and the contracting Powers specifically declared in Article IX of the treaty that they had themselves no right "to interfere, either collectively or separately, in the relations

of his Majesty, the Sultan, with his subjects, nor in the internal administration of his empire."

The Treaty of Paris of 1856 was the climax of European diplomacy based solely upon policy. The Concert of Powers had by the fear of Russia abandoned all considerations based upon humanity. What a change had been wrought in thirty years! In 1826 the powers had interfered in the government of Turkey, and had declared that the Greeks should enjoy a complete liberty of conscience and should exclusively conduct their own internal government. They had interfered, too, by force of arms, and had rescued the classic fields of Achaia from the hand of an Oriental despot, and had given to an oppressed people a free and independent government. Such was the diplomacy of Europe at the time of the Greek revolution; but such was not the diplomacy of Europe at the time of the Crimean war. Now the Powers had received this Oriental despot into their arms as one among themselves, and practically declared to his suffering Christian subjects that, whatever might be their wrongs, they must henceforth look to their Mohammedan master and not to Christian Europe for help.

We have now learned that the Treaty of Paris, so far as it related to the Ottoman Empire, was based upon a wretched fiction; and this fiction was that the house of Othman, with its tyrant chief and its hungry horde of pashas, backed by centuries of cruelty and misrule, could by a stroke of the diplomatic pen be converted into a civilized European state. The powers at Paris by a strange infatuation seemed to forget what they had remembered in the Greek revolution-that the real European was the subject of the Sultan and not the Sultan himself-that the Sultan was a compar