sified the aims of philosophy, by introducing other rules of thought, and bringing within the limits of philosophy the long-exiled questions of the nature, duty, and destiny of man. He never opened a school, nor did he deliver showy lectures, like the Sophists; neither did he stain his palm with the receipt of fees. He devoted himself to the self-imposed task of thinking, teaching, and controversy; to awaken the Greeks to inquiry rather than inquisitiveness; and to "arouse the sensual and the vain" among the Athenians to raptures of a newer and nobler kind—those which true knowledge yields. His surpassing capacity for clear explanation, ready suggestion, acute questioning, and unwearied thought, gave him an immense advantage over the Sophists, and made him the antagonist of every false appearance, and every conceit of knowledge. This last statement leads us to mention, that though we have explained the dialectical irony which Socrates employed as consisting of a continuous stratum of apparent coincidence of thought with a substratum of real hostility, we do not intend to intimate that there was any dishonest seeming in his style of controversy. It had always a double meaning in it, but it had no double dealing. The great tact he possessed in so doubling his thought as to bring out, at once and invariably, a test-instance which possessed an apparent congruence with his respondent's theory or thought, and yet, in reality, was fully charged with a destruction-dealing potency, is one of the marvels of this great man's nature. The firm hold which, amid all his vivacity, humour, pleasantry, and even equivoque, he held of the leading thought or principle which he had in view, was most extraordinary, and his faith in the method of ironic controversy was so great, that he could even surrender himself to the passing current of the moment. and converse on any and every conceivable topic, in the full confidence that out of the talk would arise an opportunity of insisting upon and impressing the great moral truths about which he was most concerned, and which also most concerned man as man. This strength of mind and purpose might, if we rightly understood it, enable us to comprehend the much vexed question of the genius or "demon of Socrates." This extraordinary faculty of judgment-which so unerringly, intuitively, almost even instinctively, led him to apprehend and know results from an acquaintance with their antecedents-which gave to him almost the power of prophecy, always the capacity to decide and determine-which he had learned to look upon as his unfailing help in argument, and his infallible guide in life—was it in reality natural or supernatural? When he looked abroad upon the flighty, unsettled, fickle Athenians, "tossed about with every wind of doctrine," and veering continually as the tenor of a discourse changed; when he conversed with the reputed wisdom-mongers of his day, and found them each opposing the other, and yet unable to give him explicit and unequivocal grounds for the belief they strove to inculcate on the minds of men; when he saw worships, polities, parties, &c., changing to suit the changing fashions of the time, and yet felt within himself a spirit of fixed and firm. built faith-an instantaneous decisiveness of thought—a resolutely unswerving method of life,-what could he fancy but that there was in him a something, an agency, a spirit, which was not equally operant in other men. The very earnestness and force of his imagination, the very power and intensity of his intellect, would give a feeling of inspiration to him at some moments; and he would fancy, in these supreme hours of thought, as the poet in his rapt and excited moods fables himself submissive to the muse-that a Divine teacher whispered to his soul, that a wisdom higher than man's spoke in his thoughts, and that his genius really taught him to distinguish false from true. An idea, something like this, was mooted in the early ages, in the Platonic schools. Apuleius, in "The Demon of Socrates," says: According to a certain definition, the human soul, even when it is still located in the body, is called a demon." "Dîne hunc ardorem mentibus addunt Euryale?—an sua cuique deus fit dira cupido?"* If, then, this is the case, a longing of the soul, that is of good tendency, is a "good demon." Similarly, Olympiodorus, in his Scholia on the First Alcibiades of Plato, says: "The allotted demon is conscience, which is the consummate flower of the soul." Menander, the Greek poet, who was a pupil of Theophrastus, the successor of Aristotle, gives currency to a similar thought. One of his fragments is to this effect:: To every mortal, conscience is a god." Many ingenious hypotheses have been framed upon this topic, ranging from lunacy to inspiration,-a pretty wide sweep of the pendulum, unless, indeed, we consent to believe, despite the eloquent disclaimer recently produced in Blackwood's Magazine, that "Great wit to madness nearly is allied." was once But the most rational, and withal the most consonant with the * "Do the gods, O Euryalus! add this ardour to our souls? we support seems best to secure this desirable point, and, therefore, seems to us the best attainable one. Hastily and inefficiently, we feel, have we run over the most marked characteristics of the Socratic philosophy. So grand a theme was worthy of greater care, and more extended exposition. Much space might be occupied with debateable and debated topics to little purpose. We have sought to seize upon the salient points, and to present these to the reader. We have endeavoured, however ineffectively, to indicate the place of Socrates as a thoughtsman among the thinkers of ancient-of all times,-and we do not scruple now to endorse the estimate of Mitford :- -"The singular merit of Socrates lay in the purity and usefulness of his manners and conversation; the clearness with which he saw, and the steadiness with which he practised, in a blind and corrupt age, all moral duties; the disinterestedness and the zeal with which he devoted himself to the benefit of others; and the enlarged and warm bene volence; whence his supreme and only pleasure seems to have consisted in doing good. The purity of Christian morality-little enough, indeed, seen in practice,-nevertheless is become so familiar in theory, that it passes almost for obvious, and even congenial to the human mind. Those only will justly estimate the merit of that near approach to it which Socrates made, who will take the pains to gather, as they may, from the writings of his contemporaries and predecessors, how little conception of it was entertained before his time; how dull to a just moral sense the human mind has really been; how slow the progress in the investigation of the moral duties, even where not only great pains have been taken, but the greatest abilities zealously employed; and when discovered, how difficult it has been to establish them by proofs beyond controversy, or