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essential difference exists among the individual of any one stirps. Such being then the ordinary course of nature, it must necessarily be irrational to assume, without positive and most irrefragible proof, that one species may become another, either from outward circumstances, however potent in their character, or from inward influences of the most impulsive nature. To suppose the change to arise from inward impulse, is to suppose a cause contrary and superior to the ordained course of its being a supposition of glaring absurdity; and to suppose the change to be effected by outward circumstances, is to give to secondary causes of an unintelligent and inanimate nature a power to override and render nugatory the great First Cause of being, the intelligent Creator of the universe, which is a species of reckless daring amounting to blasphemous impiety. Nor can objection be taken to this view of the reason of the thing, from the apparent similarity of all organic existence at the beginning, or during the period of embryonic existence. The germinal cell may appear to us similar in all cases, but its appearing so to us, with our limited powers of knowing whether it is so, is no proof that it does not possess distinctive peculiarities sufficient to act as natural and efficient causes to produce those results which the ordained course of its being requires, in each particular individual, according to its genealogic relations.

In like manner, the embryonic condition of organic life may present certain analogous appearances, with the same mysterious deviations at certain ordained times; but these deviations occur according to the ordained course of that stirps to which the individual embryo belongs. We submit that the order and regularity of the change proves the existence of an efficient cause, in accordance with the laws of the Great Creator, implanted in the germinal cell, and continued throughout its embryonic state, until maturity is secured. To suppose otherwise, were to resist reason, facts, nature, and nature's God.

That the principles of the theory are assumptions without proof, is evident to the most casual student; for a theory is started, and facts are distorted; hypothesis is taken as the groundwork, while the ignorance and weakness of the human intellect are made the superstructure upon which the whole theory is elaborated. It has been well observed, that one fact would have done good service in support of the theory; but the absence of all well-authenticated facts, the opposition of all known facts and experiences, combined with the irrationality of the theory, stamp it as a futile, fallacious folly-a monument erected to commemorate the vagaries to which scientific men have committed themselves in the nineteenth century.

In conclusion, we submit, since science demands it, that this theory, in common with all other theories which are contrary to observation and the historic experiences of this world's life, should produce demonstrable proof of each and every step in the theory, from its foundation maxim upwards, to the most minute

detail. Until this is done-and we contend, the onus probandi lies with the theorists-our conviction of the permanence of species must remain, and be utterly opposed to the idea of development as hitherto propounded. L'OUVRIER.

Social Economy.

IS COUNSEL JUSTIFIED IN DEFENDING FROM PUN. ISHMENT A CRIMINAL OF WHOSE GUILT HE HAS BEEN PROFESSIONALLY MADE COGNIZANT?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.-II.

Ir appears to us that this question is unfairly put, as it assumes that counsel usually know whether the criminals whom they are defending be guilty or not. This, we believe, is seldom or never the case; but granting, for the sake of the present discussion, that it is, we yet affirm that even then an advocate is justified in defending the criminal with whose guilt he has been professionally made acquainted; and we hope we shall be able to adduce sufficient reasons to justify our position. Far be it, however, from us to wish for the painful spectacle of eminent advocates calling on the Deity to attest the innocence of known guilty clients, or, with tears in their eyes, declaring that they believe them to be injured persons; but even in such cases, the excitement of the moment, the pale faces of the criminals, the shadow of the gibbet, and the impending sentence of the law, furnish many excuses for this error in advocacy.

In order to set the question more clearly before our minds, let us suppose, for the moment, that it stands thus:-" Is counsel justified in defending from legal punishment a criminal of whose moral guilt he has been professionally made cognizant ?" Should we give a negative or an affirmative to this proposition? Undoubtedly an affirmative.

Let us correctly ascertain, then, in the first place, what is the precise position of the prisoner as he stands before the dread tribunal of the law.

He is arraigned by the law, to answer to the law, whether he has offended that law or not. He has been domiciled in the place where the law before which he is arraigned has been in operation, and he has, therefore, the right to any and every protection which he can derive from that law, in his hour of need; and he has as good a title to that protection as the purest in the land, even though his guilt were as deep-dyed as that of the notorious Palmer.

Twelve of his fellow-men have been summoned to decide whether he has offended against the law or not,-each being under the

protection of the same law. The prisoner has then read over to him an indictment, -a legal instrument,-detailing those parts of the law against which he is supposed to have offended. He is then required to say whether he be guilty or not, which simply means, "Do you wish to be tried, or do you not?" and he makes his reply according to his own pleasure; but whichever way he may choose to plead, he must be found guilty by the jury, for the judge cannot sentence the man, although self-convicted, till he is likewise convicted by the law; and, according to law, he is not guilty till he is found and proved to be so; and, in many cases, it happens that, although he may be guilty of an act against the law, yet he may not be guilty of the act imputed to him.

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Mr. Baron Martin, some short time ago, was the judge before whom a young man was indicted for wilful murder. When called upon to declare himself "guilty or not guilty," he chose the former but the learned judge did not like to take this confession, and pressed upon him the importance of pleading "Not guilty," at the same time explaining to him that he would in no way compromise his conscience by so doing, as he thereby merely expressed his wish to have the matter proved, one way or the other. He even humanely offered to grant him a day for consideration; but, although the young man persisted in his course, it was with the sincere tears of genuine feeling in his eyes that he pronounced upon him the fearful sentence of the law and all honour, we say, to that judge, for his humanity, in not wishing to doom his fellow-man to destruction, if it could be avoided.

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It is the duty of the administrators of the law also to study justice; and it is, or ought to be, the spirit and intention of the laws of a Christian country not so much to punish as to reform; not to send the man out of the world unprepared, nor to turn him into the world with the brand of the felon on his brow, but to make him, if possible, a fit and useful member of society, remembering the Divine injunction, "He that is without guilt, let him cast the first stone!"

