§ 2. RECOGNITION OF A NEW FORM OF GOVERNMENT

We may then, in the first place, consider the case in which a nation sees fit to change its own form of government and adopt a new form. If such a change takes place within the limits of a sovereign state, and does not affect the interests of other states, it is proper to recognize it without inquiry as to the antecedent causes which have brought it about, provided only it is an accomplished fact. Such a change is a matter solely within the jurisdiction of the state itself, with which other states have nothing to do. Other states have no judicial authority to investigate into the justice or expediency or other reasons, which concern only the nation itself.

This principle has uniformly been adopted by the United States in dealing with other nations. It has been necessary, from very early times, for our government to announce its policy in this respect, especially in view of the frequent changes of government which have taken place in France since the French Revolution. With the establishment of the First Republic in 1792, Thomas Jefferson, who was Secretary of State under Wasington, writing to our minister at Paris (Nov. 7, 1792), said: "It accords with our principles to acknowledge any government to be rightful which is formed by the will of the nation, substantially expressed." And again (March 12, 1793): "We surely cannot deny to any nation that right whereon our own government is founded-that every one may govern itself according to whatever form it pleases, and change these forms according to its own will; and that it may transact its business with foreign nations through whatever organ it thinks

proper, whether king, convention, assembly, committee, president or anything else it may choose. (Moore's Digest of Int. Law, I, p. 120.)

This principle was followed in the many subsequent changes that took place in France. It was followed at the establishment of the First Empire under Napoleon in 1804. It was also followed upon the abdication of Napoleon and the restoration of the monarchy under Louis XVIII in 1814. It was not departed from at the time of the Revolution of 1830 when Louis Philippe became king of the French. With the establishment of the Second Republic in 1848, Mr. Buchanan, while Secretary of State, transmitted to the American minister at Paris a letter of credence (March 31, 1848) with these words: "In its intercourse with foreign nations the government of the United States has, from its origin, always recognized de facto governments. We recognize the right of all nations to create and reform their political institutions according to their own will and pleasure. We do not go behind the existing government, to involve ourselves in the question of legitimacy. It is enough for us to know that a government exists capable of maintaining itself, and then its recognition on our part inevitably follows." (Ibid., I, pp. 122-124.)

While Mr. Webster was Secretary of State another political change took place in France, whereby, in December, 1851, the Second Republic was transformed into the Second Empire under Louis Napoleon, who took the title of Napoleon III. Almost immediately after this event, Mr. Webster wrote to the American minister at Paris (Jan. 12, 1852) as follows: "From President Washington's time down to the present day, it has been a principle acknowledged

by the United States, that every nation possesses the right to govern itself according to its own will, to change its institutions, and to transact its business. through whatever agents it may think proper to employ. . . . If the French people have substantially made another change, we have no choice but to acknowledge that also." (Ibid., I, p. 126.)

We are fortunately obliged to record only one further important change of the French government, and that is the establishment of the Third Republic in 1870, at the close of the Franco-Prussian War. At that time, the minister of the United States at Paris, Mr. Washburne, received the following instructions (Sept. 6, 1870): "If provisional government has actual control and possession of power and is acknowledged by the French people, so as to be, in point of fact, de facto government, of which you will be able to decide by the time this reaches you, you will not hesitate to acknowledge it." (Ibid., I, 127.)

The attitude of the United States in respect to the matter of recognition as applied to the successive governments of France, seems clearly to show that such governments may be recognized, without any inquiry as to their justice or expediency or the antecedent causes of their adoption, or the prospect of their endurance.

There is, however, one condition that seems to have been assumed in the case of France, namely, that the new governments were really de facto, that is, actually approved by the French people. Such a condition seems to have acquired a special importance in connection with the revolutionary governments of South and Central America. The frequency of such revolutions in these countries has sometimes made it dif

ficult to decide which of two rival governments actually holds the reins of power. The question arises in such a case, not which as a matter of right and justice is the de jure government, but which as a matter of evidence is the de facto government. It has not been the policy of the United States to go back of existing conditions and involve itself in a judicial investigation as to what government ought to be supreme, but to consider what government is supreme. Here, as in all other cases, the recognition must be based upon fact, and not upon opinion.

One or two examples only will be sufficient to illustrate this point. In the case of a revolutionary disturbance in Nicaragua, President Pierce fully explained this principle in a special message to Congress (March 15, 1856). He said: "It is the established policy of the United States to recognize all governments without question of their source, or organization, or of the means by which the governing persons attained their power, provided there be a government de facto, accepted by the people of the country. We do not go behind the fact of a foreign government's exercising actual power, to investigate questions of legitimacy; we do not inquire into the causes which led to a change of government. All these matters we leave to the people and the public authorities to determine. . . . It is the more imperatively necessary to apply this rule to the Spanish American republics, in consideration of the frequent and not seldom anomalous changes of organization or administration which they undergo, and the revolutionary nature of most of the changes." (Ibid., I, p. 142.) This principle was also most clearly laid down by Dr. David Jayne Hill, when Acting Secretary of State, in the

case of Colombia (Sept. 8, 1900). Dr. Hill sent to the United States minister at Bogota the following instruction: "The policy of the United States announced and practiced upon occasion for more than a century, has been to refrain from acting upon conflicting claims to the de jure control of the executive power of a foreign state; but to base the recognition of a foreign government solely on its de facto control to hold the reins of administrative power." (Ibid., I, p. 139.)

We may then conclude that, in accordance with the practice of the United States as seen in the cases of France and the Spanish-American republics, a new government may be recognized, without inquiring into the causes of its adoption, and without interfering with the sovereignty of the state itself, provided the new government is de facto, or actually established.

$ 3. RECOGNITION OF A BELLIGERENT COMMUNITY

When we come, however, to consider the matter relating to the "recognition of belligerency" we encounter a more serious problem. Belligerency is, properly speaking, the status that independent and sovereign nations assume with reference to one another, when engaged in war. Such independent nations, by the very fact of their being engaged in war, acquire certain specified rights and also become subject to certain specified obligations, which are sanctioned by the rules of international law. Such nations do not require any "recognition" as belligerents; they are already invested with that status by the "laws of war."

But in the case of an insurgent community, engaged