consequently his very manner and appearance, under such awkward circumstances, would be against him. The false swearers would come forward, and all would appear plausible and truthful; accorddingly, the man would be condemned to the gallows, and would die innocent, solely because he was undefended by counsel ! The writers on the negative side, in order to argue their case, are bound to imagine that counsel, generally, are an unworthy class of persons. It has been asked what there is in the profession of an advocate, to invest him with power to set aside the great command of God, "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour"? I answer that there is nothing which gives such a power, nor is counsel justified in claiming it. There is a vast difference, however, between trying to show wherein evidence may be imperfect, and affirming that the criminal is, beyond all doubt, innocent. Even if counsel were boldly to plead the innocence of the known guilty party, he would not, then, bear false witness against, but in favour of, his neighbour. So that the command referred to would not exactly meet the case. In the 35th chapter of Numbers, and at the 30th verse, we read, "Whoso killeth any person, the murderer shall be put to death by the mouth of witnesses; but one witness shall not testify against any person to cause him to die." In the 19th chapter of Deuteronomy, and at the 15th verse, it is said, that "one witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity or any sin that he sinneth." So that the Bible is in favour of a criminal being fairly and lawfully tried, by advocating the necessity of more than one witness; and I hold, that if witnesses are requisite, it follows, as a matter of course, that those witnesses ought to be questioned, on the part of a prisoner, by competent persons, or counsel, in order that he may be defended from improper treatment, and his prosecutors be compelled to attempt to prove him legally guilty. "Great men are not always wise” (Job xxxii. 9), and, therefore, judges and juries are liable to mistakes. This being so, every man is entitled to legal assistance, whatever his "iniquity" or "sin may be. L'Ouvrier quotes the opinion of Jeremy Bentham, as to defending a known criminal:-" A man has committed a theft; another man who, without a licence, knowing what he has done, has assisted him in making his escape, is punished as an accomplice. But the lawthat is, the judges by whom in this behalf the law has been madehas contrived to grant to their connections, acting in the character of advocates, a licence for this purpose. What the non-advocate is hanged for, the advocate is paid for, and admired." Now, it has been my lot to be present at numerous trials for theft, &c., and I say, without hesitation, and with perfect confidence, that the knowledge of an accomplice, as to guilt, cannot be compared with the knowledge of an advocate; for the former is acquainted with the fact from presence and sight; whereas, the latter can, under any circumstances, only be aware of it from information furnished to him. Again, the . escape" which an accomplice might effect, would be before, and in order to prevent a trial. But the " escape " which an advocate might succeed in affording would be after that legal proceeding had been gone through, and the "mouth of witnesses" had failed beyond doubt to prove the prisoner guilty; for, it should be remembered, that there ought to be no doubt whatever, when a man's character, liberty, or life happens to be in danger. Further, how inconsistent it would be for counsel to be allowed to act on the part of prosecutors, whereby every point would be fully brought out against the accused, and argued with force and ability, leaving the prisoner without the least protection. Some may, however, say that criminals are such disreputable beings, that they ought to have no favour shown to them. But, on the contrary, it appears to me to be our bounden duty, as Christians, to give every man, however wicked, when placed upon his trial, an opportunity of defending himself in such a way as he may think best; and, if he prefer legal assistance, he should be permitted to obtain it. Better far that a few should escape in this world, on account of the advocacy of counsel, leaving our heavenly Judge and Master hereafter to award such punishment to sinners as seemeth to Him just and proper, than that even one should innocently suffer in consequence of an unfair or imperfect trial, for want of professional assistance. The more we consider the subject under discussion, the more we feel certain of the justice of the view we, and those who think with us, take on this side of the question. R. D. R. NEGATIVE ARTICLE.-III. Ir is amusing to remark the innocence and earnestness with which our leading opponent, "Nona," carries the present literary campaign into a territory altogether neutral. Any one casually reading his clever and argumentative paper might naturally suppose the question to be, "Is counsel justified in endeavouring to limit or diminish the punishment of a criminal of whose guilt he has professionally been made cognizant ?" And such a question would form an admirable groove for the opinions which this writer has expressed. But with the present question they have simply nothing to do. We hold the language, which heralds this discussion, to be sufficiently explicit and precise; that the query-whether an advocate would be justified in endeavouring to defend from punishment an acknowledged criminal?—is only susceptible of one meaning―i.e., whether counsel can be sanctioned in attempting to prove a known criminal's innocence; this being the only means of effecting the desired exemption from punishment, and of meeting the terms of this discussion. The area of debate being thus clearly defined, we, will suppose a criminal to have been arraigned on a charge of murder. His guilt is well known to his counsel, though only, by powerful circumstantial evidence, apprehended by the prosecution. The advocate may entertain an inward horror of capital punishments; he may consider it outrageous that the sacrifice of one life should involve the sacrifice of another; and some romantic idea may have entered his thoughts of a far more preferable method of entombing the guilty in some asylum during the balance of their existence. And in his enthusiasm he may have supposed that such an asylum would be an admirable moral guarantee, excellently adapted for the lustration of a depraved moral character. These rosy views may be entertained and believed with all the tenacity that self-opinionativeness supplies; and the advocate may permit his opinions and his arguments to be swayed by their surging force. But, in allowing himself to be guided by such considerations, he is silently offending against, though not ostensibly opposing, the laws of his country; and is himself, virtually, no inconsiderable offender. Should he prove successful in veiling the