In the next place, let us ascertain what is the duty of the English advocate. It is his sacred duty to throw the shield of protection over the weak, to defend the defenceless, to give counsel to those who need it, to help his fellow out of the " Slough of Despond," and finally, as Lord Brougham declares, to know no one but his client, to believe none other, and to do his best for that client, utterly regardless of any consequences that may accrue; this then is the duty of the advocate, and we believe every man to be justified in doing his duty, whatever that may be.

Surely, then, if the prisoner should have acknowledged to his counsel that he is guilty, as he stands arraigned at the bar, to answer for his life, or liberty, with, perhaps, a few circumstances in his favour, he is a proper subject for the English advocate to extend the strong hand of protection to. Take, for instance, the extreme case of murder, and grant that the advocate is aware of the criminality

of the accused, yet there may be circumstances in extenuation of the crime-circumstances of provocation, or extreme wretchedness, or blindness through drink, or other matters-which can only be drawn out of the witnesses by a counsel used to dealing with them, although they have been sworn to give the "whole truth;" and who can so well as a disinterested person show the effect these circumstances may have had upon the mind of the criminal, whereby he may have been insanely urged to the committal of the deed of blood?

Surely, in this age of civilization, it will not be argued that it is unjustifiable for an advocate to endeavour to produce all the favourable evidence and extenuating circumstances he can, to mitigate the blackness of the offence. To this may be traced the fact of many lives being saved through recommendations to mercy, brought about by favourable evidence thus adduced, and which would, otherwise, never have come to light. Far distant be the day when the justice of the interference of counsel to protect even the guilty shall be universally denied! We think this is one of the foundationstones on which the gorgeous superstructure of free English jurisprudence has been raised, and we hope we may never live to see the time when it will be thrown from its place and trampled upon. Again: it is a well-known fact that there are so many different shades of offence, that it might happen, but for this interference of counsel, that the prisoner, although guilty of an offence, might receive punishment for some offence never committed. Thus it so frequently occurs that prisoners accused of murder are often only guilty of, and receive punishment for, manslaughter; and the same holds good for all offences.

Let us refer to the famous state trial of Simon Bernard, for aiding in the attempt against the life of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte. There can, we think, be very little doubt that he was really guilty of that crime (if crime it was), but, according to the ancient usages and laws of England, he was not legally guilty, and the jury refused to convict him. Will it be said that his counsel acted wrongly in defending him from punishment? Surely not.

But it is better that ten guilty men be liberated, than that an innocent one suffer; and it is rarely or never the case that the guilty man obtains an acquittal, whatever may be the ingenuity of his counsel. Although he may not be convicted of the capital offence for which he is indicted, yet it usually happens that he is sentenced on the lesser charge.

The well-known case of Astlett exemplifies this principle. Through the ingenuity of Lord (then Mr.) Erskine, he was acquitted from the charge of forging Exchequer bills, and, without entering into the details, we may say that this was a verdict strictly in accordance with every principle of truth. But what then? He was sentenced and imprisoned on a charge of stealing pieces of paper, of which he was guilty. No prisoner should be sentenced for forging, if he be not guilty of it; and if it can only be detected by an advocate, we

think that advocate is fully justified, although he may be aware that he is guilty of some crime.

In conclusion, whenever a prisoner stands before us, we should remember that we see a man, a brother in trouble, it may be, with a heart seared and a conscience blackened by the committal of crime; but he is weak and helpless, and perhaps repentant, therefore we hold it to be the duty of every one of us, as far as we can, to shield him from destruction, and to endeavour to find some good in him still, to save him from punishment, if we can, and turn him, if possible, into a right path; to succour and assist him, knowing not to what temptations and severe trials he may have been subjected, nor through what fiery furnace of affliction he may have had to walk to the criminal's position. H. K.

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NEGATIVE ARTICLE.-II.

SIMILAR Or the same arguments should be used to prove the above question in the affirmative as would be employed to prove all punishsince the success of a counsel who defends guilty men tends to prevent all punishment. If it be wrong to punish, it cannot be wrong to assist a criminal to escape punishment; but if it be right-nay, even necessary-to take vengeance on guilt; then it seems to us the question is answered, and there remains little need for discussion. Yet, as it is probable the busy, acute brains of some intelligent contributors may discover reasons why an advocate should defend a guilty man, we shall endeavour briefly and conclusively to show it to be both unjustifiable and immoral.

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With respect to the criminal, it may perhaps be said that he was driven to his deed by drunkenness or by hunger; that he is weak and unfortunate; and that his case will be made worse than it is by the counsel for the prosecution. Certainly he is to be pitied, but bad as his condition is, he is plainly answerable for it. If he was drunk when he acted wrongly, it was himself who put the "serpent into his mouth that stole away his senses.' If hunger urged him on-and that is the very best excuse we can imagine a prisoner alleging he still had no right to take what was not his own. If the prosecuting counsel makes the case appear worse than the truth, it is then the proper work of the prisoner's advocate to show where the exaggeration is. Still he is a criminal, and must be treated as such. As he is a man, we mourn over him; as he is fallen, we pity him; but as he is guilty, we punish him.

Of the advocate it may be said, that his knowledge of the prisoner's guilt was obtained professionally; and an attempt may be made to endow him with a sort of dual existence, to separate the man from the counsel, and to allow in the special pleader what is not allowable in the man. To a person who is guided by the moral principles which no one likes openly to scoff at, it will not seem excuse sufficient to say, that because he would not have known except professionally, he was therefore justified in lying professionally. And what must we think of a profession that assumes the right of pre

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