garded as inciting the Indians to hostility, and hence presenting a permanent obstacle to the settlement of the Western lands. It was not until after the adoption of the Federal Constitution in September, 1787, that these difficulties were brought to a direct issue in a regular and diplomatic manner. It was at this time that Great Britain first established permanent diplomatic relations with the United States, by sending Mr. George Hammond as Minister Plenipotentiary to this country. Mr. Thomas Jefferson was then Secretary of State for the United States.

After being assured that the new British minister possessed full power to enter into negotiations respecting the differences between the two countries, Mr. Jefferson proposed that each side should specify the particular acts which he considers to have been done by the other in contravention of the treaty. He himself set the example by citing the seventh article of the treaty, which provided for the withdrawal of the British forces "with all convenient speed, and without carrying away any negroes or other property of the American inhabitants." In respect to the withdrawal of the British forces, Mr. Jefferson made these specific points: (1) that the British garrisons were not withdrawn with all convenient speed, nor had they yet been withdrawn from Michillimackinac, Detroit, Fort Erie and Oswego on the Great Lakes, nor from Pointe Au-fer and Dutchman's Point on Lake Champlain; (2) that the British officers had, in fact, undertaken to exercise jurisdiction over the country and the inhabitants in the vicinity of these posts; and (3) that they had excluded the citizens of the United States from navigating even on our side of the middle line established as a boundary between the two countries.

In respect to the carrying away of the negroes, Mr. Jefferson specifically declared: (1) that a large embarkation of negroes took place before the arrival of our commissioners who were appointed to superintend the embarkation; (2) that nearly three thousand others were publicly carried away by the avowed order of the British commanding officer, and against the remonstrance of our commissioners; and (3) that a great number were carried off in private vessels without opposition on the part of the commanding officer. All these acts were declared to be inconsistent with the terms of the treaty.

The British minister, Mr. Hammond, had already in his preliminary correspondence called attention to the fact that the King, his master, had been induced to suspend this seventh article, to which Mr. Jefferson referred, “in consequence of the non-compliance on the part of the United States of the engagements contained in the fourth, fifth and sixth articles of the treaty"—which articles referred to the collection of British debts and the matter of confiscated estates. Mr. Hammond, now in direct reply to Mr. Jefferson, stated the specific claims of Great Britain. While being compelled to admit that Congress had twice sent recommendations to the several states as required by the fifth article, he insisted that by the fourth article the United States had positively agreed there should be no lawful impediment to the collection of British debts. It could not be presumed, he said "that the commissioners who negotiated the treaty would engage in behalf of Congress to make recommendations to the legislatures of the respective states which they did not expect to be effectual, or enter into direct stipulations which they did not have the power to en

force." As a matter of fact, Mr. Hammond declared, the states had not repealed their confiscation laws; they had not restored the estates already confiscated; and they had not, either in their legislatures or in their courts, supported British creditors in their efforts to recover the full value of their debts.

To these claims of Mr. Hammond, Mr. Jefferson made a reply, which forms one of his most able state papers. He showed, in the first place, that the term "recommend" as used in the treaty was not misunderstood by the American commissioners, who negotiated the treaty and who fully comprehended the limitations of Congress at the time the treaty was made. He showed that the term was not misunderstood by the British commissioner who, at the time of the negotiation, was warned that the states would probably refuse to heed such a recommendation. He also showed that it was not misunderstood by the British ministry, nor by the members of Parliament, as evidenced by many extracts from their speeches in both Houses. Moreover, in this reply, Mr. Jefferson took occasion to show that the Continental Congress had conscientiously fulfilled the obligations imposed upon it by the treaty; and he proved, by a detailed examination of the legislative acts and judicial decisions of the several states that their attitude had been, in the large majority of cases, favorable to British creditors.

But the most incisive point in Jefferson's argument rested upon the principle that priority of time in the infraction of a treaty, on the part of one party, justifies a non-compliance on the part of the other party. The British minister had sought to justify the nonwithdrawal of the British troops from American posts on the ground that the United States had been dila

tory in carrying out their engagements. But the truth was that Great Britain was the one that first ignored the treaty by carrying off the negroes immediately at the close of the war. If Great Britain insisted that the negroes were not, at the time, the legal property of American citizens, she was still the first to infract the treaty in the failure to withdraw her garrisons as stipulated—because it was a principle of international law that when the precise time for the execution of an obligation is not stated, it is understood to take effect immediately; but also because it was an express stipulation of the treaty itself that the British troops should be withdrawn "with all convenient speed." If Great Britain had failed to execute an immediate obligation, she had no claim against the United States for any subsequent infraction that might be alleged. (For this correspondence, see Wait's State Papers, Vol. I.)

The friends and enemies of Mr. Jefferson might perhaps differ as to whether his arguments were capable of being answered. As a matter of fact, they were never answered by the British government. In acknowledging the receipt of Jefferson's communication (dated May 29, 1792) Mr. Hammond said that he would transmit it without delay to his Court for the consideration of his Majesty's ministers. Nearly thirteen months later (June 19, 1793) Jefferson asked when he might expect the honor of a reply. Mr. Hammond answered that his instructions had probably been delayed by the interesting events which were then transpiring in Europe. After the lapse of another five months (Nov. 13, 1793) Mr. Jefferson, at the request of the President, again sent a communication to the British minister asking whether a reply might not then be expected. To this inquiry Mr. Hammond

replied that he had not yet received such definite instructions as would enable him to renew the discussion.

This closed the diplomatic correspondence regarding the infractions of the Treaty of 1783. But the wounds still remained open; the northern forts were still held by British soldiers; the Indians still remained in a state of hostility; and the Western lands were still unsettled.

§ 2. BRITISH REFUSAL TO ENTER COMMERCIAL

RELATIONS

In the meantime there had come into prominence other matters which seriously affected the peaceful relation of the two countries. These difficulties, which began with a series of annoyances not sufficiently grave to warrant a formal protest, increased in importance and complexity, until at last war seemed imminent. It may be said that these misunderstandings were due, not simply to the non-fulfillment of treaty obligations, as we have already indicated, but also to the continued refusal of Great Britain to enter into any commercial treaty relations with the United States. This refusal may perhaps be explained, at least in the first instance, by the absence of sufficient authority on the part of the United States, under the old Confederation, to warrant such an arrangement.

From the first, the Continental Congress itself had perceived the benefit of such commercial treaties with foreign powers. Even before the Treaty of 1783 it had formed commercial alliances, as we have seen, with France, with the Netherlands and with Sweden. But it was with Great Britain that the United States