duct. The horrors of war, when abstractly considered and pictured to the imagination are repellant in the extreme; but when associated with the preservation of a nation's honor, they become objects of a certain kind of admiration, and their endurance is often viewed as evincing the noblest spirit of devotion and sacrifice. A human body pierced with hostile spears is a pitiful sight to behold; but when the body is that of Arnold of Winkelreid in the battle of Sempach, the sense of pain disappears in admiring the prowess of a patriotic soldier. The deadly charge at Balaklava, the bloody angle at Spottsylvania, and the victorious sacrifice at Belleau Wood, become transformed from an object of horror into a picture of heroism when it becomes set in a nation's history. The fact that the horrors of war are thus often neutralized by the heroic sentiments with which they are sometimes viewed, furnishes, of course, no justification for war; it simply shows that mere appeals to the pacific sentiments will be comparatively weak so long as sacrifice and suffering are considered as inevitable incidents in the protection of a nation's life.

The real difficulty which lurks in the purely sentimental method of dealing with the question of peace and war, consists in the fact that in the intense anxiety to obtain peace there is furnished no satisfactory substitute for war. Peace, however desirable it may appear to its advocates, cannot in the nature of things. be perpetual as long as society seems unable to accomplish in a peaceful way those ends which are now accomplished only by war. To appreciate the force of this statement it is necessary to consider the legitimate place which war has occupied in the international system.

Every nation, as an organized aggregate of human beings, possesses those fundamental rights with which human beings themselves are endowed, namely, the right of existence, the right of honor, and the right of property. It is evident that rights can be secure only when guaranteed by an authority which has the power to protect them against infringement. In the absence of any higher authority than that of the nation itself, each nation must be the judge and enforcer of its own rights. To secure its rights from infringement its force must be organized and made efficient. Armies must be maintained and navies must be built; and, as a last resort, these must be actually employed to protect the nation from injury and to punish the wrong doer. War may thus be the employment of force for the protection of rights. It is the ultimate remedy for a wrong committed or threatened; and in the absence of any other remedy it is difficult to see why it is not a necessary and legitimate exercise of sanctioning power.

With all due respect, therefore, to the sentimental or purely ethical advocates of peace and with all due respect to their laudable efforts to mitigate the horrors and excesses of war, it seems the height of folly to talk of perpetual peace while the rights of nations are indefinitely determined or inadequately guaranteed.

§ 2. IDEAL PROJECTS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL STATE

But all the advocates of peace have not relied upon mere appeals to sentiment. Among the most interesting speculations of modern times are the attempts to formulate schemes of perpetual peace based upon some kind of international organization, so constructed

that the rights of each nation may be guaranteed without an appeal to arms.

Those who have adopted this method of solving the problem of peace have proceeded upon the theory that under the present system war is a necessity, which can be abolished only by the creation of some adequate substitute for war. Without disparaging the cultivation of the pacific sentiments they have sought to establish an institutional basis for peace. These different plans have varied in definiteness from the vague idea of a universal Christian commonwealth to fully elaborated schemes of an international super-state, with its various powers distributed in a manner analogous to that which marks the organization of individual states. It is unnecessary for our purpose to describe in detail these various schemes. Their chief merits and defects will be sufficiently evident by calling attention to some of their most essential characteristics.

To Henry IV of France has been usually ascribed the earliest of these projects of perpetual peace. This scheme, or "Grand Design," of Henry IV, as summarized by Sir George Cornwall Lewis, "proceeded on the basis that the religious creed of each Christian European country was to be recognized and maintained; that the infidel powers should be expelled from Europe; that Europe should be repartitioned with a view mainly of diminishing the power of the house of Austria; and that a federal council, with a federal army and navy, for all the European states should be established. By this means it was thought, a perpetual peace would be preserved among the members of the great Christian republic."

The plan thus described seems entirely consonant

with the noble spirit of the King who issued the Edict of Nantes, inspired, as he no doubt was, by the Duke of Sully. Its practicability, however, may be judged by those who consider what would be involved in the attempt to draw the new divisional lines necessary for the repartitioning of Europe, and also in the attempt to solve the Eastern question by driving out the Infidel, especially if it should be found necessary, as Henry IV suggested, to drive out the Muscovite along with the Turk. The serious attempt to pacify Europe by cutting up the sympathetic powers and by driving out the disaffected ones, would probably have provoked wars quite as disastrous as those which afterward attended the less laudable schemes of Louis XIV.

The plan of Henry IV furnished the basis of the more remarkable and elaborate project of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, a publicist and influential writer of the early part of the eighteenth century. Having been present at the conference at Utrecht and being impressed with the difficulties of settling the terms of that Peace, Saint-Pierre resolved to draw up a plan of international organization by which the Peace of Utrecht should be made perpetual. This plan was first published in 1713, and afterward elaborated in a work published in 1729. The scheme was intended. to maintain the equilibrium of forces among the various European powers and to furnish what was thought to be an adequate means of adjusting their differences. The five articles which contained the essential features of this interesting project may be epitomized as follows:

(1) That a perpetual alliance be established between members of the European League, or Christian republic, for their mutual security against both foreign

and civil war, and for the mutual guaranty of their respective possessions and of the treaties of peace conIcluded at Utrecht.

(2) That each ally contribute to the common expenses of the general Alliance a monthly contribution to be regulated by the general assembly of their plenipotentiaries.

(3) That the allies renounce the right of making war against each other and accept the mediation and arbitration of the general assembly of the league for the termination of their mutual differences-threefourths of the votes being necessary for a definite judgment.

(4) That if any of the allied powers should refuse to carry into effect the judgments and regulations of the grand Alliance, or negotiate treaties in contravention thereof, or prepare to wage war, the alliance should arm and act offensively against the offending power until it was reduced to obedience.

(5) That the general assembly have the power to enact by a plurality of votes all laws necessary and proper to carry into effect the object of the Alliance; but no alteration in the fundamental articles to be made without the unanimous consent of the allies.

The general European assembly, as proposed by Saint-Pierre, was to consist of the representatives of nineteen principal sovereigns and states, arranged in a certain order of precedence from the king of France to the king of Sardinia, each representation having a single vote, while the smaller republics and princes were conjointly to be represented by a single collective It was thus proposed to establish a sort of super-state, or "League of Nations," which was expected to ensure the permanent peace of Europe.

vote.

The chief defects which have been attributed to this