ing to the American people. At the very beginning of the Anglo-French war, Washington had issued his Proclamation of Neutrality, and had insisted upon its strict observance. When the French minister, Genet, came to our shores and attempted to draw this country into an alliance with France against Great Britain, his fiery zeal had been quickly "snuffed out" by the President. And now the infringements of England upon our neutral rights, and the repeated assaults upon our shipping, seemed an unfair reward for our fidelity.

For all these reasons the hostility toward England grew in strength and bitterness; and the British sympathizers in Congress were reduced to a waning minority. Edmond Randolph, the new Secretary of State, submitted specific complaints and positive proofs regarding what were called "the vexations and spoliations upon our commerce." Resolution after resolution was introduced into Congress to increase the military force of the country, to strengthen the naval armament, and to provide adequate remedies against the wrongs from which we were suffering. Mr. Dayton, a New Jersey federalist, who had imbibed the war spirit, introduced a resolution (March 27, 1794) to sequester all debts due from Americans to British. subjects, and turn them into a fund to indemnify American sufferers from British spoliation. Mr. Dexter of Massachusetts proposed (March 31) that the President be empowered to organize 80,000 effective militia, to be ready to march at a moment's warning. A resolution was finally introduced (April 7th) by Mr. Clark of New Jersey to prohibit all commercial intercourse with Great Britain, until restitution had been made for all losses growing out of British

aggressions, and until all posts held by British garrisons in the United States should be surrendered. This proposal in favor of non-intercourse passed the committee of the House; it would certainly pass the House in regular session, and would probably pass the Senate.

§ 5. THE PRESIDENT'S INTERFERENCE FOR PEACE

While Congress was thus providing remedies against the aggressions of England-aggressions against our rights as a neutral nation, as well as against our rights secured by the Treaty of 1783— the angry temper of the whole country was aroused by a report, recently published, that Lord Dorchester, the British governor of Canada, had in a recent speech to the Indians forewarned them of the coming war between Great Britain and the United States.

In the midst of this tempest of anti-British feeling and hostile action, which was fast driving the country into war, was suddenly heard a voice calling for peace. It was the voice of Washington. On the 19th day of April, 1794, the Senate received a communication from the President submitting the name of John Jay as minister extraordinary to Great Britain for the purpose of securing a "friendly adjustment of our complaints." Although the Senate was equally divided between the parties, the influence of Washington is seen in the fact that the nomination of Jay was confirmed by a vote of eighteen to eight. The House persisted in passing the non-intercourse act, which was, however, defeated in the Senate by the casting vote of the Vice-president, John Adams.

There were few instances in the eight years of Washington's administration when his influence was

so strongly and beneficially felt, as when he interfered to prevent the country from being plunged into a war with England. To Congress and the country the aggressions of England seemed to justify the most hostile measures of redress. The charges against her were specific and pointed. She had broken the Treaty of Peace of 1783. She had haughtily disdained to enter into any commercial relations with us. She had imposed restrictions upon our commerce which had seriously affected our industrial prosperity. She had above all committed spoliations upon our merchant marine, contrary to our rights as a neutral nation. If England has smitten us, shall we not also smite England? So it seemed to Congress, so it seemed to the country. But not so did it seem to Washington. In the face of what seemed to be the most flagrant wrongs there should be some room left for calm judgment. And this judgment should be based upon what was expedient and what was right. The country was at this time in no condition to endure the drafts upon her life and resources which a war would entail. On the other hand, England was at the height of her military power. She was in armed alliance with some of the chief nations of Europe against France. It was not only impolitic for us to enter into hostilities with England, when England meant a great part of Europe except France; but it was also wrong to adopt hostile measures when the resources of peace had not been exhausted. It might seem to many that the failure of the previous diplomatic correspondence between Mr. Hammond and Mr. Jefferson was sufficient to discourage any further attempt to settle by negotiation the more complicated difficulties growing out of our commercial relations.

But against this storm of opinion, which demanded hostile and discouraged amicable means of redress, Washington stood firm. He was, indeed, in this crisis. the Apostle of Peace. To many in Congress the aversion to war might seem but another name for cowardice. But no one could charge with cowardice the man whose sword had achieved our independence. It required no more courage to be "first in war" when war was a fact, than to be "first in peace" when war was threatened. Waiving his first choice, Alexander Hamilton, he gave to John Jay the responsible task of settling by negotiation what Congress and the country had proposed to settle by retaliation and war—John Jay, the Chief Justice of the United States, and after the President the most trusted and irreproachable citizen of America, whose profound knowledge of the law, inflexible sense of justice and solidity of judgment, had already won for him the confidence of all; and whose honor and integrity are best described in the later words of Webster: "When the judicial robe fell on John Jay it touched nothing less spotless than itself."

The appointment of Jay led quickly to the suspension of all action in Congress in regard to our foreign relations, and tended to subdue the tone of hostile feeling against Great Britain. From this time for eleven months, the country waited, with varying degrees of patience and anxiety, for the results of Jay's negotiations.

CHAPTER II

FEDERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY: THE CASE OF THE "CAROLINE"

As generally understood, what is called "international law" rests upon the postulate that nations are moral persons, with reciprocal rights and duties— that the possession of certain rights is conditioned upon the fulfillment of certain obligations. The particular form of government which a nation may adopt to control its own affairs is of no concern to others, provided only it does not affect the rights of other nations, and does not prevent the fulfillment of its own international duties.

It must then be a source of chagrin to every patriotic American that the United States government has ever been compelled to enter the plea of incompetence, or "non-liability," in connection with its international obligations. And one's sense of chagrin is not likely to be dispelled when one is informed that this plea of non-liability is due to supposed defects in the Federal Constitution. It, therefore, becomes a very pertinent question, How far international liability may be affected by a federal form of government. This was, as a matter of fact, once made the subject of a bitter diplomatic controversy between Great Britain and the United States, in the now almost forgotten case of the "Caroline."