deeds of the assassin, the result would necessarily be the acquittal of the prisoner, and a severe wound would thereby be inflicted on public peace and social order. And no private convictions or conclusions ought to bias a question of guilt or innocence, where these convictions and conclusions are oblique to the existing state of the law. The above is the most charitable supposition that we can advance of the conduct of an advocate in defending an acknowledged criminal. Listen, however, to "Nona." "The evidence of a prisoner's guilt being conclusive, it is no less necessary that the law, which he is believed to have vio'ated, be distinct, precise, and perfectly applicable to his case." This the bench themselves will have the most ample means of ascertaining. Following the stream of our opponent's argument, we find it shortly afterwards taking a most unexpected angle into alien territory-as the following:'Not a week elapses but some one is accused upon suspicions almost groundless. Now it is a bank official on a charge of embez zlement, who is afterwards dismissed without the slightest imputation on his character," &c., &c. Any eye, that can discover a connecting link between this excerpt and the text, must certainly be endowed with peculiar power. No one, indeed, questions that an advocate is entirely justified in defending a prisoner whose guilt is doubtful and unconfessed; and when the evidence inclines him to regard the prisoner as innocent of the charge brought against him. We would not have the law, that allows counsel to every prisoner, changed. The morale of the bar ought to prevent the contre-temps of a barrister staining his talents by defending one who has revolted against the laws of his country, and rebelled against the dictates of his Creator. We should have thought it impossible, had we not a visual testimony, that any photographer of thought could have perpetrated such an argument as the following:-"Supposing that the advocate determines to cut the connection" between himself and the criminal, "what is the obvious result? Why, that his client goes to other counsel, from whom he carefully conceals as much as he can; and the chances are, that the ends of justice will be defeated by the latter advancing bold and skilful hypotheses, which he would not have done, had he been better acquainted with the merits of the case." So that any robber might be justified in plundering an individual, if he were assured that others were intending, for the sake of spoil, not only to rob but to murder the man; that, by stripping the intended victim of his property, he would remove a temptation to others, who would not shrink at committing a deadlier deed. If it be wrong to defend a guilty individual, no healthy or unhealthy anxiety to further the "ends of justice" ought to induce him to do so. The principle is one which only a Machiavelli could sanction. We are informed by "Nona" that the law of the land exacts a strict observance of the truth on the part of the advocate. We will not suppose that he directly infringes this requirement-indeed, if he did, it would be entirely useless. Statements of fact, unweighted by evidence, would only afford a banquet of amusement. But there is the utterance of half truths, equivocation, the suppression of facts-and, above all, the ingenious framework of specious argument -all of which are no less infractions of the truth than the most direct falsehoods. When to the foregoing pre-requisites are added a distinct and happy delivery, a continuous cascade of language, a felicitous and delightful imagery, an enthusiastic and vigorous expression, the triumph of the advocate is often complete; and when he has succeeded in saving the guilty one from punishment, when he has triumphed in unloosing upon society a criminal, the fanged thought of it will afterwards afford no pleasure, no satisfaction. Its sting will indeed be felt in every resurrection of the past. Further; forensic talents, perversely employed, inflict no inconsiderable injury on the administration of justice itself. An advocate employing his talents to defeat the "ends of justice "-to release, if by his utmost efforts he possibly can, a person of acknowledged criminality from deserved punishment, is virtually as much a violator of the law as the man who endeavours to obstruct a policeman in the performance of his duty; or as one who attempts to further the escape of a prisoner. All are equally guilty in impeding free action of the law. Can "Nona" imagine the debasing influence which the continual and deliberate defence of admitted criminals must eventually exert on the advocate's character? How every architect of falsehood, and obstructor of justice, must gradually lose his self-respect, and by practice still less hesitatingly enter into a defence of the vile; and with less and less difficulty wildly embark in the most disgraceful sophistries and deceits! We have a witness to the invincibility of our position, far higher than any that mere argument can boast,a witness, to whose autocracy, nations past and present, peoples barbarous and civilized, have willingly submitted-a witness regnant in the minds of the slave and of the free, of the conquered and of the victorious-a witness enthroned in man himself to his eternal conscience we appeal for the decision of this great question. S. E. L. The Essayist. SHAKESPERE FACTS, FANCIES, FORGERIES, AND FABRICATIONS. V. THE FAME, FAMILY, FAITH, AND FRIENDS OF SHAKESPERE. SHAKESPERE was buried in the chancel of the church of the Holy Trinity, Stratford. A flat stone, underneath which his body is said to lie, bears an epitaph in wretched doggerel, traditionally reported to have been "made by himself a little before his death," but worthy only, as De Quincey thinks, of the grave-digger or the parish clerk. The objurgation is certainly more forcible and fierce than gentle, which was the prescriptive characteristic of the dramatist. It is as follows: "Good frend for Jesus sake forbeare, If we doubt the authorship of these verses, is not our doubt made greater by looking on his monument, on the north wall of the church, which bears these lines ? "Judicio Pylium, genio Socratem, arte Maronem, LL Stay, Passenger, why goest thou by so fast? Read, if thou canst, whom envious Death hath plast Obiit Año Do 1616, [Who wrote this inscription, Jonson, Drayton, or Dr. Hall?] At the time of Shakespere's death, his family consisted of his wife; Susanna, married to Dr. Hall, whose only daughter Elizabeth was alive; and Judith, married to Thomas Quiney. On 23rd November, 1616, Judith's son was baptized, in memory of his grandfather, as appears in the register-"Shaksper, filius Thomas Quiny, gen." On 3rd February, 1617, we know that Dr. John Hall, Shakespere's son-in-law, inhabited New Place. On May 8th, 1617, Shakespere Quiney was buried. Anne Hathaway survived William Shakespere seven years. She died on 6th August, 1623, and was buried beside her husband on the |