You inquire, whither are we to look for independent evidence of mind and will "concerned in natural events happening within the range. of the solar system." Certainly not to the court of pure physical science. For that has ruled this case out of its jurisdiction by assuming a fixed dependence of consequent upon antecedent throughout its domain. There are plenty of phenomena to which it cannot assign known causal antecedents; but it supplics their place at once, either by assuming that there is a physical antecedent still unguessed, or by inventing one in an hypothesis. It deals in effects and causes, and knows nothing of ends. It has no verdict to render against our case, for it does not entertain it, and has no jurisdiction under which to try it. But its wiser judges do not insist that theirs is the only court in the realm. We have not to go beyond Nature for a jurisdiction, which may be likened to that of Equity, since it enforces specific performance, and which adds to causes and effects the consideration of ends. Biology takes cognizance of the former, like physics, of which it is on one side a part, but also of ends; and here ends (which mean intention) become a legitimate scientific study. The natural history of ends becomes consistent and reasonably intelligible under the light of evolution. As the forms and kinds rise gradually out of that which was well-nigh formless into a consummate form, so do biological ends rise and assert themselves in increasing distinctness, variety, and dignity. Vegetables and animals have paved the earth with intentions. The study and the estimate of these is quite the same, under whatever view of the mode in which the structures and beings that exemplify them came to be. The highest of these exemplars is himself conscious of ends. He pronounces that critical monosyllable I. I am, I will, I accomplish ends. I modify the outcome of Nature. Here, at length, is something "on the planets" which "has been concerned in events;" and in my opinion it is just now a good and useful theistic view which connects this something with all the lower psychological phenomena that preceded and accompany it. Our wills, in their limited degree, modify the course of Nature, subservient though that be to fixed laws. By our will we make these laws subserve our ends. We momently violate the uniformity of Nature. But we do not violate the law of the uniformity of Nature. Is it not legitimate, is it not inev itable, that a being who knows that he is a will, and a power, and a successful contriver, should explain what he sees around and above him by the hypothesis of a higher and supreme will? A will which has disposed things in view of ends in establishing Nature, and which may, it need be, dispose to particular and timed ends, either with or without perceptible suspension of the law of the uniformity of Nature. The question I ask has been adversely answered, substantially as follows: It may be that in the first instance men can hardly avoid predicating a being who has done and is doing all this. Nevertheless a trained mind soon reaches the incongruity of it, at least "as concerns any events which have happened within the range of the solar system." For the belief that a supernatural power has so acted contradicts that very belief in the uniformity of Nature upon which all scientific reasoning and practical judg ments rest. To this it is well rejoined, that the ultimate scientific belief on which our reason reposes "is that belief in the uniformity of Nature which is equivalent to a belief in the law of universal causation; which again is equivalent to a belief that similar antecedents are always followed by similar consequents. But this belief is in no way inconsistent with a belief in supernatural interference." If the principle of the uniformity of Nature asserted that every natural effect is, and has ever been, preceded by natural causes, then it would be in terms inconsistent with supernatural interference and with supernatural origination of the system. But science does not give us nor find any such principle. All scientific beliefs " are in themselves as true and as fully proved if supernatural interference be possible as they are if such interference be impossible. A law does no more than state that under certain circumstances (positive and negative) certain phenomena will occur. If on some occasions these circumstances, owing to supernatural interference, do not occur, the fact that the phenomena do not follow proves nothing as to the truth or falsehood of the law." If such interference violates the law of the uniformity of Nature, the human will, and all wills, and all direction of material forces to ends, are every day violating it. It is also urged that giving particular direc • Balfour (Arthur). A Defence of Philosophic Doubt, p. 329. The note on the Discrepancy between Religion and Science is particularly pertinent. |