proofs even that would be generally admitted by the reason It is through the light diffused by his doctrine, enforced by his practice, with the advantage of having both the doctrine and practice exhibited to the highest advantage in the incomparable writings of disciples such as Xenophon and Plato, that his life forms. an era in the history of Athens and of men." of men. S. N. The bibliography of works on Socrates is very extensive. We recall, at present, as among the most useful and interesting, in addition to those already quoted and referred to, Wigger's "Life of Socrates;" Stapfer's article, "Socrates," in the Biographie Universelle," as well as his monograph, Berne, 1786," De Philosophia Socratis;" Heller's "Socrates," Frankfort, 1789; Gilbert Cooper's "Life of Socrates," London, 1749; the chapters on "Socrates," in Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy," second edition; Potter's "Socrates and Plato," the article, sub voce, by Janet, in the "Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques;" and by Brandis, in Smith's "Dictionary of Classical Biography," &c. A great collection of other references are to be found in Tennemann's "Manual of the History of Philosophy" (Bohn), and in several works referred to above. They need not, therefore, be mentioned here. Religion. IS THE CATHOLIC RULE OF FAITH TRUE? AFFIRMATIVE REPLY. As all the principal objections of the negative side have been disposed of by J. H., I propose, in the present article, to notice the paper of "Lex Scripta," which appeared in the last Number, and then to lay before the reader a summary of the reasoning generally employed to demonstrate the Catholic Rule of Faith, in order to supply a connecting link between the articles which have appeared on the affirmative side. 66 The purport of "Lex Scripta's" article is to show that the affirm ative writers have assumed many points without demonstrating them. He goes through the articles of his opponents, and wherever he meets with a passing allusion to a Catholic doctrine, he insists upon the proof of that doctrine. If a simple historical fact is mentioned, he insists upon having the evidence for that fact. If the Papacy is alluded to, he asks us to demonstrate that every single pontiff really did exist. If St. Timothy is alluded to as a bishop, he would compel us to go into the controversy between Episco palians and Presbyterians. When " A Layman" quotes a number of passages from the early Fathers to show that their Rule of Faith was identical with that which Catholics now hold, "Lex Scripta" declares that the whole article is based upon assumptions;" the "assumption" being, I suppose, that these authors really did exist, and that they wrote the works from which "A Layman" quotes. I do not know what the readers of the British Controversialist may think, but, to my mind, the mere subterfuge to which "Lex Scripta" seems obliged to have recourse, indicates his utter inability to answer our arguments on the question under discussion. I could very easily retort his accusation. His own article is full of the wildest assumptions. He tells us that a large number of the Roman Pontiffs were purely imaginary persons. Where is his proof? He tells us that the apostles did not deliver anything to their successors which they did not also commit to writing. Where, again, is his proof? In opposition to the testimony of every respectable historian, he tells us that St. Peter never was at Rome. Where is his proof? Do not all historians agree that he was martyred there, with St. Paul? Does not St. Peter himself inform us that he was there, in his first epistle (chap. v. 12, 13)? It would occupy too much space to attempt to expose even a few of the extravagant statements of which his article is composed; besides, I do not think that anything I could write would go far to convince a writer who threatens, if the editor can allow him another article, to disprove a fact so patent to all the world as the visibility of the Catholic Church. In accordance with my promise, I will now lay before the reader an abstract of the line of argument generally used to demonstrate the Catholic Rule of Faith. Let us suppose that a Catholic, not content with the more compendious method whereby God brought him, through baptism, and early instruction, into the possession of the faith, were desirous of investigating the authority of its principles. He naturally commences with the Scripture; he takes up the Gospels, and submits them to examination. He abstracts, for a moment, from his belief in their inspiration and Divine authority; he looks at them simply as historical words, intended for his information. He finds, in the first place, that to these Gospels, whether considered in their substance or their form, are attached all those motives of human credibility which he can possibly require; that there is throughout them an absence of everything which might create a suspicion that there has either been a desire to deceive, or a possibility of having been mistaken. He finds a body of external testimony sufficient to convince him that they are documents produced at the time at which they profess to have been written, and that those persons were their authors whose names they bear. As the writers were eyewitnesses of what they relate, and give us in their lives and characters the strongest security of their veracity, he concludes that all they have recorded must be certain and true. We thus arrive at the discovery that, besides the mere narrative, they unfold to us a system of religion preached by One who wrought the most stupendous miracles to establish the Divinity of His mission. In other words, we are led, by the simple principle of human investigation, to an acknowledgment of the authority of Christ to teach as one who came from God; and we are thus led to the necessity of yielding implicit credence to whatever we find Him to have taught. So far the investigation, being one of outward and visible facts, cannot require anything more than ordinary historical or human evidence. 66 Having once established the Divine mission of Christ, we naturally ask, What did Christ teach ?" We find that He was not content with teaching certain general principles of morality—that He was not satisfied with unfolding to mankind doctrines such as none before Him had attempted to teach, and thereby making man acquainted with his own fallen nature and his future destiny, but that, moreover, He adopted means to preserve those doctrinal communications to mankind. He selects a certain body of men ; He invests them with great authority and power; He makes them a promise of remaining with them, and teaching among them, till the end of time. From the very words of the commission which Christ gave to His apostles, we conclude that there exists now, and that there will exist to the end of time, a corresponding institution for the preservation of those doctrines, and for the perpetuation of |